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The New American Tories

A Critique of Nixon's Domestic Program

Alan Trachtenberg

CULTURE AND REBELLION

ENGLAND, OUR ENGLAND

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Dilemmas of Social Democracy

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ROBERT LEKACHMAN writes a column of comment on U.S. domestic affairs in every other issue of DISSENT. Mr. Lekachman is teaching courses in law and economics and in law and poverty at the New York State University at Stony Brook. He has written widely on economics and the social scene and is the author of *The Age of Keynes.*

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Duplicity, Murk and Blood

October 20

THERE IS an essential shoddiness in Richard Nixon's politics that shines out, like fool's gold, from every word he speaks and every step he takes. In domestic policy (Southern school desegregation, tax "reform," Supreme Court appointments, etc.) this is clear enough; and now we can see it in his emerging scheme for Vietnam.

On the one hand, we may expect some withdrawals of troops; steps to decrease the number of battle casualties; reductions of draft quotas; pious statements favoring negotiations. On the other hand: a sustained effort to buttress the Thieu government militarily and politically.

The calculation is simple enough, though not without some cleverness. Nixon's hope is first to mute and scatter antiwar criticism, or at least to confine it to a small segment of peace and student activists. If the fighting declines, if the casualties drop, if not many sons are drafted, then—the expectation runs—there will not be large-scale popular resentment; people will lose interest in the prolonged negotiations and maneuvers; and the second part of the strategy will thereby unfold itself.

To wit: A prolonged holding operation, with 200,000 or 250,000 troops in Vietnam, not trying for "victory" perhaps, but active enough to keep the other side off balance, to prevent a Viet Cong take-over, and to give the Saigon regime sufficient time, money, and power to consolidate itself. That done, the strategy assumes, Hanoi and the Viet Cong will have no choice but to negotiate on terms more favorable to what the Nixon administrations wants. For as Nixon has remarked, he does not wish to be "the first President to preside over an American defeat." On this score, perhaps, we can reassure him: the first President so to preside was named Lyndon Johnson.

Will the Nixon strategy work?

Domestically, it may bring him a breathing spell for a little while, but even that is by no means certain. For we must remember that there is barely present any longer an articulate or coherent body of spokesmen for the U.S. Vietnam policy: McGeorge Bundy has gone ahead to still more glorious disasters, John P. Roche now favors his contemporaries with a valued silence. The students are not likely to be deceived by the Nixon strategy, they want the war to end regardless of who or how many get drafted. The "ordinary voters" may be lulled for a while, but among them one senses a strong common-sense approach: if victory is no longer our goal, then what's the point of more killing? And an increasing number of Democratic party leaders, most of them heroes after the event, are joining in the clamor against Nixon's policy. Gene McCarthy, too, shows signs of coming back to political life.

But the main difficulties in Nixon's policy lie not in the U.S. but in Vietnam. For if the U.S. adopts a wait-and-hold position, what possible motive do the Vietnamese Communists have for accepting terms of negotiations which they already rejected under heavy military pressure? Here the President's dilemma seems insoluble: the very measures that may ease the pressure on him at home must also weaken his efforts to apply pressure on Hanoi. If Nixon is prepared to wait, then so too may the successors of Ho—and probably with greater success.

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An assumption behind the Nixon policy may be, however, that the other side will come to fear the growing strength of the Saigon government and therefore acquiesce in U.S. settlement terms. To deny such a possibility out of hand would be foolish, but to rest a policy on it would be feckless. Given the experience of the last two decades, in which over and over again equivalent expectations were held by U.S. policy-makers, does it not seem likely that the Vietnamese Communists don't have very much to fear from a consolidated Thieu regime?

In a sense, it is Nixon who has more to fear from Thieu and his friends. For as the Saigon government feels more desperate, it will grow more belligerent. A puppet haunted by the fear of abandonment can suddenly put up a show of independence and truculence. It is entirely in the interest of the Thieu clique to prolong the Vietnam stalemate and keep a strong protective cover of U.S. troops. It is in their interest because at some point one can anticipate a desperate response in Washington: "well, the policy of wait-and-hold hasn't worked, so maybe the only choice left is to start increasing military pressure on Hanoi" —in other words, back to the ways of Lyndon. For domestic political reasons this may not be likely, but as long as the Nixon policy is maintained, it continues to be a possibility.

•

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES there is a strong emotional appeal in the idea of a cease-fire in Vietnam, the proposal now being advanced by some Democratic leaders and moderate peace groups. If the negotiations are stalled, their argument runs, then at least let's stop the pointless shedding of blood. And of course, if a cease-fire were possible, then we should all want to be in favor of it. But as a political proposal advanced by the antiwar opposition, cease-fire seems less and less adequate—five years ago, even three years ago, it made more sense. Apart from the inherent difficulties of a cease-fire in a guerrilla war which has no precise boundary demarcations, there is the new and probably decisive fact that *right now* a cease-fire would seem to be a step enabling Nixon's strategy of maintaining a low-casualty but firm military presence in Vietnam. A cease-fire would greatly lessen the pressures on Nixon, while the policy he is initiating has *already* lessened the pressures on Hanoi. Is there any reason to suppose, then, that the Communists would accept a cease-fire?

The central issue remains political, in Senator Fulbright's words: "It does not matter how much we talk about settlement, the war cannot be settled as long as we insist upon maintaining the puppet government in South Vietnam." The Communists continue to insist that a political agreement must precede a military truce. Whether they are "right" or "wrong" about this hardly matters; what matters is that they are in a position to enforce their views. Either the Nixon administration, while engaged in massive troop withdrawals, starts cutting its ties with the Thieu clique and accepts proposals—the exact formula can't here concern us—for a provisional "coalition" or "neutralist" regime, or the war continues. We have no illusions whatever about the character or likely outcome of such a regime; we only say that the war is by far a greater evil.

The President demands a muting of criticism. The President must be denied. And the Vietnam Moratorium of October 15 seems a sufficient indication that he will be denied.

—I. H.

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Robert Lekachman

The New American Tories

A Critique of Nixon's Welfare Program

IN ENGLAND 1795 was a gloomy year. Respectable opinion divided its concern between the wild French revolutionaries, their possible impact upon discontented Englishmen, and the soaring domestic price level. As usual it was worse to be poor and unrespectable. Bread, the staple diet of English working-folk, was so expensive that industrious farm laborers were unable to feed their families.

Economic necessity as well as altruism compelled some sort of official action. One response was that of the justices of the peace of Berkshire who decided to deploy some of the statutory powers over wages and prices which the still-operative Elizabethan Poor Law confided to them. At their May 6, 1795, meeting in the district of Speenhamland the justices fatefully decided that subsidies should be given to the honest and deserving poor, whether or not they were currently employed, on a scale related to the price of bread. This was, if you like, an early version of a guaranteed income.

As the public declaration put the new commitment, when the gallon loaf

> . . . shall cost 1 shilling, then every poor and industrious person shall have for his support 3 shillings weekly, either procured by his own or his family's labour, *or an allowance from the poor rates* [italics added], and for the support of his wife and every other of his family, 1 shilling, 6 pence; when the gallon loaf shall cost 1/6, then 4 shillings weekly, plus 1/10; on every penny which the bread price raises above 1 shilling he shall have 3 pence for himself and 1 penny for the others.

The concept and the scale were widely copied and until the drastic Poor Law Act of 1834 English welfare policy was dominated by the Speenhamland model.

The justices of Berkshire were practical gentlemen of humane inclination. Although they probably thought that they had reconciled the necessities of the poor with the labor requirements of rural employers, events worked themselves out in unexpected directions. The minimum, subsistence wage rapidly became a maximum. Since rural laborers were plentiful, farmers could and did pay below living wages in the justified confidence that public funds would come to the rescue. Lacking incentives to efficient performance, laborers became progressively more demoralized. Squires and other landowners increased their already great power over the rural proletariat. Even the farmers who paid such pitifully inadequate wages did not necessarily benefit because in their second role as ratepayers they were forced to provide the wage supplements necessitated by their own policies.

Speenhamland, in Karl Polanti's judgment, "precipitated a social catastrophe." As a sharp-eyed and fluent 19th-century observer, Harriet Martineau, put it in her *History of England during the Thirty Years' Peace,*

> The poor had become public spoil. . . . To obtain their share the brutal bullied the administrators, the profligate exhibited their bastards which must be fed, the idle folded their arms and waited until they got it; ignorant boys and girls married upon it;

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> poachers, thieves, and prostitutes extorted it by intimidation; country justices lavished it for popularity, and guardians for convenience.

Nobody seems to have worked very hard. Thus,

> Instead of the proper numbers of laborers to till the land . . . the farmers were compelled to take double the number, whose wages were paid partly out of the rates; and these men, being employed by compulsion on him, were beyond his control—worked or not as they chose—let down the quality of the land, and disabled him from employing the better men who would have toiled hard for independence. These better men sank down among the worst; the rate paying cottager, after a vain struggle went to the pay table to seek relief. . . .

The indictment of Speenhamland was not always internally consistent and Miss Martineau undoubtedly exaggerated, although out of better motives than those of some American critics of welfare mothers and relief chiselers. Standards of life, possibly even standards of humanity, are higher in 20th-century America than they were at a poorer time in a poorer country. All the same, it is hard not to recall Speenhamland and its demoralizing effects upon the morale of the rural labor force in the wake of the misguided chorus of praise which has greeted the disastrous Nixon welfare "revolution."

What Mr. Nixon—allegedly influenced by his adviser Daniel Moynihan's discourses on the Tory welfarism of 19th-century England and his own reading of Robert Blake's recent biography of Benjamin Disraeli—proposes to do can be shortly summarized. The President wishes to commit the national government to support of a family of four at the less than magnificent level of $1600 per year, substantially less than half the poverty line minimum of $3550. The grants are to be available only to families that accept employment when it is offered and training when it is not.

As in 19th-century England, the administrators of the scheme will be local officials. In Mississippi and Alabama, mayors and councilmen will define available jobs, suitable training, and appropriate behavior. It will be these worthies who divide the federal bounty between white and black citizens. In Mayor Stenvig's Minneapolis, Mayor Yorty's Los Angeles, possibly in Mayor Procaccino's New York, standards of administration may well shift closer to the Southern model than to the humane, sociologically sophisticated conduct of such professional experts as New York's Mitchell Ginsberg. It can only be interpreted as another discouraging symptom of the ideological disarray in which many liberals find themselves that even qualified noises of approbation have emanated from the throats of such veteran liberals as Hubert Humphrey and Max Lerner. No wonder President Nixon is reportedly astonished at how well his proposals have been received.

One source of confusion is the horribly ambiguous notion of governmental decentralization and local democracy which has won so many adherents on the Left. Let it here be recorded that my admiration for the efficiency of federal bureaucracy is only a trifle larger than my confidence in the liberalism of Congress. Nevertheless, as every radical ought daily to remind himself, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were on domestic issues considerably more enlightened than even the most liberal of recent Congresses, and these Congresses were in turn usually in advance of the bulk of their constituents. There is no dodging the conclusion that the severely-flawed crusades of the 1960s toward racial equality, open educational opportunity, wider distribution of health care, and the elimination of poverty achieved their small successes only because Washington overrode local opposition in state capitols and city halls. Federal legislation, Washington pressure for compliance, national standards, and Depart-

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ment of Justice litigation have been the major counterweights to Southern intransigence, blue-collar resistance to job, school, and housing integration, and rural reluctance to assist the great cities. Not much has been accomplished but still less would have been achieved in the absence of federal pressure. Of this fact conservatives at least have been aware, as their crusades against federal standards on everything from unemployment insurance to billboards along highways amply demonstrate.

AMONG RADICALS the rage for local control has operated to disguise the realities of the large amount of local control already in existence. Every business group knows about local control of complaisant and frequently corrupt legislatures and city governments. Here are obtained contracts, benefits, franchises, and all manner of good things, usually quite out of sight of the national media which occasionally blow the whistle upon thievery on a continental scale.

In our time conservatives have been a good deal more realistic than liberals about the sort of public policy that increases their own welfare or promotes causes they value. Revenue-sharing, a second plank in Nixon's New Federalism, is a convenient example of the generalization. As promulgated in 1964 by two inveterate Democratic economists, Walter W. Heller, then still chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Joseph Pechman of the Brookings Institution, federal revenue-sharing with the states was designed to cope with the "fiscal dividend"—then about $10 billion and now about $15 billion each year to be anticipated from the normal growth of the economy and the equally normal increase of federal receipts from corporate and personal income levies. In those innocent days before Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam war, liberal tax sharers were dreadfully worried that Congress would take the fiscal dividend as a pretext for tax reduction. If it did so, education and other good causes could expect no fiscal benefit from the economy's growth. Heller and Pechman claimed as additional virtues of their scheme relief to hard-pressed states and localities compelled to cope with mounting costs out of a tax system that responded only sluggishly to increases in general prosperity. Moreover, the cause of equity would be served if more money were raised from the mildly progressive federal tax system rather than from the definitely regressive property and sales imposts which are the major revenue sources of cities and states. Heller and Pechman did attach three strings to these otherwise unrestricted grants: use on highway construction was prohibited; periodic audits of state disbursements out of the grants were to be required; most important, states were to be held to compliance with the civil rights acts and the labor standards statutes.

Given a cold shoulder by Lyndon Johnson who had other things on his mind, revenue-sharing was quickly taken up by Congressman Melvin Laird and by Charles Goodell, at the time a still markedly conservative member of the House of Representatives. Why did they and other conservatives welcome an idea whose parents were notorious liberals? The answer possibly emerges when a close look is taken at the actual proposal which President Nixon sent to Congress on August 13, just before that body departed for its ill-earned summer recess. Although I have seen little notice of the omission, *the Heller-Pechman requirement of compliance with civil rights and labor laws has been dropped.* It has been hard enough to get even spotty compliance with civil rights statutes, even when the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has been empowered to cut off the funds of violators or the Department of Justice has been able to institute court enforcement proceedings. Omission here is tantamount to an invitation to states and localities to spend federal funds in any fashion they choose, however unfair to blacks this may turn out to be.

Revenue-sharing is as much a triumph for

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the states over the cities as for segregationists over integrationists. Governors have consistently favored and mayors as consistently opposed unrestricted federal grants made directly to the states. In the present administration plan, the pass-through formula simply freezes existing inequitable state practices by requiring that states pass on to localities the same percentage of new money as their existing aid formulas now confer upon cities and towns. If, as is everywhere the case, state education, health, and highway formulas discriminate against the big cities, the new scheme will leave the discrimination untouched.

The New York situation differs only in scale from city-state relations throughout the nation. Two years ago, on December 22, 1967, John Lindsay wrote an exceedingly plaintive letter to Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Mayors generally write to governors around budget time and the plight of the city was, as usual, grave. The gap between estimated receipts and projected expenditures was $440 million. Congress had taken action to increase New York's public assistance and medicaid burdens. The city badly needed state help. This time the Mayor had an idea about the shape in which the help should arrive—"Urbanaid." Urbanaid, proclaimed the Mayor, "would apply within New York State the fundamental principles of the so-called Heller-Pechman plan for state and local sharing in federal revenues." Mr. Lindsay's mini-Heller plan would have allocated permanently to the localities 27.5 percent of the state's receipts from the personal income tax. Cities like New York which taxed themselves heavily were to get more per capita aid than communities whose tax effort was smaller.

As any student of the Mayor and the Governor could have foretold, Mr. Rockefeller, a fervent Hellerite nationally, ignored the Lindsay initiative, proving yet again that what is sauce for the gubernatorial gander is not necessarily sauce for the mayoral goose. The episode drearily confirms everybody's judgment that the states shortchange the cities and state legislators have scant sympathy for the Sodoms and Gomorrahs within their jurisdictions. There was a brief moment of hope after the Supreme Court's ruling in Baker *vs.* Carr that reapportionment would gradually diminish the inequity of city-state relations. But with time, it has become increasingly plain that the suburbs, which gained most from reapportionment, have found more in common with rural voters than with the big cities from which many suburbanites quite deliberately escaped.

Only categorical grants for specific purposes administered according to national criteria can give direct aid to the cities. Insofar as revenue-sharing comes partially or completely to replace categorical grants (as many conservatives have openly hoped will occur), the power of the states in relation to the central cities will increase and the nation's capacity to pursue a concerted assault upon urban ills will decline. Liberals may protest that the unrestricted grants should merely supplement older categorical grants. Conservatives see and are grasping the chance to weaken social programs which since New Deal days have drawn their sustenance from Washington.

PRESIDENT NIXON, I suppose, deserves credit for composing the first even plausibly coherent conservative program since the simple days of Calvin Coolidge. Since we may have to live with it or in spite of it for some years, we may as well take a look at contemporary conservatism. On inspection it resembles the traditional models. Although responsible conservatives do not deny the existence of social problems, they try to cope with them as inexpensively, grudgingly, and slowly as possible. Since conservatives tend to be skeptical about government's power to alter human attitudes or behavior, their agenda for public action is likely to include little more than protection of property, maintenance of public order, defense of the realm, and highway construction. No-

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body in his right mind expects the federal government to shrink to the insignificance of the prenuclear age. But conservatives will think they have done well if they gain local control over welfare and job training and the gradual pruning of centrally-directed social programs in favor of revenue-sharing.

Coherent conservatism is practical about the sources of its own support and the identity of its constituency. Here again Mr. Nixon deserves a high grade. In the main the President's new policies confer benefits on groups and localities where their sponsor did well in 1968 and hopes to fare still better in 1972. The welfare program does far more for the mean Southern states who usually pay substantially less than the proposed $1600 than for comparatively humane jurisdictions like New York and Connecticut which tactlessly preferred Mr. Humphrey to Mr. Nixon last year. The training and employment hedges around welfare benefits can be readily interpreted to benefit white, middle-class employers of household help and low-paid service and factory workers. According to a calculation made for New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes only 9 percent of the revenue-sharing funds will reach cities over 250,000 in population. The big cities do not like Mr. Nixon. The revenue-sharing formula implies that the President reciprocates the emotion. The President has counted his clientele and tried his level best to please them. What a pity it is that the nation's needs occur most pressingly in the places and among the groups in which these clients are so scarce.

Government is based on the potentiality of coercion. Good conservatives attempt sufficiently to confuse or bribe their opponents so as to stave off open mutiny. But if confusion and corruption falter, conservatives are prepared to employ vigorously the repressive tools of state power. The presence of John Mitchell, Mr. Law and Order as *Newsweek's* cover story dubbed him, in the key office of Attorney General and the Supreme Court appointments of Warren Burger and Clement Haynesworth are Presidential assurances that the administration of justice and the maintenance of public order will be firm, unburdened by humanitarian sentiment, and not unduly attached to individual rights—a "charge" made by Mr. Mitchell against his predecessor, Ramsay Clark. Signs of the new regime are abundant, among them the Department of Justice's preventive detention scheme, its proposed barbaric schedule of penalties for drug violations, its systematic harassment of the Black Panthers, and its breathtaking claim to wiretapping autonomy in so-called national security cases.

I referred earlier to the irony of Republican theft of liberal notions. There is a symmetrical irony on the Right. Businessmen overwhelmingly preferred Nixon to Humphrey. Accordingly they expect great things from their choice. But it is quite likely that the Democrats under Kennedy and Johnson will turn out to have given business far more tax breaks, insisted upon much less antitrust activity, and supplied a climate more friendly to high profits than the Republicans promise soon to furnish. In part this is bad economic luck for the Republicans. For the time being, the need to restrain inflation does justify some measure of federal construction restraint and some continuation of high interest rates. It is what follows that is disquieting. Like the Eisenhower presidency before it, the present administration is prone to stress the limitations of federal revenue sources, the many claims upon these revenues, and the desirability of attaining budgetary surpluses as high employment is neared.

The combination of frugality, suspicion of new social spending, and morbid fear of inflation is likely to return us to another spell of Eisenhower economic sluggishness. Even if the cities do not explode anew as black unemployment soars, sales and profits will surely shrink and the business commu-

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nity become disenchanted with their hero. The fashion in the White House these days is to salute the emergent Republican majority. If my gloomy guess is accurate, a good many of the unyoung and unblack members of that majority will cease to be unpoor and soon afterwards will become un-Republican. If this is the way things go, the emerging Republican majority will be as evanescent, to borrow Daniel Moynihan's language, as the morning clouds over San Clemente.

An Opinion on the New York City Election

The following letter was sent in early October to the New York Times.

TO THE EDITOR:

WE BELIEVE JOHN LINDSAY should be reelected Mayor of New York.

The choices before us do not fill us with joy. We would have much preferred a victory for Herman Badillo. But in the present difficult situation, we think all partisans of democratic social change should vote for Lindsay.

This is not an uncritical endorsement. Mr. Lindsay's conduct of collective bargaining—especially in the transit and sanitation strikes—was often atrocious and a source of needless divisions in the city. Perhaps because of an elitist bias, he has failed to understand the social responses of working-class and lower-middle-class people—responses it would be foolish and self-defeating to dismiss simply as "racist." His Republican allegiance led him to extol the candidacy of Spiro Agnew, the Dixiecrat's hostage in Washington. And his managers have connived in the outrageous removal of two minor socialist parties from the ballot, an action hardly appropriate to a mayor who so frequently indulges in the rhetoric of high-mindedness.

But the other choices are much worse. Marchi and Procaccino are not ideological racists, but they won their nominations by exploiting racist emotions through the tricky and dangerous slogan of "law and order." Marchi, as a conservative, is opposed in principle to the radical innovations the city needs. Procaccino represents the dull-spirited reactionary wing of the Democratic party which was defeated in 1961 and managed to capture the party label in 1969 only because the liberal wing was split. A victory for either of these men would be interpreted nationally as further evidence of a popular drift toward the Right.

On some issues, to be fair, the Mayor has distinguished himself. We entirely agree with him that the Vietnam war is a major issue in this election, first because it has become the single overriding problem for Americans everywhere, and second because New York will not get federal funds for dealing with its problems until the horror in Southeast Asia is brought to an end. The Mayor has also shown a proper sense of social priorities which must prevail when peace comes; we hope he will stick to these convictions even if it brings him into conflict with his own party's President.

For these reasons we urge the large liberal and democratic radical community of New York to vote for John Lindsay. Criticism of his political approach should not be muted, but that criticism will be most profitable if he, and not one of his two undistinguished opponents, is Mayor.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON
IRVING HOWE

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Seymour Melman

The Pentagon Budget as War Policy

Or How to Cut War Expenditure to the Bone

THE SENATE DEBATE last summer on the ABM system was important not only in its own right, but also for the practice it gave senators in evaluating military-political issues. Since the end of the Second World War military budgets have been adopted by the Congress virtually without debate, and 1941 was the last time that a major military proposal (the draft) passed the Senate by a margin of one vote. The narrowness of this margin is a political fact of considerable importance, indicating a shift of attitude both in the country at large and in Washington; it suggests that the day when the Pentagon could get almost anything it wished may now be over.

One of the central themes of the Senate ABM debate was the idea that voting money for military technologies and organizations is tantamount to a vote on foreign policy. The capability conferred by weapons systems is capability for particular international behaviors; giving the Executive this capability has begun to be understood as the functional equivalent of authorizing its use, in accordance with the judgment of the President. What is involved here is the decision-power of the Senate. This element gave the Senate debate on ABM its special quality, apart from such considerations as inflation, national priorities, disillusion with the military performance in Vietnam, and the danger of nuclear war from an escalated arms race. I think it reasonable to expect the concern of senators over their decision-power to be a continuing factor that will produce sustained criticism of Pentagon budgets.

The following is the text of a memorandum I prepared on behalf of SANE and presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations of the House Appropriations Committee. The analysis proceeds from a fundamental statement of the war plans of the United States, i.e., the military contingencies implied by American foreign policy. Present war plans are contrasted to alternatives that are based upon noninterventionism and recognition of the reality of nuclear overkill as a limit on military power.

Obviously, such budget proposals are based upon publicly available data and therefore are subject to error owing to possible duplications among categories, and over- as well as understatement of various components. Nevertheless, I am confident that this memorandum reflects the kind of military budget changes that would be appropriate to a basic revision of war plans (foreign policy) of the United States.

The significance of this analysis will be clear to the reader upon comparing it with the military budget proposals in the August 1969 *Fortune,* which discovered how to reduce the Pentagon's budget by about $17 billion. The difference between that proposal and the one below for a cut of $54 billion is the difference between sustained reliance on military power and intervention as a base for foreign policy, as against rejection of military interventionism and nuclear war.

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MEMORANDUM TO THE U.S. SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, MAY 2, 1969;
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, JUNE 9, 1969

1. THE PROPOSED BUDGETS for national defense for Fiscal Year 1970 amount to $80,815 million (allowing for proposed modifications in the Johnson administration budget by Secretary of Defense Laird, March 16, 1969). This is the largest item in the federal budget and exceeds annual spending for military purposes except those at the peak of the Second World War.

2. In his first official press conference in January 1969, President Nixon announced that, in his view, what the United States required is sufficiency in the realm of defense. Sufficiency means adequacy. Definite, explicit criteria are required in order to define what is enough.

3. Since 1961 the design of the armed forces of the United States has been oriented toward a three-fold requirement:

(1) a war in the NATO area;
(2) a war in the China area;
(3) a lesser military action in Latin America.

Further: the requirement has been that U.S. armed forces should be capable of fighting wars in each of these areas at the same time. This means the conduct of one nuclear war and two conventional wars at once.

4. This combination of military operations does not refer to the defense of the United States. A nuclear war is an end-of-society war. The war in Vietnam, as a model of conventional Far Eastern war is clearly a military, political, economic and moral disaster—a major drain on American society and highly destructive of this nation both materially and morally. Such wars, in combination, are the military requirements in terms of which the Congress has voted funds from 1961 to 1969: to prepare 18 Army Divisions as against 11 in 1961; 11,000 deliverable nuclear warheads for intercontinental effect, as against 1,100 in 1961; 34,000 aircraft, as against 30,000 aircraft in 1961.

5. An evaluation of "sufficiency" for the armed forces of the United States requires a basic definition of the nature of security commitment that is to be served by U.S. military power. The following are alternative criteria of sufficiency for U.S. armed forces:

(1) Operation of a strategic deterrence force.
(2) Guarding the shores of the United States.
(3) Capability for participation in International peacekeeping operations.

6. This memorandum proposes a set of modifications in the Fiscal Year 1970 budget for U.S. military forces on the ground that the above criteria are a sound basis for judging sufficiency of U.S. military security forces. It should be underscored that these criteria do *not* include war plan elements of the following sort; there is no intention here of preparing a nuclear force in such numbers and of such powers as to be calculably competent for a first-strike operation against another nuclear power; these criteria for military sufficiency exclude the intention of preparing armed forces for wars of intervention as in Vietnam.

7. It is emphasized that *after* the substantial reductions recommended here are made for reasons of merit, the armed forces of the U.S. would consist of 2,300,000

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men, and would operate missile, aircraft and naval forces of staggering power. *These reductions are directed toward deescalating additions to already massive overkill forces.*

Proposed Reductions of Department of Defense and Related Spending by Deescalation of Present Overkill Forces and Other Wasteful Practices.

A. *Incremental costs of the Vietnam war.* The additional military spending owing to the operation of the Vietnam war refers to the using up of ammunition, material and people directly or indirectly connected with the Vietnam war. This amounts to $20 billion per year. The Congress should reduce the budget of the Department of Defense by this amount as an instruction to the Department and to the President to terminate this war. $ 20 bill.

B. *Reducing additions to strategic overkill.* It is generally appreciated that no present or foreseeable research effort will make it possible for the armed forces of the United States, or any other nation, to destroy a person or a community more than once. Nevertheless, the nuclear forces and delivery systems of the United States have been built up with multiples of overkill. The exact number is, of course, unknown since we have not observed a full-scale nuclear war. Such observation is not required, however, to understand that with present capability for delivering 11,000 nuclear warheads to the territory of the Soviet Union refers mainly to 156 Soviet cities of 100,000 or over. The systems include various long- and short-range missile systems, aircraft and submarines. To continue a buildup of these forces is grossly wasteful, not to mention irrational. Accordingly the following reductions in proposed budgeted expenditures are recommended:

1) *New nuclear weapons production.* The proposed budget for the Atomic Energy Commission includes funds for further production of nuclear materials and for further production of nuclear weapons. This activity should simply be stopped as being militarily and humanly irrational (*Budget of the U.S. Government, 1970*, p. 80). $ 1,518 mill.

2) *Research, development, test and evaluation.* The descriptive material in the *Budget* (pp. 265, 266) indicates that the major part of new military research activity is oriented to new strategic weapons delivery systems. This is part of the proliferation of overkill forces which has no rational justification whatsoever (except to keep managerial-industrial empires intact). Accordingly a substantial reduction is recommended in this budget line. $ 5,000 mill.

3) *Poseidon and Minuteman III.* These "new generation" intercontinental missiles would make possible a multiplication of nuclear warheads beyond the present 11,000, and perhaps allow for an increased calculated accuracy. A few hundred yards closer to calculated target in such weapons should be appreciated against the fact that their destructive power extends over miles. Accordingly, a reduction is recommended to cut off this enlargement of overkill forces. $ 1,000 mill.

4) *ABM.* The proposed antiballistic missile system has been the subject of exhaustive debate. The technical workability of the system is under grave doubt on the grounds of complexity and in terms of the experience with an unsuccessful attempt to build an antiaircraft defense system. The antiaircraft system involves much simpler requirements, and we know from a principal designer of this system (Dr. Jerome Weisner of MIT)

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that this system has failed. There is the further prospect that the construction of an ABM system will serve to severely escalate fear among nations and hence drive forward an already irrational arms race. Accordingly, the budgeted items for their purpose (*Budget,* pp. 264, 265, 266) are recommended for elimination. $ 904 mill.

5) *Chemical and Biological warfare.* Since 1961 the United States has been producing and stockpiling increasing quantities of these lethal materials. Outside Denver, 100 million doses of nerve gas have been placed in open storage in steel containers. The mass production of these and biological warfare materials means more overkill weapons systems. In addition, the very existence of these materials in quantities exposes the people of the United States itself to grave hazards because of possible accidents in the handling of lethal, self-propagating organisms. It is therefore recommended that this production be stopped: $ 350 mill.

6) *Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft.* In the face of already existing massive overkill capability the proposal to build additional and new high-speed bombers is organizational and industrial empire-building and little else. This should be terminated. $ 102 mill.

7) *Bomber defense system (SAGE).* It has long been understood that the Soviets do not have meaningful long-range bomber capacity. When this is coupled with the known defects in the operation of the SAGE-type system there is no reason for incurring the large cost that building this would involve since it would apparently add nothing meaningful to the defense of the United States (see discussion in the *Congressional Quarterly,* June 28, 1968). $ 1,000 mill.

8) *Surface to air missiles.* Former Pentagon staff have indicated that substantial savings could be made by holding back on major spending for ineffective antiaircraft missiles, and deferring production on apparently inadequate designs (see the discussion on surface-to-air missiles in the *Congressional Quarterly, op. cit.*). $ 850 mill.

9) *The Manned Orbiting Laboratory.* This is an Air Force venture that is NASA's task on the scientific side, and an addition to overkill if used to add to nuclear delivery. Hence, reduction is recommended. (See Robert Benson, "How the Pentagon Can Save $9,000,000," *Washington Monthly,* March 1969.) $ 576 mill.

C. *Reduction in additions to conventional war overkill.*

1) *Vietnam war manpower.* The Vietnam war now uses 639,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen. As the Congress instructs the Department of Defense and the President to refrain from operating wars of intervention, these 639,000 men would not be required. Their termination (annual cost of about $10,000 per man) would leave the United States with armed forces of 2,900,000 and an opportunity to effect a major reduction in an unnecessary military outlay. $ 6,390 mill.

2) *Surplus military manpower.* Analysts in the Department of Defense have reported (see *Congressional Quarterly*) that substantial savings could be made in manpower in all the services by a 10 percent cut in "support" forces, which use a lion's share of military manpower and have been unjustifiably large compared with other armies of the world. In addition

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manpower savings could be effected by imposing a requirement to reduce the large category of "transient" personnel. These combined reductions in the Army, Navy and Airforce would make possible a reduction of $4.2 billion, allowing for a cost of $10,000 per man year. $ 4,200 mill.

3) *Tactical aircraft programs.* Specialists in the aviation field have indicated that elimination of overly elaborate and impractical electronic systems and concentration on simpler (hence more reliable) aircraft would make possible savings on a large scale. (See details in Benson, *op. cit,* and *Congressional Quarterly, op. cit.*) $ 1,800 mill.

4) *Attack carriers.* The United States now operates 15 attack carrier forces. Their justification is based on the assumption of fighting three wars at once. Even a beginning of reasonable economy in the use of these forces (see details in *Congressional Quarterly, op. cit.*) make possible substantial budget reductions. $ 360 mill.

5) *Antisubmarine carrier forces.* These forces are known to have severely limited capability in their military function, casting grave doubt on the worth of continuing them, according to Pentagon specialists. $ 400 mill.

6) *Amphibious forces and Fast Deployment Logistics Ships (FDL).* The amphibious forces are massively overbuilt (see *Budget,* p. 75) and are presumably oriented to a Western hemiphere war mission. These could be substantially reduced without reducing a massive military capability. The FDLs are part of an expanded Vietnam wars program that should be stopped by the Congress (see *Congressional Quarterly, op. cit.*). $ 500 mill.

7) *C5–A jet transport.* This plane has been specifically designed to transport large numbers of troops for the Pentagon's worldwide policing and Vietnam wars program. This capability should be curtailed. $ 500 mill.

8) *Military assistance.* For some time it has been apparent that the U.S. military assistance program has been a major factor in encouraging and sustaining dictatorial and backward regimes in many countries. This outlay has no demonstrable relation to the defense of the United States and should therefore be eliminated. $ 610 mill.

9) *New naval ship construction.* We are informed in the *Budget* (p. 77) that "The largest single 1970 increase proposed for General Purpose Forces is for a new ship construction program for our naval forces of $2.4 billion total obligational authority." Such massive expenditures for naval forces is justifiable only in terms of the 3-wars-at-once military perspective. Even first steps toward building a military sufficiency force, as against a military overkill force for 3-wars-at-once, requires elimination of this item. $ 2,400 mill.

10) *Economies in Training.* A former Pentagon staffer (Office of Comptroller) recommends changes in training methods that would save an appreciable sum as against present methods and costs (see Benson, *op. cit.*) $ 50 mill.

11) *Improved buying procedures.* A series of straightforward steps can apparently produce major savings in Pentagon buying—by curtailing the pattern of costly cost-overruns. (See Benson, *op. cit.,* for details.) Therefore the following Procurement reduction is indicated. $ 2,700 mill.

12) *U.S. NATO forces.* Pentagon staff indicate feasibility of reducing

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forces in Europe by 125,000 and their backup by 50,000. (See Benson, *op. cit.*) At $10,000 cost per man, this justifies budget reduction of $ 1,750 mill.

D. *Miscellaneous economies.*

1) *Military construction.* The Budget for FY 1970 (p. 266) enumerates diverse purposes for which new military construction has been scheduled. Secretary of Defense Laird proposed a reduction of the $1,948 million military construction item by $634 million, leaving $1,314 million. This should be further reduced in order to limit the further overexpansion of unnecessary military forces within the United States and abroad—in terms of the requirements of defense sufficiency. $ 1,000 mill.

2) *F–14 aircraft.* The Navy has announced a program for constructing a new class of fighter planes to be carried by its major aircraft carriers. These fighter planes are of doubtful worth since there is no present or potential opposing force with fleets of carriers against which U.S. carrier forces and fighter planes will conceivably be operated. Furthermore, the enlargement of the carrier aircraft force involves a major addition to preparations for further Vietnam-type wars. This alone is the issue with respect to this aircraft (not whether the design is right, or whether the contractor is competent). The *Budget* for FY 1970 (p. 264) suggests the amount intended for this purpose. This should be eliminated. $ 834 mill.

The sum of these proposed savings in the military spending of the United States for FY 1970 is: $54,794 mill.

A Sufficiency Security Force for the United States

A second approach that can be used by the Congress for considering defense expenditures is a yardstick of adequacy for designing a United States security force. A security force should be designed for the United States to serve three requirements:

(1) operate and maintain a strategic deterrence force;

(2) give reasonable security for the shores of the United States;

(3) have capability for participating in international peacekeeping operations.

Such a force is designed, with its nuclear capabilities, to give pause to any potential attacker of the United States. Its coastal patrol and allied defense forces give solid assurance against attack on the shores of this country. Finally, the mobile, combat units proposed in this security force give highly competent capability both for the defense of the United States and for participation in international peacekeeping.

I have estimated the direct, combat manpower requirements for an American security force along these lines as follows:

	(Men)
Strategic Deterrence Forces	
International Warning Net	25,000
Strategic Weapons System Operations and Maintenance	10,000
Coastal Defense	
Warships for patrol	7,500
Coastal Air-Patrol—Tactical	2,400
Airborne Combat Units for International Peacekeeping	
100 Autonomous Airborne Combat Units	40,000
Tactical Air-Ground Support	16,000
Air Transport	10,000
	110,900

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With direct combat personnel of 111,000 there is requirement for support staffs for the ordinary military headquarters and backup functions including: combined headquarters, intelligence, communication, engineering, logistics, procurement, training and recruitment, research and medical. Such support forces can be estimated on the ratio of 5 to 1, or more elaborately estimated on the basis of 7 to 1. On the former basis the total security force with supporting personnel would amount to 666,000; with the larger allowance for support the total force would require 888,000 men. This security force for the U.S. would require high-caliber voluntary enlistees on a career basis. Conscription would be irrelevant and inappropriate. The annual operating cost of such a security force would be about $20,000 million.

Altogether, such a security force for the United States would have formidable military capabilities for deterring any potential nuclear attack, for securing the United States against physical penetration from the outside, and for deploying highly competent airborne battalions for local defense and for international peacekeeping.

The Armed Services Committees of the Congress could consider the design of a security force along these lines, using it as a yardstick against which to gauge present and subsequent budget proposals. It is underscored that this security force is designed to operate *before* international disarmament agreements of any sort are completed.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS given above for savings in Fiscal Year 1970 military programs of the United States are justified on the following grounds:

1. Present forces are more than sufficient to serve as a competent security force for the United States.
2. The Congress should stop the armed forces from adding to overkill.
3. The Congress should stop preparation for more Vietnam wars.
4. No conceivable armed forces can do more than help to secure the U.S. in a military sense. Defense as a literal shield is no longer purchasable. The Joint Chiefs do not promise to defend the U.S.—they cannot do it. Neither can they promise a nuclear war "victory," for a "successful first-strike" without one's own destruction is not achievable.
5. The Congress, through these budget reductions, can make available a large fund that is needed for productive, life-serving purposes within the United States.
6. Only by these means can the American people cope constructively with the nation's massive problems of economic development and forestall the dread prospect of racial confrontation in this land.

The application of recommended savings to these purposes could probably be accomplished, swiftly, by translating these savings into major tax reductions. This would permit the cities and the states to use their existing taxing mechanisms for tapping this new source of tax power and applying these funds to the urgent needs of our own people.

[NOTE: *The Recommendations for reducing the Pentagon budget by $3 million, made by Secretary of Defense Laird in August 1969, confirm the qualitative judgments made here on nuclear overkill forces, military manpower, antisubmarine forces, carrier task forces, amphibious forces, size of the Navy, and military research and development.—S. M.*]

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England, Our England

The two articles below present sharply different judgments—though at some points similar analyses—of the problems of the British Labour government. David Marquand is a young Labour MP, and one of the most stimulating publicists of the movement; he offers, from a "revisionist" point of view, some notable revisions of "revisionist" doctrine. Bernard Rosenberg, an editor of DISSENT *who spent last year in England, has some caustic things to say which parallel the views of the traditional Labour Left. We hope for further comment on these topics, since they reflect a deep-going crisis within the socialist movement, not only of England but of many European countries.*—ED.

David Marquand

The Dilemmas of "Revisionist" Social Democracy

"A SPECTER is haunting Europe," mocked Anthony Crosland in an attack on the traditional Left of the British Labour party nearly ten years ago, "the specter of revisionism." Crosland was the leading theorist on the right wing of the party, and his boast seemed well-founded. All over Western Europe, the traditional Marxist Left was on the defensive. Socialist parties were abandoning their old belief in the class war and the expropriation of the property owner. Revisionism was in the ascendant in Holland, West Germany, and Scandinavia. Even in Britain, where Hugh Gaitskell failed to persuade his party to repudiate its formal commitment to wholesale public ownership, the Left was emotionally and intellectually on the defensive. The revisionists had the self-confidence and the élan, as well as the arguments. They recognized that it would be a long and difficult task to convert the rest of the labor movement, but they had little doubt they would do so in the end or that, having done so, they would gradually reshape British society in the image of reformist social democracy.

Ten years later, Crosland's mockery has a hollow ring. In terms of political power, the revisionist analysis has been triumphantly vindicated. Revisionist or quasi-revisionist leaders are firmly in control in most important social democratic parties. Revisionists hold or have held ministerial office in three of the four largest countries in Western Europe. It is still as true as it was ten years ago that—outside the Third World, and perhaps even there—the alternative to revisionist democratic socialism is not revolution, but reaction. But although the revisionist road remains the only road toward a fairer and more humane society in Western Europe and North America, a disquietingly large proportion of the radical intelligentsia no longer seems to want it. Those who do, no longer display the self-confidence of ten years ago. Emotionally, though not intellectually, revisionism is on the defensive now; among the radical young, the specters haunting Europe are those of Che Guevara, Her-

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bert Marcuse, and (even more astonishingly) Mao Tse-tung.

At the same time, the traditional Marxist or quasi-Marxist Left has turned out to be a good deal more resilient than most revisionists expected. In West Germany, it is true, traditional Marxism seems to be as discredited as ever; and the political muscle of the far Left, as well as its emotional fervor, comes from the campus revolutionists in the New Left. But in France the Communist party has kept its share of the working-class vote despite ten years of rising living standards; in Italy the Communists have gained voters at the expense of the Socialists. In Britain, the Communist party is as impotent electorally as always; but the traditional, quasi-Marxist Left remains firmly extrenched in the trade unions, and won at least two major victories at the latest TUC Congress this September.

The result is that revisionist democratic socialists now face a much more difficult task than they did ten years ago. Then their opponents were a forlorn and dwindling minority of activists, clinging to traditional beliefs less because they seriously hoped to carry them into effect than because they could not bear the thought of giving them up. The strongest card of the far Left was nostalgia. Its symbols and rallying cries were echoes from the past, not signposts to the future. Far more than French Gaullists, British Conservatives, or German Christian Democrats, it drew its inspiration from a mythical golden age when villains were really villainous and heroes really heroic. Except to the eye of love, its hopes, its policies, and its social and economic assumptions were all patently irrelevant to the society it purported to want to change. It was, no doubt, an albatross upon the labor movement; but it could reasonably be expected to fall off of its own accord.

None of this is true today. The ideology of the student Left is as irrelevant to contemporary industrial society as the ideology of the traditional Left in the 1950s. But it is irrelevant in a different way—in space, not time. Che Guevara is as useless a symbol for the labor movement in Western Europe and North America as the Paris Commune or the Petrograd Soviet were. But he is useless and dangerous because he is irrelevant to the problems of an advanced industrial society, not because he is irrelevant to the mid-twentieth century. In any case, it was not only the irrelevance of revolutionary socialism that crippled the far Left of ten years ago. It was also its inhumanity and immorality; and that, too, is now much less obvious than it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Ten years ago, the horrors of Stalinism were alive and real, even to the younger generation of socialists. In my own case, for example, though I was only nineteen the year Stalin died, the labor camps, the show trials, and even the Kronstadt rising were somehow part of my own immediate political experience. Emotionally, I came at the tail end of the generation whose hopes were betrayed in the Spanish Civil War, the generation that liberated Belsen and Buchenwald and learned where the exaltation of emotion at the expense of reason could lead, and that watched in horror while the social democrats of Eastern Europe were murdered. I did not need to learn from history books that even an unjust society is usually better than anarchy, that force and terror are inseparable from revolution, and that revolutions devour their children; the lesson was part of the environment in which I grew up. That environment no longer exists. The terror and tragedy of the thirties and forties seem as remote to a generation that was not even born at the time of the Berlin blockade as the Boer War seemed to me—or as the terror and tragedy of the French Revolution seemed by 1848.

The difficulties which today's revisionist social democrats face in confronting the traditional Left are different, but almost as great. Ten years ago, most revisionists took it for granted that affluence would produce

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embourgeoisement, and that *embourgeoisement* would sustain revisionism. Rising living standards, they argued, would diminish felt inequalities and lower-class barriers. Industrial workers would continue to have conflicts of interest with shareholders or managers, and it would still be necessary for them to defend their interests by belonging to trade unions and voting for left-wing parties. But as their style of life approximated more and more closely that of the middle class, the bitter memories of the past would subside and the slogans of the class war lose their appeal.

THESE PROPHECIES have been borne out only in part. In Britain, at least, rising living standards have not led to *embourgeoisement,* except in the most trivial sense. The affluent worker who owns a car and a washing machine does not, for that reason, think of himself as middle-class or adopt middle-class values. The old slogans of the class war have acquired a different psychological meaning from what they had 30 years ago, but they have not lost their power. It is doubtful that the traditional Left—either in the trade unions or in the Labour party—looks forward in any serious sense to the disappearance of the capitalist system, or expects to take part in an apocalyptic "final conflict" with the *bourgeoisie.* But although the messianic vision that once lay behind the slogans of the class war has evaporated, it has left a harsh sediment not likely to disappear in the near future.

In many industries, the effective representatives of working-class opinion—the shop stewards who wield power in day-to-day negotiation with employers—still use the old slogans as a bargaining weapon, and get results by doing so. Nor do the slogans appeal only to those with personal experience of the bad old days, or evoke a response only in obsolescent industries suffering from the effects of technological change. On the contrary, there is some evidence—albeit sketchy and impressionistic—that they appeal more strongly to the generation grown up since the war than they do to those who actually lived through depression and mass unemployment. There is no doubt at all they are at least as potent in the advanced and thriving automobile industry, for example, as in "traditional" industries like the docks or coal mines. The old, embittered ghosts still walk. They no longer beckon men to a utopian future, but they still give an edge of bitterness to the ordinary conflicts of industrial life and, in doing so, sustain the old psychology of "us" and "them."

A vital link in the revisionist chain is missing. A significant proportion of the working class has adopted a middle-class style of life without adopting middle-class values. It enjoys the fruits of welfare capitalism, but it angrily disputes its legitimacy. The class war is no longer fought with cavalry. Instead, the army has entrenched itself in the mud of a psychological Western Front.

This has not invalidated the rest of the revisionist analysis, but it has made the revisionist position much more uncomfortable politically than most revisionists expected. They were wrong in thinking that the class war would end of its own accord. They were right in believing that a political party that continued to wage it would be doomed to sterility. A significant proportion of the working class still responds to the old, class-war slogans, but even so, the working class is steadily dwindling. The real enemy of the traditional Left, it has turned out, is not the disappearance of traditional working-class attitudes produced by rising living standards, but the disappearance of traditional working-class occupations produced by technical change.

For the forseeable future, left-wing parties will still need working-class votes if they are to have any hope of achieving power. But there will be fewer working-class votes to win, and as a result, the Left will increasingly have to appeal to other

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sections of the population as well. What the revisionists said is as true now as when they first said it. But the survival of traditional, class-war attitudes makes it much more difficult to create an effective coalition—capable of appealing at the same time to a diminishing army of blue-collar workers and a growing army of white-collar ones—than it seemed ten years ago.

The unexpected resilience of the traditional Left, in other words, is not just an irritating quirk of social history. It is a major political challenge. The same applies, though for different reasons, to the upsurge of the revolutionary New Left. In terms of votes at general elections and seats in parliaments, it presents no threat. Abuse from the German New Left has not cost Willy Brandt a single vote; abuse from its equivalents in Britain would benefit Harold Wilson far more than harm him. Nor does it present a significant threat in terms of ideas. In depressing contrast to its precursors of ten years ago, the student Left of today appears to have turned its back on the hard work of social and political analysis in favor of the delights of political protest and an emotional communion of souls. The values it appears to exalt are nonintellectual, if not anti-intellectual; in terms of the long history of socialist theory it represents not so much a dead end as a Gadarene leap.

But although this neo-Marxist revivalism need not be taken seriously, politically or intellectually, it should be taken very seriously in less obvious ways. Put at its lowest, the alienation of a significant proportion of the left-wing intelligentsia of the developed world from the only left-wing parties with any hope of holding power would be a tragic human loss. Parties of the Right can afford to do without intellectuals, because they can afford to do without ideas. Parties of the Left which try to emulate them end up as bodies without heads. The labor movement came into existence as an alliance between the organized working class and the radical intelligentsia. Both are still essential to success, if success is defined in any but the most superficial way. The Labour party might continue to hold power without a single intellectual in its ranks. It would do so as an increasingly bureaucratic and conservative political machine, not as a vehicle for social change.

There is a dilemma at the heart of gradualist social democracy which has to be faced anew in every generation. Socialist aims can only be achieved by consent: consent can only be obtained by working within existing society, and trying to modify it piecemeal. A socialist party which tries to achieve its aims by force ends as a totalitarian monstrosity, as the Russian Bolsheviks did. A party which combines a revolutionary ideology with democratic methods ends with the worst of both worlds, as the German Social Democrats did before 1914. But there is another trap, of an opposite kind. A party which accepts the need to win over a majority in the society risks absorbing the values of that society, and may become an apologist for the system it came into existence to change. All socialist parties have to steer between the Scylla of "revolutionary" sectarianism and the Charybdis of "democratic" complacency. If the student Left got its hands on the tiller, the labor movement would be heading for Scylla inside two minutes. If it does not even take part in the voyage, the rest of us are that much more likely to drift—just as disastrously—in the opposite direction.

This does not mean that revisionist social democrats should make any concessions to their opponents on the far Left. What it does mean is that we can no longer take our constituency for granted. We must recognize that the traditional Left is not going to drown in a sea of refrigerators and television sets. We must face the fact that many of those whom we expected to follow in our footsteps find our ideas barren and our values corrupt. We must, in short, reopen the old struggle against revolutionary utopianism and class-war dogmatism which

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we thought our intellectual ancestors had won long ago.

IN ANY SUCH STRUGGLE, the record of the present Labour government in Britain seems certain to be one of the main bones of contention. The British Labour party is the strongest social democratic party in the world. It was the 1945 Labour government which finally proved that socialist aims could be translated into action without violence or terror—not only in remote New Zealand or placid Sweden, but even in a large and notoriously conservative country. It was British socialists like Anthony Crosland and John Strachey who developed the most comprehensive critique of the traditional Marxist belief in the inevitability of the class war and the necessity of wholesale nationalization. If revisionism makes sense anywhere, it ought to make sense in Britain: if its claims are valid at all, they ought to be borne out by the record of a British government in which so many distinguished revisionists hold high office.

For that very reason, this record is already a matter of intense controversy. The government is savagely attacked, both by what I have called the traditional Left and the New Left. Beneath all the sound and fury, one criticism stands out. The Wilson government, says the Left, has sacrificed the interests of the working class to the demands of international finance. It has imposed a wage freeze on the trade unions and flirted with legislation against unofficial strikes. It has introduced charges in some social services and cut down expenditure in others. It has held back economic growth and allowed unemployment to rise. And it has done all this because the foreign bankers have forced it to, as the price for supporting sterling. But there is nothing odd about that. Foreign bankers are, after all, capitalists; they cannot be expected to approve of a socialist government, and they have been determined to prevent it from carrying out socialist policies. Like the unfortunate 1929 government, in fact, the Wilson government has discovered that it is not possible to carry out a socialist program when the "commanding heights" of economic power are in nonsocialist hands. In doing so, the Left critique runs, it has disproved the most important part of the whole revisionist argument.

So far, the traditional Left and the New Left agree. The New Left, however, goes much further. The conclusion the traditional Left draws from its analysis of the failures of the present government is that the Labour party should return to its old socialist faith. The conclusion drawn by the New Left is that it should be replaced. The weakness and cowardice of the Wilson government, says the New Left, are not accidental. All Labour governments are weak and cowardly; and they are weak and cowardly because the Labour party itself is weak and cowardly. Ramsay MacDonald, Clement Attlee, Harold Wilson—the faces are different, but the policy is the same. The left wing of the Parliamentary Labour party, which sustains the Wilson government in power as it previously sustained the Attlee and MacDonald governments, is as guilty as the right wing; in some respects it is even more guilty. It is useless and self-defeating to work within the Labour party and try to push it to the left. What is needed, says the New Left, is an entirely new movement.

This disagreement is of more than academic interest. For the New Left has taken the traditional Left's analysis to its logical conclusion. The central proposition, common to both, is that the Wilson government has been prevented from carrying out socialist policies because the levers of economic power—in Britain, and still more abroad—are in the hand of its enemies. If this is true of the Wilson government, it would presumably be true of any socialist government. If the socialist government concerned were more radical than the Wilson government, the holders of economic power would be even more hostile. If even

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the Wilson government has been forced to water down its already inadequate program by the need to conciliate foreign holders of sterling, a left-wing socialist government would be under much greater pressure to do the same. By definition, such a government would refuse to give in. But this would entail far more hardship for the British people than the fairly mild austerities inflicted on them in the last five years.

The reason the Wilson government has had to pay so much attention to confidence factors is that for some years the British people have been consuming too much of their national income, and exporting too little. This government was able to soften the blow involved in putting this situation right by borrowing abroad. But a government that decided to ignore confidence factors altogether would no longer be able to borrow; and the only alternative would be a drastic cut in consumption, which would make the measures introduced by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer look like chicken feed. A cut in current consumption of the size that would be necessary is almost inconceivable in a democracy in peacetime. The traditional Left in this country eschews violence, and is firmly committed to parliamentary methods. Even so, a government that would attempt to carry out its program in defiance of the international economic system, of which this country is a part, would almost certainly be forced into totalitarian paths.

But this only proves that the left-wing alternative is no pleasanter than the present strategy. It does not prove that the left-wing critique of the Wilson government is wrong. If revisionism is to mount an effective counterattack on the far Left, it must rebut that critique more positively than I have tried to do so far. In particular, it must rebut the two central charges—that the government has failed to carry even its own reformist program into practice, and that it has failed to do this because economic power is still in the hands of its enemies. Can this be done?

The answer is that it can, but in a curiously paradoxical way. Labour's program in the 1964 election consisted of two parts. Borrowing from the revisionist analysis of the late 1950s, the party had put its faith in economic growth, as the necessary prerequisite for social reform. The task of a socialist government was to be two-fold: first, to produce a higher rate of growth, and second, to spend the proceeds on attacking the Galbraithian imbalance between private affluence and public squalor. Most socialists would probably agree that the second part of this program, which said that the fruits of growth should be spent on attacking inequality and injustice, was much more distinctively "socialist" than the first part, which merely said that the sluggish growth rate Britain had enjoyed under the Conservatives should be increased. The paradox is that the government has been far more successful in carrying out the second part of the program than in carrying out the first, and that it is precisely because of this that it has been so bitterly attacked by the Left.

The Galbraithian imbalance can only be put right by increasing public expenditure. Under this government public expenditure has in fact increased—both absolutely and as a proportion of the national income. When the government came into power, it produced a National Plan covering the period from 1965 to 1970. This plan envisaged that public expenditure would increase at approximately the same rate as the national income. In the event, the national income has grown much more slowly than the government hoped. Despite recurrent "cuts" in spending programs, however, public expenditure as a whole has grown at approximately the forecast rate. *In other words, the government has carried out a much greater shift of resources from the private sector to the public than it promised to do.* Instead of being applauded for sticking to its socialist guns, however, it has been

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bitterly attacked for cutting working-class living standards. The reason, of course, is that in order to allow public expenditure to increase in this way it has been necessary to keep down the increase in private consumption to a much lower rate than that of the recent past. And in a society that has grown accustomed to a steady and apparently automatic increase in private consumption, a sudden fall in the rate of increase seems like an infringement on natural justice.

THE IMPLICATIONS are clear. Thirty years ago, the labor movement represented a great army of "have-nots," confronting a minority of "haves." Today, the "have-nots" are a minority. In Britain, as in the U.S., by far the ugliest feature of the affluent society is the cruel and growing gap between certain minorities of poor people—the old, the disabled, the mentally retarded, the parents of large families, the possessors of colored skins—and a comfortable majority. That gap cannot be closed merely by soaking the rich, however desirable soaking the rich may be on other grounds. It can only be closed by a deliberate redistribution of income, away from the comfortable and toward the poor. In a democracy, this can only be done if the majority —or at least a significant part of the majority—agree. And the moral of the last five years of British history is that the majority are not going to agree unless the overall rate of growth is high enough for their own living standards to improve in absolute terms while the redistribution is carried out. The revisionists of ten years ago were wrong in thinking that a high rate of growth would automatically induce social inequality and class tension. But they were right in thinking that a low rate of growth would fortify them both. Growth and social justice do go hand in hand—though not for the reasons the revisionists imagined.

Then why has this government not produced a much higher rate of growth? The left-wing answer is simple: because the bankers have prevented it from carrying out an expansionist policy. The truth is more prosaic and infinitely more complicated. Before 1964, the Labour party had worked out a reasonably comprehensive strategy for modernizing and restructuring the British economy. What it did not do was to accompany that strategy with a strategy for the balance of payments. In particular, it failed to reckon with the possibility that a high rate of growth at home would be incompatible with the existing exchange rate. Hence its refusal to devalue the pound in 1964, when it inherited the Conservative balance of payments deficit, and in 1966, when it became clear that it could only maintain the $2.80 parity at the cost of severe deflation.

The low growth rate of its first three years in office was the result. Since devaluation, the rate of growth has been high by British standards. The government has had to disinflate the economy to prevent a runaway boom, which would erode the competitive advantage devaluation brought and frustrate the necessary switch of resources to exports. But the purpose of the exercise is not to hold back growth. It is to ensure that growth is export-led. If devaluation succeeds—and the signs are that it will—Britain will at last be able to escape from the balance-of-payments straitjacket that has condemned her to a low rate of growth since the middle fifties.

The government's unwillingness to devalue in 1964 or 1966, moreover, was not the result of some sinister capitalist conspiracy. It was the result of a complex network of attitudes and emotions—to be found in every social class and every political party. The crucial argument against devaluation was not strictly economic or strictly political, but a mixture of the two. Britain, it was said, was not India or even France. Britain was a major trading nation; sterling was a major reserve currency. A British devaluation—unlike an Indian or

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French one—might cause such chaos in the international monetary system that the whole world would be the poorer, including Britain herself. This argument, it is important to note, was not wholly without foundation. Sterling *was* a major reserve currency: Britain's devaluation *did* cause a much greater disturbance to the international monetary system than other devaluations have done. Nevertheless, it was based on a disastrous misunderstanding. Consciously or unconsiciously, those who used it—like those who used the parallel argument in favor of maintaining a British presence in the Far East—still thought of Britain as a world power, with a world role and world responsibilities. It was this misunderstanding—honorable, moving, sometimes even noble—which lay behind the government's foreign and economic policies from 1964 to 1967. And the misunderstanding was, and is, at least as common on the left wing of the labor movement as on the right.

This is the real moral of the last five years. Politically and militarily, Britain's retreat from empire was almost complete by 1964. Psychologically it had barely begun. Five years later, after the withdrawal from east of Suez and the devaluation of 1967, the old bugle calls no longer sound through the corridors of Westminster and Whitehall; and on a superficial view, policy-makers are thoroughly reconciled to their disappearance. But even now the adjustment is incomplete. The world role has gone: but it has been replaced by a vacuum. The most urgent task for the British Left is to make sure that the vacuum is filled by it and not by its enemies. This is not a task for which the old myths of proletarian solidarity or new dreams of a British Cuba are likely to be of much use; and if it is to be carried out at all, it will have to be carried out by the revisionist wing of the Labour party. It is a more difficult challenge than any it has yet faced.

Bernard Rosenberg

Half a Cheer (No More) for British Labour

HOW CAN ANYBODY raise more than about one-half of a cheer for the tattered British Labour party? Few Britons would go that far. Seeing themselves as condemned to five years of Hard Labour, they are more likely to hiss or laugh derisively. However, an American Anglophile fresh from the bloody arena of American politics can find a little virtue in the lesser evil.

Hopes ran high in 1964 when, after 13 year of Opposition, Labour returned to power. Those hopes have largely been dashed. More of us should have remembered Aneuran Bevan's anguished cry: "We are socialists out of power and tories in power." Well, yes, but it's a matter of degree. No one called the colorless but conscientious Attlee, Clem MacDonald; Ramsay MacWilson is common currency.

Labour is not just demoralized and discredited: it is barely breathing. One blunder after another on top of one defeat after another, a shameful and possibly fatal ra-

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cialist lapse, real retrenchment and apparent betrayal, the freeze and squeeze, devaluation, Keynesian and pre-Keynesian economic policy—with "planned unemployment" for God's sake—and a foreign policy tied sycophantically to that of the U.S., except in Nigeria where Britain actively helps to starve and bomb Biafra out of existence: all this from the party that until recently seemed a beacon.

So what else is new? A little, a very little that justifies our fraction of a cheer. George Brown, a charming and erratic apologist for the cabinet from which he has resigned, ruefully observed last year at a Labour gathering in Blackpool, "If the Tories had done half what we've done, you'd all go out and vote for them." Historically, Brown would seem to be right. But socialists are expected to do more and do it faster than champions of the status quo. That they would this time *undo* so much until they themselves were undone, one could not have known until, say, last year. For despite economic fetishes and electoral expediencies, Wilson and his ministers were bent on achieving quite a bit.

The remnants of Empire were to be liquidated, less skilfully than by de Gaulle but also with less damage to the democratic process. This experience has been traumatic. Shrinking pains seem to hurt more than growing pains. Thus the comic-opera invasion of Anguilla, which prompted a *Punch* cartoonist to jeer, "Anguilla today, tomorrow the world."

The sun, which shines seldom enough on the British Isles, will never again rise on the British Empire. Positively, with the withering away of Empire came a decline in defense spending which at last took second place to education. Public expenditure was protected throughout a severe and continuing monetary crisis—no small achievement. A marked growth in social services took place, so that, for example, a 50 percent increase in public housing and slum clearance since 1964 could be claimed. It is one datum in a Niagara of statistics Labour publicists regularly release. The notorious eleven-plus system for perpetuating caste is on its way out, and comprehensive schools, which appear to be more admirable than not, will continue to multiply under Labour. Moreover, various kinds of humane and liberal legislation, unthinkable without a Labour majority, are on the books.

Most of the best came first. Labour shone brightly when its Parliamentary power hung on a few votes. Given a big mandate and further encouragement for social democratic change, the party went haywire. By 1966, Wilson had disgraced himself on the race question. Then, with the unpardonable exclusion of Kenya Asians, he lost those of his dons who had not been elected to office. Quite a few in office became recalcitrant backbenchers. The prevailing academic —and public—attitude can be heard in an old refrain: it doesn't matter who's in office because the Tories are always in power. Of the intellectuals who remained, practically every one turned sour. They diddled and waffled and muddled—but not through to anything. Who was there but: Dennis Healy, the Hawk; Richard Crossman, the Fumbler; Barbara Castle, later dubbed Barbarella the Union Buster, previously a darling of the Left; Anthony Crosland, the right-winger. And so on through a list that begins with Bevan's old ally, Harold Wilson, who wept publicly over his country's "enslavement to international financiers" while capitulating to most of their nineteenth-century demands.

It is widely assumed that through direct dictation, the International Monetary Fund runs Britain's economy. On this score, for complex technological and financial reasons, a postimperial mini-country can have maxi-problems. But Wilson and his advisers have been less resourceful in coping with them than their opposite numbers on the Continent. Labour is divided even now on entering the Common Market. So is the electorate. And no one really knows how beneficial or harmful admission would be.

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To be sure, Labour inherited a mess. Industrially, under the Tories, Britain fell farther and farther behind. An unfavorable balance of trade is no new story. And yet how poignantly right Roy Jenkins is when he says: "We are still one of the richer nations—able to pay our own way without being subsidized by others." It is he who has challenged the illusion that a first-power status can be maintained on the basis of a medium-power economy. But his prescription, which is essentially workers' austerity, will not or does not do the trick.

ALL THAT GRAY MATTER and so much incompetence, so many unfathomable reversals. During his worst week this year, Crossman on several successive days fought himself to a standstill in the House of Commons. He haltingly advanced at least three implausible and contradictory explanations of the government's decision to water down its superb system of socialized medicine. This exhibition caused Dr. Shirley Sumerskill, Labour MP for Halifax, to exclaim, "Mr. Crossman gives the impression of someone whose left hand does not know what his other left hand is doing." Twist those left hands this way and that, and cross them with many an extended right hand: strangulation is bound to ensue. Early on, the Wilson administration restored partial prescription payments—a pittance to all except the poor who even now must watch their ha' pennies. The yield on this operation was almost exactly zero. Bureaucratic processing did cost only a trifle less than the payments brought in! So they have been increased another 25 percent, which will really enrich the Exchequer. If not, a new charge for spectacles and dentures should fill the bill: all this pettiness Secretary Crossman just could not explain.

Why chip away at the welfare state? Presumably to capture the middle-class vote. Since nearly 70 percent of the British population is composed of manual laborers, they would seem to be a sufficient electoral target. And Labour is committed to wholesale betterment of working-class conditions exactly as the restorative Britain needs. Ah, but now behold *The Conservative Worker,* a mighty, abstract object of sociological inquiry. Whether we use rise in income or home ownership (which is to say, a hundred-year mortgage) as the criterion, *embourgeoisement* is plainly discernible. About one-third of the working class votes Conservative. On the other hand, success at the polls has lately depended in part on progressive middle-class civil service and related types. Now Wilson's politics of opportunism has alienated just these swing voters who might have made a second consecutive victory possible.

The litmus (or Titmuss) test of any Labour government has been equality. From R. H. Tawney to R. M. Titmuss, BLP thinkers have favored an assault on the class structure, greater equity for women, and a gradual but consistent redistribution of wealth. Today left-wingers urge adoption of a wealth tax. Party conferences endorse it—and Labour's own research reveals no actual change in maldistribution since 1938. A critic like John Vaizey does not doubt that his party wishes to reduce inequalities, but, mainly through inadvertence and mindlessness, it has only managed to increase them. He writes:

> The Labour government, by inflating capital values, by encouraging mergers, by handing out lavish subsidies to private business, by legislation to keep down wages, by making the tax laws so complex that well-paid private lawyers are bound to beat poorly paid civil servants, by eroding welfare benefits through price rises—by all these means (to mention only a few) it has made the rich more secure and the poor less secure. Only some of this has been deliberate. The other actions, insofar as they had any ultimate purpose beyond action for the sake of action, were designed to improve the lot of the poor. The fact that they have made it relatively worse is only because

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> between the idea and the action lies a great gulf of ignorance and muddle, similar to that which lay between MacDonald and action to cure unemployment.

Decades of the welfare state have brought benefits to everybody, but most of all to the prosperous who know best how to use them. Large disparities remain and grow, producing that "relative deprivation" which generates *ressentiment* and transforms xenophobia into something uglier as it crunches and maddens "the little man." Increased material well-being for all, far from softening class lines, has tended to heighten the visibility of an immemorial difference between "them" and "us." This difference cannot be drowned out by the jingle of half crowns in working-class pockets. For those deflated coins are invidiously compared with the pounds "they" carry.

As a professional economist, Wilson might be expected to strive above all for that stream-lined technological society whose eventual wonders he constantly celebrates. Why is he finding it impossible to overhaul and modernize a somewhat obsolescent system of production? Partly for a commonsense reason that many men endorse, namely that while Britain won the war in 1945, it subsequently lost the peace, and vice versa for Germany and Japan. Wilson's own irrational inclination in 1969 is to blame workmen who go out on wildcat strikes—even though he knows that industrial accidents cause a greater loss of man hours on the job than all official *and* unofficial strikes put together. In pursuit of his obsession, he ignores a Royal Commission report, or at least its major recommendations, and produces instead the notorious White Paper ironically entitled *In Place of Strife*. Barbara Castle as Minister of Productivity and Employment has had to bear the brunt of responsibility for that strange document. Next came the proposed Industrial Relations Act, replete with cooling-off periods and penal sanctions, which amounts to an unprovoked declaration of war on the unions. That war only common enemies of both the party and the unions could possibly win. *In Place of Strife* gave rise to more unnecessary fratricide than any witness can readily recall.

Labor spokesmen continued to denounce "gnomes" in the City, in Zurich, and on Wall Street for their government's fiscal plight. Now economic stagnation plainly has much to do with the machinations of bankers, but no serious move has been directed at *them*. This Labour government has not put a levy on investments. Its incomes policy, which hits those at the bottom hardest, has not been accompanied by a system of redistributed budget allocations. With consumer prices, profits, and managerial salaries soaring, organized labor will not stand for wage controls. Union muscle gets wage increases that could be resisted in the interests of a larger GNP only if others shared more equitably in a general austerity. Meanwhile gross exploitation of the unorganized continues, for instance in Britain's 400,000 small retail establishments. Approximately three and a half million women and half a million men would come out ahead if the minimum wage were set at *12 pounds a week*. Equal pay for women and for farm workers might help to stimulate a lagging economy.

So would a boost in morale. Workers might be more interested in increasing output if they had some say in decision-making. At present, nationalized industries are run by business directors and professors. Now and then, in pursuit of "joint consultation," workers' representatives chat with a few officials. This procedure is no substitute for the democratization of management toward which Labour should want to move. As the economy is rationalized, merger follows merger, and a smaller oligarchy gets to be more concentrated than ever. If so, this is the moment to try dispersing discipline and broadening authority. Instead,

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Wilson's government has overtaxed our credulity by futile action mobilized against the unauthorized, usually very brief, stoppages of the workers.

LABOUR CANNOT BE CENSURED for all the troubles that bedevil a people among whom such a salutation as, "The best of British luck to you," is a common curse. Bereft of colonies, with the Commonwealth reduced to a skeleton, Britain itself begins to fly apart. Centuries of turmoil, complicated by religious bigotry and continuing persecution, substantially account for "the Bitter Oranges" reaped in Northern Ireland. But why should a bloody rupture occur at just this moment, if not on account of economic conditions? Ulster, like Wales and Scotland, suffers from a significantly higher rate of misery and unemployment (20 percent in Londonderry) than England. The kind of devolution that Welsh and Scottish nationalists demand, Ulstermen attained 50 years ago. Labour is less responsive to the nationalist clamor than either the Conservative or the Liberal parties. Remaining aloof can be considered correct, provided far more energetic efforts are made to alleviate very real regional hardships.

What to say about the race question? That it has been Americanized? Not quite; and yet, in some ways, stereotyping starts earlier and goes deeper than with us. The most successful writer in England until her death some months ago was Miss Enid Blyton. Her innumerable childrens' books still outsell all others. I was unable to find one, and I looked at more than enough, without the ubiquitous Golliwog. That black villain is part of every Englishmen's infantile imagery. Given the heritage of colonial contempt for Asian and African peoples, it is hardly surprising that a trickle of dark-skinned immigrants should be mistaken for a flood. Nor that poorly educated dock workers should demonstrate against their illusory enemies. Nor that all this should fuel revolutionary black nationalism. (I almost heard Michael X, modeled after our own Malcolm, propose total extermination of the white race. I just missed him at the University of Essex where, I'm told, most of his audience cheered, while a few white students asked for and magnanimously received, personal exemption.)

But Enoch Powell, professor of Greek, turned populist politician! If Labour had not proved that intellectuals should remain in their studies, Enoch Powell alone would be evidence enough. In Blackpool Wilson referred to Powellism as a virus. Powell replied, "of course. It is a virus that kills socialists." Mixed with another variety of bacilli emanating from the New Left and raised to epidemic proportions, the virus would destroy more than socialists. It would leave only those primitives who want to inherit the world. Wilson got a laugh when he spoke of Powell as "the Conservative Guru from Wolverhamptom." But some months later, when a Labour MP, Mrs. Renée Short, made her own racist noises, all of a sudden there was Powell's reverse image: "the left-wing Guru from Wolverhampton." It will take political courage of a high order for a British leader to fight race prejudice. If Labour leaders, who still look better than their opponents on this issue, lack that courage, a deadly chain of events can follow.

Moral and esthetic insensitivity, as much as lackluster politics, probably repels youth from the BLP. At any rate, they stay away in droves (Joan Lestor reports that 41,000 left the party in 1967), and no very vigorous attempt is made to recruit them. Indeed the Wilson era is one of general disenchantment—with young people getting to be apolitical only a bit faster than their elders. It's a rare bird who can work up much enthusiasm for any of the parties. What Mr. Heath stands for does not excite this generation of British students. The more bizarre sort (they're called Situationists—somewhat like our Crazies) have

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found refuge in the Liberal party. Before withdrawing from that position, and doubtless in despair of locating a genuine constituency, Liberal leader Jo Grimond began to express admiration for "extra-parliamentary politics." Grimond's abberation supplied a home for one small segment of the young anarcho-fascist Left. Its larger cadres are naturally more at home in the university.

Again, it is not cricket to fault Wilson or his pedantic minister of Education for failing to solve a problem that appears to be practically insoluble everywhere. Why should "academic de-authorization" be less pronounced in Britain than anwhere else? Vulnerability to student unrest is universal. After a sit-in and a bad dose of violence at the London School of Economics, from which that institution may never recover, complacency disappeared. Total rejection of the system at art schools, rebellion against "proctorial power" at Oxford, demonstrations at Birmingham, "Revolutionary Festivals" at Essex, rumblings everywhere followed by clever and useless post hoc analyses, leave academic administrators and public officials virtually as jittery as Americans. Their sense is that they lag behind us in campus turmoil by a few years. If so, the worst kind of academic upheaval, like the worst kind of racial tension, could still be avoided.

IDEAS are not lacking: for workers' democracy as more than a shibboleth, for women's rights in a country where women comprise a large part of the underprivileged working class, for a national minimum wage at a time when millions of laborers earn less than 15 pounds a week, for every species of social improvement from town planning to large-scale schooling. How is a so-called poor people to do that? Not only but not least by progressive instead of regressive taxation. Realizable goals have been established. They cannot be set aside forever. Labour will no doubt go down to defeat in the next election. A new pension system, widely touted as the greatest breakthrough since Beveridge, will be fully operative by —this is no typo—1999! That's scarcely calculated to rekindle old fires. If only the party had not so hopelessly compromised itself. If only Labour could go down to defeat or—*mirabile dictu*—forward to triumph, on principle! The Joan Lestors, Ian Mikardos, Michael Footes, unstained in this decade by old *Tribune* fellow-traveling, all of them notwithstanding, no such happy outcome seems likely.

One suspects that Britain will be saved, if saved at all, by its traditional values, among them that "political stupidity" which keeps its leaders from pursuing false logic to fanatical conclusions. Powell misappropriated the poet's line, but Britain still remains "a green and pleasant land," more civilized than any in the Western world, where decency, respect for privacy, a sense of fair play, tolerance, and good humor persist. (And anyone with a historical sense must admit that a good part of what is good about England is due to the long and noble efforts of its labor movement.)

Who knows? A people with such virtues may win out in the end. Even so, it would be nice to have a Prime Minister in the next Labor government who heeded Michael Foote's admonition: "Let us readopt the socialist platform on which we were elected. Let us act on *our* principles, not theirs."

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Alan Trachtenberg

Culture and Rebellion

Dilemmas of Radical Teachers

STUDENT ACTIVISM still looms as the foremost fact of life in schools everywhere. In the past year demands have escalated, tactics have become more disruptive and abrasive, countermeasures more harsh and angry. While it is too early to say what forms both protest and repression will take this year, it is apparent that the character of the student movement has already undergone a decisive change since its beginnings in the civil rights and free speech campaign of the early 1960s. It has become more inclusive in its aims and its membership, more assured that the university is the proper battleground on which to engage a variety of enemies it sees as interconnected: imperialism, racism, corporate liberalism.

The movement seems impatient with nice distinctions: if the university behaves as a servant to militarism even in the smallest way, as a buttress to racism, as a slum landlord, then it has lost its immunity. Its practices expose its ideals of rationality as fraudulent. If the school permits the making of poison gas anywhere on its campus, in no matter how obscure a corner, then never mind what else it offers, never mind the supposed ideals of learning, the humane values allegedly enshrined there, the cherished forms of academic freedom. The presence of evil makes the other functions irrelevant for the moment, if not indeed themselves suspicious of contamination. In their rhetoric, and there is no reason to believe it is not sincere, student radicals want to represent in the halls of learning the cries of napalmed children, the anger and animosity of black and "third world" youth, the eruptive rhythms of middle-class youth shedding the moral duplicity, the "up-tight" style of their family and their class. These are the immediate facts of the world these young people inhabit, and if the university refuses to accommodate itself to them, then the university must be overhauled. They seem confident in their power to do precisely that.

In the eyes of many Americans—faculty members as well as the generally hostile public—the movement wears the aspect of a sinister contagion. We hear accusations of "left fascism," of a new barbarism at the gates. Many people see the student protests as a symptom of larger, deeper disorders, a failure of authority throughout society, a collapse of cultural values which have stood for centuries, an epidemical regression to infantilism. In regard to the university itself, a common response is that student radicals seem willing to eliminate the baby with the dirty bath water, that while they have done a service to call attention to the need of reform, they have by now gone beyond a meliorist crusade and are attacking fundamental values without which no university is possible. The resort to violence—at least what looks like violence to most people—suggests that political goals have gotten enmeshed in antipolitical intentions: it seems hard now to distinguish whatever may be sound in their moral aims from the intolerable nihilism and anarchism, so-called, of their behavior. Listen for the tune, not the words, and you hear sounds discordant with the humane goals of social transformation many academics were initially attracted to.

Does the movement take its character from the words or the tune? Has the tune, which sometimes sounds like a rock cacophony, come to prevail over the words, the principles and theories of social criticism,

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or is the point that tune and words are now one, that the students have achieved an authentic expressive form for their political and social vision? Some older radicals seem already to have decided: if SDS is making a revolution, they say, they might very well line up on the other side. Social justice, freedom of thought, egalitarianism seem to have better defenders, they feel, among parliamentary liberals than among New Left anarchists.

My own position is less certain, and I suspect that my mixed feelings and divided loyalties are shared by at least a small number of academics on every campus. Faced with growing pressure to line up against the students, to resist demands backed up by threat of force, to defend rational process and disinterestedness as ends in themselves, we are stuck in a dilemma. The pressure is to see the protests as discipline problems, and to define the campus issues under the heading of control and punishment. But in some moods student uprisings seem an avenging angel come to haunt us with our own little sins, compromises and equivocations, which suddenly loom as a major guilt —the guilt of being an academic, a scholar, a teacher, while wars rage and people starve. What kind of commitment is it we have made to Truth that takes locked files and riot police to protect? Does rational process include university-supported war research, ROTC, social engineering? Do we really mean disinterestedness, or passivity, and isn't neutrality often a cover for complicity? The way most universities are run, can we honestly speak of reason and humane learning as central values?

THESE QUESTIONS HAVE bothered us long before the occupation of buildings. True, we may have allowed ourselves to drift into careers that have deflected our attention from such issues. For many of us, the academic campaign against the Vietnam war a few years ago represented a repoliticalization, a reactivation of older ambitions and passions. I am not sure how widespread is the feeling of a strain between demands of career and demands of politics. But that is not exactly the dilemma I refer to, for it is a personal matter, a question of priorities in use of time and energy. Whatever doubt we may feel is not over militarism, racism, or the structure of social privilege which discriminate in education against the poor and the ethnic minorities. Whatever else, we feel the university as well as society at large ought to free itself from these intolerable conditions.

But our own experiences have led us to value the university in a way apparently incomprehensible to student radicals. For most of us the university has represented access to a culture fundamentally at odds with that of the larger society, a countervailing culture that honors the development of consciousness, and reading, thinking, and writing as the faculties of consciousness. It may sound excessive to say so, but the university has been a sort of salvation for many of us, salvation from the confinements and destructive ends, the dilution of ideas and culture, in the larger society. True, the academy exacts its own price, has its own intellectual and emotional pitfalls. Yes, scholarship and criticism is often exasperatingly pretentious, overwrought, and stupid. The academic mind can be just as insulated from experiences outside its limits as any other, and just as arrogant and patronizing about its own values. But why characterize the university only by its worst features? The university is perhaps the sole institution that makes accessible to its members the grounds of self-criticism, the only formal "place" arranged for free discussion, where the inherited and the contemporary can confront each other openly, where a usable tradition can be elicited from the encounter of old and new.

This is not to say it always happens; intellectual freedom can be as empty a convention, as mindless a slogan as "up against the wall." And in the recent period,

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formalism and narrow professionalism did frequently place constraints on thought. But the ideal and the possibility of freedom persist, perhaps nowhere stronger than among the liberal and radical faculty who value the opportunities for critical research and discourse the university affords. It is from that ideal itself that they derive their support for many of the aims of student protest.

Only a few years ago collaboration between students and faculty in behalf of a better university seemed natural. The enemy was seen as the administration. Its extensive bureaucracy, its machinery of manipulation, its budget-minded caution seemed to represent, as Thorstein Veblen argued in *The Higher Learning in America* (1918), the invasion of business-minded habits of thought into the academy. We seemed agreed on the necessity of freeing the "higher learning" from, in Veblen's words, "the manner of life enforced on the group by the circumstances in which it is placed."

In the past year, however, the situation has tipped. Students are now more likely to find support, especially for demands of increased power over educational policy, from administrators who are coming to see their function as one of diplomacy and negotiation. And from the faculty they are more likely to meet a stubborn clinging to notions of standards and integrity and traditional prerogatives. Faculty resistance can be traced to a guild outlook, emerging tentatively from a dimly recalled past when teachers were teachers, masters of a field and carriers of a culture, and students were students, who came to learn. It is a teacher's business to decide what is to be taught. Of course in some measure his decision is made for him by his culture. But how else can you define a teacher? How can a syllabus be a negotiable issue? Moreover, teachers want to think that their subject makes a difference, that it is not merely a subject but an access to significance, an opening to a higher life.

This idea of teaching has been called elitist, and in part it is. A major sociological fact of university life in the past generation is that many teachers, particularly in the humanities (a category, by the way, that is itself part of the difficulty), bring to their work an unmistakable sense of superiority to their students. It rests not only on differences of training and expertness, but also on differences of values. It is felt to be a condition of life that to teach literature, art, and philosophy, it is necessary to wean most students from the culture of their backgrounds, a culture of provincial manners, of puritanical practices, of constricted, not to say crippling emotions. The students we have called "best" are those who display a sensibility for a "higher life," those who come to share our contempt for the mass culture of American society.

The idea of a cultural mission of the university is frequently evoked by those who worry about the anti-intellectualism of students. This worry has been transferred, it is interesting to note, from the average, sluggish student—the typical middle-class American youth—to the radical and activist student, who is often also the "best." It is worth digressing for a moment to consider the special character of this mission in American universities, and the ambiguities it contains.

CULTURE IS ONE of the most difficult of our commonly used terms to define, and the difficulties themselves indicate the historical dimensions of the problem. The word is generally used in two interchangeable senses, one normative and the other neutral or "scientific." One refers to the inherited ideas and artistic monuments which express the ideal values of a society, what it collectively accepts as its best, its loftiest, its most honorific achievements in the realm of "spirit." The other refers to the "whole way of life" of a society, its manners as well as its arts, its patterns of behavior as well as its official ideas. When Matthew Arnold speaks of culture as the alternative to

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anarchy he means the first sense, "the best that has been thought and known in the world." This notion of culture stresses individual cultivation, refinement of sensibility, and especially the development of values, virtually religious, which lend meaning to life. While the other definition of culture does not judge but describes, this version of the word implies a criticism of common life, a set of judgments of the quality of life. It values detachment and inwardness. It sees itself as Culture at odds with "culture."

Both senses of the word have had complex developments in the period of industrial society. The discriminations between "high" and "mass" culture grew out of the fear that industrialism would destroy the values attached to traditional art and thought. While anthropologists introduced relativism into the comparative study of culture—that is, the idea that no culture had a claim to intrinsic superiority over another which arose under its own conditions—partisans of traditional culture in Europe and America felt their values threatened by bourgeois society. Intellectuals began to see themselves as critics of "mass" society, and by the beginning of the twentieth century the university was accepted as a place where traditional or "high" culture was preserved and nourished, where the student would be trained to open the mysteries of literature, art, philosophy. Academics and the public at large probably still agree that, at least in some measure, "cultivation" is an aim of higher education.

But with the new functions and services undertaken by the modern university, with the proliferating specialization of knowledge required by the economy and its technology, with the splitting apart of curriculum into quasi-feudal domains called departments each with an increasingly specialized methodology of its own, and with the rise of business and engineering schools as major political forces within the university, the operational aims of higher education became less clear. The ideal of cultivation had placed upon the university the responsibility for developing the entire apparatus of mind and feeling, for enlarging the student's sense of the world and of the self in the world. Now this ideal became the property of one branch of the university, the liberal arts, and was called upon to justify itself in terms fundamentally antithetical to its nature, terms designed to persuade the controllers of budget and curriculum of the convertability of liberal arts into concrete rewards—garlands of allusions for executives, fancier vocabularies for engineers, and for all, a "respect for values."

This picture is of course much simplified; in fact the liberal arts have been more vigorous in scholarship and criticism in the past generation than one might have expected under the circumstances. But in some crucial ways the liberal arts did acquiesce. The "Great Books" or "Leading Ideas of Western Civilization" courses, well-intentioned as they were in most cases, became a form of pandering to the belief that culture could be had through a form of purchase. Called upon to explain themselves in terms accessible to administrators, who in turn have to persuade alumni or legislators, some academic humanists tended to adopt those terms as their own and, perhaps as protective coloration, were willing to present themselves as proprietors of a particular line of goods—the "values" counter. Culture became in part identified with particular literary monuments thought of as "timeless"—a pleasant distraction for a society increasingly subject to time-study experts—and just as important, with a certain style of expression and demeanor: one is expected to be a gentleman in pursuit of Truth, Beauty, and especially Goodness.

In consequence of this defensive position the liberal arts have allowed humane culture to be pushed from the center to the periphery of education. Instead of resisting, or even recognizing the fatal loss of authority of the ideal culture, many humanists

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settled quite snuggly into their peripheral domain, and cultivated irony and disdain to support an inner sense of superiority to the prevailing powers. One effect of their teaching and writing was to separate their culture (call it "high" or "academic") decisively from the culture of the larger society. This gave to "high" culture a putative and precarious authority drawn not from living experience but from self-evident propositions. Humanities courses often have the tone of an initiation into a life of the mind drained of the vitality which was once its mark and is still its potentiality.

NOW WE ARE taken unawares by the fact that even—indeed, *especially*—our "best" students seem no longer interested in any version of the "higher life." This raises an extremely sensitive issue. Far from sharing our contempt—and fear—of mass culture, many students are now embracing it. A comment like Richard Goldstein's in *The Poetry of Rock,* that "America's single greatest contribution to the world has been her Pop (music, cinema, painting, even merchandising)," that "mass culture can be as vital as high art," must surely meet with wide approval among the young. But I am frankly skeptical of its truth. To be sure, notions of "high" and "low" tend to become formal conventions, genteel sanctions do frequently compete with intrinsic sanctions in "high" culture, and "official" academic values can stifle art and deny it the nourishment of new experience. The "higher life" does threaten to externalize itself, to yield to the satisfactions of an insignia, of manners and elegant speech—in short, snobbishness—instead of maintaining itself as an inner condition, a freedom and subtlety of mind and feeling.

Moreover, the badge of culture, like all badges and uniforms, can be put to antidemocratic uses. Whitman charged that the word "Culture" was an enemy of Democracy. It separated people into castes, it projected an aristocratic hierarchy of worth. A hundred years ago he wrote: "Of all the dangers to a nation, as things exist in our day, there can be no greater one than having certain portions of the people set off from the rest by a line drawn—they not privileged as others, but degraded, humiliated, made of no account." It is still a danger. The academic idea of "high" culture, which was won against the genteel tradition of earlier generations, has often, and often unwittingly, served as a fence around a special preserve of experiences. The academy has seen itself as a means of liberation from the hold of bourgeois values—usually abstracted as "materialism," as if that exhausted the matter—and from the banalities and easy satisfactions, what Whitman called the "half sleep," of mass culture. Yes. But the alternative has tended to become a brand of its own. The exclusion of black, of immigrant, of working-class and ethnic experiences from university culture is one instance. The insistence of "third world" students that the university not deprive them of their historical culture (even where they have to scratch to find evidence of one), not compel them to forget their language and their customs, but instead equip them with the means to foster cultural self-consciousness among their people, is precisely to this point.

Anthropology alone should have taught us that there are many ways of conceiving a "higher life," and that cultural deprivation robs a man as ruinously as any other form of banditry. But the demand that the university redefine its cultural role in light of the multiplicity of American life (a severe undertaking under any circumstances) is one thing, and the demand, implicit in much of the protest, that it reject the life of the mind altogether, is quite another. One of the reasons for stiffening faculty resistance is an uneasy feeling that while the students may be acting out of and thereby reviving ethical imperatives, they may also be enacting a mindlessness we have always felt as an intimidating presence in American life. The quest for "pure" experience, the substi-

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tution of sensation for thought, the flight from discipline—these have been historical features of American culture. In conflict with opposite ideas identified with "Europe," ideas of tradition, authority, and complexity, they have leavened much of our literature and thought.

But detached from their opposites, celebrated as self-evident goals in their own right, these impulses toward anarchic freedom lose the very conditions which made them meaningful, and radical, in earlier periods. Yes, our young radicals have rejected, with refreshing spirit and elan, much of the musty and cramped style of middle-class life. They are loose, if they are nothing else. But their rejection takes a form that might in the end reinforce the institutions they want to overturn. The glorification of Pop, for example, suggests that as profoundly as the young feel alienated from their society, they are right at home in its culture.

Admittedly I am characterizing the movement by its most glaring outcroppings. But the times are such, the desperation for action and sensation so intense, that the most extreme can overnight become the norm. And isn't this in itself a Pop phenomenon, a condition manufactured by the machinery of mass culture, which feeds on confrontation, on theatricality, on always "new" and bizarre gestures? There are times when protest has seemed a creature of the media. This is unfair of course: I do not mean to charge anyone with frivolity. But does the act of demonstrating always spring from the issues, from a considered grasp of their meaning, from a deliberative strategy regarding them? Is there no reason for concern that the political action of students might be, or become, a reflex of their culture, a compulsion to act and to prove oneself (in the name of "authenticity"), rather than a participation in social change?

INSOFAR AS THE MOOD of rebellious students represents skepticism toward the pieties of national life, toward the evasions of intellectuals and academics, and toward the present state of knowledge—especially the split between value and fact reflected in the absurdly compartmentalized university curriculum—the mood invites faculty support and alliance. But there is cause for worry and for criticism in the degree to which student radicalism deviates from democratic and socialist thought, and veers in the direction of a "counterculture" which is capturing many Americans.

In part campus unrest conforms to a wave of changes in personal style that defy political or racial lines. It is a style that stresses the self-sufficiency of adventure, experiment, spontaneity. It is a style of repudiation, and it brooks no interference with "free" expression. We see it in the arts, in theater and film and music. Most of all we see it in fashion. It might be mistaken for a new avant-garde movement, but an avant-garde with such popular appeal should make us suspicious. It is more likely that the mass media are catching up with the earlier avant-garde movements—Dada, surrealism, theater of cruelty—and detaching mannerisms and tactics from their theoretical foundations as a calculated critique of bourgeois culture and vestigial classicism and formalism. What was assault then, has by now become sheer mannerism, sheer sensation.

The mass media are playing an unprecedented role in propagating a "counterculture" with the flavor of "now!" Think of the importance of rock. Its practitioners are no longer entertainers but gurus. The music and its makers are celebrated—the proper word may be promoted—not only for the excitement of rhythm and sound, but for their message, their litany of liberation. And their message inspires a craving for what? For more of the same, as the record industry well knows. The same message, the same inducement to "do your own thing" and to "let it all hang out" can be heard in theater, in film, in the very visible "under-

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ground press," in the mushrooming "encounter groups." Writing in *Esquire* Elenore Lester has described the message as this: "Try hallucinogens: they drive you out of your wretched mind. Try nudity: it returns you to your sanity. Try multi-media baths: they stretch the sensorium. Try confrontation: it cleanses the psyche. Try revolution: it energizes the environment."

Of course radical students are not entirely responsible for how the media have popularized and cheapened the idea of cultural change. But two questions need to be considered. One, to what extent has the media version of "revolution" affected the form, particularly the inner feelings, of protest? And two, is there something about the current style of protest, including what passes for avant-garde art and theater, that lends itself to media needs, their hunger for sensation, for excitability?

In its disregard for theory generally, the New Left has pretty much ignored the media, and has failed to develop a critical point of view toward mass communications. Slogans from McLuhan and murky fragments from Marcuse have served in lieu of analysis. This is not the entire answer, but neglect of theory has helped make radicalism susceptible to media exploitation—and the exploitation is blatant; mind-blowing is a major industry. There is a belief abroad that changes in hair style, in dress, in sexual habits constitute a rejection of the social order and prepare you for revolution. The new style is supposed to be more "authentic"; the fact that it is also fashionable does not seem to occur to its defenders. Some intellectuals, whose sensibility has been formed in the modernist movement, are sometimes prone to hail any sign of the "new" as a spark of life, and to enjoy the idiosyncratic and the bizarre for their own sakes, for the "hell of it." Rather than a process of mastering social reality by will and thought, revolution has come to mean something dangerously close to sheer impulse.

Granted, the energy invested in cultural rebellion, in acid-rock insurrection against the old ethic of deferring pleasure for the sake of profit, may have a revolutionary potential. "In a culture judged as inorganic, dead, coercive, authoritarian," writes Susan Sontag, "it becomes a revolutionary gesture to be alive. . . . Bending the mind and shaking loose the body makes someone a less willing functionary of the bureaucratic machine. Rock, grass, better orgasms, grooving on nature—really grooving on anything—unfits, maladapts a person for the American way of life." But what *do* these gestures fit a person for? What social alternatives do they imply? Is the "American way" really in danger from such gestures? The fact is that the "American way" itself has cultivated these impulses, has set them up as its secretly-admired version of what it means to be "different." Are we witnessing the middle-class, in a mood of self-hate and anxiety about its "authenticity," turning against itself by turning itself inside out? The fantastic notion that if only the "uptight" middle-class would "turn on," war and poverty would cease, the air would depollute itself, and capitalism self-destruct has become a pleasant fantasy, and for that reason so effective a piece of vicarious entertainment for the middle class itself. And the pugnacious idea that all authority is evil, rather than specific uses of authority, serves to obscure the causes of war and poverty within the present structure of society; it raises a straw man in place of concrete analysis.

IN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT there is a considerable amount of discussion of theory; but theatricality, gesture, the hope for "instant revolution"—not to speak of indiscriminate terror—seem often more prominent than the effort to arrive at clear, persuasive statements of issues and mapping of strategy. The cry for "relevance" is a case in point. It is another example of an emerg-

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ing pattern of impatience with analysis and contempt for history. It is also an example of the debasement of a good idea through sloganizing. Many faculty members are vulnerable to the cry because inwardly they apply a standard of relevance to their own work, but they recognize how complex, how tentative, how problematic the standard can be. The current idea of what is knowledge ought always to justify itself in light of criticism; that indeed is the function of intellectuals. Perspectives on the past always reflect, with greater or lesser degrees of awareness, the influence of the present. Students make a valuable point when they attack much of what passes for "objective" knowledge as formalistic and ideological, as knowledge serving specific political and social aims under the guise of neutrality. They are right to try to penetrate to the social purposes and uses of curriculum.

But in demanding relevance students often assume that only the contemporary, which is to say the fashionable at the moment, is worth bothering about, that history, being dead, should be junked, that they themselves are the arbiters of what is relevant or not, living or dead. "Swamped with presentness," as Paul Goodman puts it, they seem unwilling to acknowledge that the "present" is a supremely difficult entity to define. Whitehead wrote that "the present contains all there is," that is, as an accumulation of the past, the present is the only possible locus of thought and action. This casts a somewhat different light on "relevance." Of course the present matters in a way the past does not; the future matters most of all. With more of a regard for history, students who cry for relevance might be better able to extrapolate from the present the best possibilities for a desirable future.

It may be that academics, even radicals, are overly fond of history, of the long and detached view. They might profit from an exchange with their students: some impatience with injustice for some historical perspective. It would be a fruitful exchange. Academics who want an organic culture in which the scholar can serve, in Emerson's words, to translate living experience into consciousness, to give meaning to life as it is being lived, have perhaps relaxed their demands on themselves by making careers in the academy. Many are now forced to admit an instability in their commitments: their political and larger cultural vision askew with the values and style of their profession. This tension is one source of the mixed feelings many have about student rebelliousness.

But it would be a hopeful sign if mixed feelings began to appear among the students as well. Recent history has raised the pitch of contradiction within society, and it would be strange if individuals did not feel the effects. Inner conflict is a sign that history still matters. Such conflicts can serve as revelations of the state of the world, within and without. The faculty might help keep alive a sense of the final uncertainty of the nature of student activism. It is senseless to exchange slogans, to hurl reproaches. It will be tragic if we allow the present agitation to settle in our minds as a discipline problem, just as it is tragic for radical students to feel no need for further education.

It is hard to say where hope for a renewed university lies. But surely it does not lie in repression of any sort. "In every era," wrote Walter Benjamin, "the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it." Unexpectedly, conformism has appeared in the camp of rebellion as well as in the main body of society. But we cannot allow that fact to obscure the larger questions, of what we mean by university, by society, by culture at all. It is ironic that we are moved to punish students who have, no matter how unceremoniously, raised these questions. A better motive would be to help transform their assault into a reasoned critique and a program for change. The immediate problem is to restore the possibility of discourse.

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Erazim V. Kohák

Progress and the Proletariat

On the Dynamics of Social Revolution

Communism has been the ideology of the industrial proletariat. The industrial proletariat is technologically obsolete.

History and Historical Dialectic Our motto is the basic fact behind the travail of Eastern Europe today. The matrix comes straight out of Marx. In essence, it is the worldwide development from agrarian to manufacturing and most recently to technological economy. Marx himself witnessed only two of these three stages, but his analysis is applicable to all of them. Each stage contains within itself a dialectic of the primary and marginal components of the productive process. Within the agrarian stage, it is the dialectic of the tiller of the land and the land owner/manager. In the manufacturing stage, it is the familiar dialectic of the industrial proletariat and the bourgeois administrator. In the technological stage, it is the dialectic of the technician on all skill levels, geared and oriented primarily to the technological productive process, and of the yet unnamed class of men whose basic orientation is humane and social rather than technological and productive.

Each class generates its characteristic ideology and life-style. The dialectic of the two divergent life-styles and ideologies, reflecting diverse functions within essentially the same basic mode of production, keeps the social structure fluid and so provides the possibility of change and progress.

Social philosophers—Marx foremost among them—have regularly recognized that it is precisely the dialectic that makes social progress possible. However, in their role as social prophets and reformers, they have equally regularly adopted a far more partial viewpoint. They have insisted that the cure for all social ills is the unqualified victory of one of the conflicting (and complimentary) life-styles and ideologies over the other. Marx is no exception. While as a social philosopher he recognized the central role of the dialectic in social progress, as a social prophet he proposes to resolve its contradictions by a victory of the proletariat.

History, by and large, has borne out social philosophers rather than social prophets. Social progress has been most rapid in those countries and periods in which no such victory came about. The unqualified victory of the Catholic-feudal class and ideology in Eastern Europe after the Thirty Years' War effectively eliminated the peasants as a social force for some five generations. It also produced a period of socioeconomic stagnation which has left its marks on Eastern Europe to this day.

Social prophets, again including Marx, have insisted that the unqualified stagnation following unqualified victories was not due to the victory as such, but rather to the fact that the victory had gone to the wrong side. They have retained their faith in unqualified victories—if only that victory could go to the right side. Accordingly, they have pro-

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fessed to be able to distinguish a "progressive" and "regressive" class and ideology within each stage of economic development.

The industrial proletariat and its ideology, communism, were supposed to be the "progressive" class and ideology. But while other progressive classes invariably suffered defeat or won only qualified victories (and, so the thesis goes, could achieve only qualified progress), the proletariat and its ideology won an unqualified victory in Eastern Europe. Its dialectical opposite, whether Polish aristocracy, Hungarian landowners or Czech bourgeoisie, ceased to exist as an effective social force. For once, unqualified victory had gone to the "right" side.

Yet what followed was hardly unqualified progress. It was progress in the sense in which the Catholization of Bohemia after 1628 was progress. The proletariat did impose its ideology and life-style on society. But it proved incapable of moving beyond that, and its life-style and ideology proved both narrow and inflexible. Eastern Europe has stagnated, whether in terms of its own potential or in comparison with neighbors such as Austria. Nor has the stagnation been only economic. It has been social as well. Though the proletariat had functioned as a progressive force within a dialectic, it became stagnant and even regressive once it became the sole, unhindered, and unqualified master.

The Marxists were amazed. I don't think Marx would have been.

The Proletariat: Class and Ideology Concrete, empirical definitions of the proletariat are devilishly hard to come by. Not surprisingly: as Marx points out, when a class becomes economically obsolete, its ideology undergoes mystification. Its categories cease to describe reality. Instead, they function as vague, emotive justification of social relations long surpassed by the realities of the productive process.

Something on this order has happened to the concept "proletariat." Today, its significance is largely evocative. Yet the mystification of proletarian ideology is of sufficently recent vintage that we can still see and remember the reality to which the word once corresponded.

The proletariat was the class of men who had nothing to lose but their chains and nothing to sell but their muscles. Their craft skills had become obsolete. All that remained was the brute power of their bodies, and that was all that interested a manufacturing industry whose organization was modern but whose technology remained essentially one of the hammer and the sickle.

To be sure, progress is continuous, and even the manufacturing stage contained within itself seeds of a later technological era. But in principle the process in which both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat found their economic justification was technologically quite primitive. Its central principle was not technological sophistication, but rather large-scale organization of muscle power. The role of the bourgeoisie in the economic process was basically one of socializing the productive masses, organizing labor in large-scale units. *Nomen omen:* the etymology of "manufacture" is literally "producing by hand."

In this stage of industrial development the proletariat played a crucial role. The function of the bourgeois was essentially administrative rather than technological or productive. The technological component was minimal, while the productive component was organized muscle power. Not surprisingly, the ideology of the bourgeoisie was essentially bourgeois-bureaucratic, and its hero-figure the bureaucrat. Correspondingly, the ideology and life-style of the industrial workers was essentially proletarian, the ideology of hammer-wielding masses, and its hero figure was the proletarian, the industrial mass-man whose crucial contribution to the productive process was muscle power.

The basic fact of modern industrial development, however, is precisely that, as an

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economic factor, this industrial proletariat has become obsolete. The basis of modern production is no longer large-scale organization of muscle power, but rather its replacement with increasingly sophisticated technology. The role of the worker in the productive process, regardless of skill level, is primarily that of a technician whose chief asset is his technological qualification. The hammer-wielding proletarian is an economic anachronism and constitutes a rapidly shrinking remnant within the working class in any industrially mature society.

Communism, embodying the life-style and ideology of the proletariat, has become obsolete together with the bourgeois/proletarian mode of production. It is little consolation that the bourgeois-bureaucratic ideology and life-style have become equally obsolete. The fact remains that the life-style of the modern working class as well as its emerging ideology are increasingly geared to technological sophistication. Its watchwords are technology rather than exertion, large-scale production rather than tightly controlled distribution, free and free-wheeling movement of ideas, men, and materials rather than rigid solidarity and strict supervision. Its emphasis is on freedom rather than on control.

In a technologically mature society, the proletarian life-style and ideology are as alien and irrelevant to the vast majority of the working class and to the economic process itself as the bourgeois-bureaucratic life-style and ideology were alien and irrelevant to the proletariat of the twenties.

Eastern Europe: The Proletariat in Power

Postwar political development in Eastern Europe, owing at least as much to Sombart as to Marx, placed the manufacturing proletariat in power. In part, it was due to Soviet needs and preferences. In part, it was due to the fact that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe was still at a manufacturing stage of industrial development. But whatever the reason, the fact remains that throughout Eastern Europe Communist parties, committed to a proletarian ideology and proletarian life-style, found themselves in the sole possession of power. They had not simply become the leading force in society—they were the only force. In the last stages of its economic viability, the proletariat became literally a ruling class, dominating entire societies and enforcing its will through direct control not only of the industry, but also of the state machinery of police, bureaucracy, and armed forces.

Marx understood that position and had predicted its consequences. As any dominant class which has outlived its economic justification, the proletariat, by now less than a majority even within the working class, has tenaciously defended its vested interests. Like feudal and bourgeois ruling classes, it has used its ideology as mystification, attributing to it a transcendental, eternal validity. It has made ideological orthodoxy, attested by party membership, virtually the sole criterion for possession of power—including technological power—in society. It has striven to make ideology rather than efficiency the proper standard of economic practice. And, like other ruling classes before it, the proletariat has resorted to repression to preserve its privileged position, interestingly enough aiming its efforts as much and more against the new technical intelligentsia as against the remnants of the old bourgeoisie.

Something of its ferocity may well be due to the recognition that, like all economically surpassed ruling classes, the "proletariat" is fighting a losing battle. The dominant role in society inevitably falls to the class that is central to a given mode of production, and the remnants of the manufacturing proletariat simply are not that. Ideology can retard but not reverse technology. In the last instance, the obsolete ruling class must be replaced, whether by gradual generational change or by a revolutionary upheaval. The "proletarian" remnants cannot absorb the rising

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technological class because the manufacturing ideology of solidarity, equality, and control is in principle incompatible with the free movement of men, ideas, and goods demanded by modern technology. Together with the privileges of power, the proletariat inherited the predicaments of change.

Czechoslovakia: Proletarian Revolution in a Test Tube

The Proletarian Revolution The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, locally known as the "Victorious February" (VF), is a classic instance of a proletarian revolution pure and simple. The VF did not coincide with the socioeconomic transition from capitalism to socialism. That transition had taken place several years earlier, for largely economic reasons. Socialism was no longer at issue. The VF was a pure seizure of unqualified power by a proletarian party in the name of proletarian ideology and life-style.

Nor did the Victorious February coincide with the Soviet take-over. Soviet help, material and moral, did make the coup possible. In turn, it did give the Soviets effective final say in Czechoslovak affairs, and the show-trials of Czech Communist leaders in 1952 made it clear that the Soviets had no scruples about taking advantage of the situation.

But for all of that, the Victorious February was a domestic proletarian revolution. The men with red armbands who patrolled the streets of Prague may have been Russian-armed, but they were Czechs. So were the men who crowded Staromestské Square to listen to Gottwald, and the men who formed action committees and seized power throughout the society, on significant as well as trivial levels. The Soviets made the revolution possible, but Czechs carried it out, and Czech initiative gave it its deep, traumatic impact on society.

Finally, the VF was a genuine revolution, and not simply a case of the proletariat assuming increasing social significance. It may have lacked some of the more colorful trimings, like barricades, public hangings, and firing squads—those came later. The VF took place in a social vacuum. The bourgeois-bureaucratic ideology had become obsolete, a technological one was barely beginning to take shape. As a result, there was much opposition but little resistance.

But what the revolution lacked in color it made up in thoroughness. Throughout the society, wherever social decisions are made, proletarian cadres replaced the incumbents. The sole qualification required was proletarian origin and party membership. The extent of the process is hard to imagine. It did not include only ministries, municipal governments, and factory managerships, but literally every position of social responsibility down to secretaryships of philatelic clubs. The result was a pure class rule. Within 18 months of the VF, the entire society on all levels was ruled entirely by men who by birth, education, experience, and party allegiance were hammer-and-sickle proletarians.

The overall impact of the proletarization of the power apparatus was to transform the society on the model of a 19th-century factory. The party's mentors may have been Marx and Lenin, but its model was Tomás Bata, the Czech prewar industrialist. Its life-style was proletarian; it was life-style which the revolution sought to change.

This is not surprising. Plans and programs may indicate the direction of a society's development, but its internal functioning is far more directly affected by its life-style. In turn, life-style reflects far more directly the assumptions of a man's customary life-world. The logic of the bourgeois-bureaucratic democracy reflected the independence and variety of small-scale craft production. Its normative image of society, imagined rather than remembered, took a high degree of independence for granted. Similarly, modern democracy assumes as its remote model the freedom that technology demands—freedom of movement for men,

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ideas, and goods, freedom of affluence, freedom from ideological preoccupation.

The ideology of the proletariat reflected the entirely different world of large-scale manufacture. It was a world of masses rather than individuals, of men stripped of the independence of individual craftsmanship but not yet endowed with the freedom of the technician. For such men, *class ideology was often the only basis of personal identity.* Theirs was a regimented, tightly controlled world by virtue of the economic process that produced it. Loyalty was the substitute for freedom, and its chief virtues were discipline, solidarity, toil, equality, enthusiasm—but definitely not freedom.

This is the world image that the proletarian revolution made normative. Not surprisingly, its first victim was personal freedom and internal democracy. Not simply on a national level. There the change was due to reasons of state: the Soviets demanded clear channels of command and the party, lacking majority support, could not afford democracy. But the same change took place throughout the society, in trade unions, in clubs, children's organizations, in schools. The new rulers distrusted all signs of individuality or complexity. The new society was to be as simple as a well-organized factory. Social structures were to become *prevodní páky*—transmission belts passing decisions of the central committee to all levels of national life. Enthusiastic support became the norm. Doubt—or even ability to doubt, attested by foreign travel or relatives abroad—became treason.

Men who have lived through that era remember most of all the enthusiasm—the perennial, compulsory enthusiasm, the perennial speeches and marches played over public address systems, the byzantine adulation of all things Soviet, the constant superlatives. At the same time, there was the constant undertone of horror—men who disappeared, things which filled minds but could not be mentioned, and the perennial suspicion that someone lacks in enthusiasm.

The chief outward sign was the proletarization of social contact, of language, dress, literature, entertainment, and all aspects of daily life. Throughout, the watchword was to be *lidový,* literally meaning "of or like the people," but in effect interpreted to mean "approximating the life-style of the industrial proletariat in the era of mass manufacture."

The most profound impact of the proletarian revolution, however, was economic and structural. The economic ideas of the new rulers again reflected factory experience. Ironically, their most successful economic venture was prison manufacture. A prison most approximates a 19th-century factory. Few people realize that the highly successful Czechoslovak exhibit at the Brussels World's Fair was designed by prisoners at the Technological Institutes of the Ministry of Interior, or that the Jablonec crystal necklaces were strung together by political prisoners. But even outsiders are aware of the incredible stress of shock-work, voluntary brigades, and mass projects. In an increasingly technological age, muscular exertion assumed the place of honor. Workers were urged to greater exertion and rewarded for it with positions in technical management. The technical intelligentsia was viewed with profound distrust, as parasitic on muscular exertion. Its members were displaced in large numbers, placed in unskilled jobs to undergo proletarization. Their places were taken by men who deserved reward—proletarians who had served the party well.

Consistently, wages were equalized to a point at which there was little point in seeking technical qualification. Nor was there a point in effort—wages were not differentiated, and in any case, advancement was entirely contingent on the decision of the *kádrovák,* the personnel supervisor who made it on the basis of "cadre profile"—ancestry, political allegiance, even "proletarian" manner. At a time when modern production created greater and greater need

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for high technical qualification, the proletarian party did its best to eliminate the technical and humane intelligentsia as a significant factor.

The overall result was that the Czechoslovaks worked increasingly harder to less and less effect. Proletarian economic policy reoriented the entire economy to an earlier stage of extensive, technologically primitive mode of production. Its basic principle was not technology but large-scale deployment of enthusiastic unskilled muscle power. It may not have been effective, but it was within the competence of "proletarian" managers and justified both their ideology and life-style.

It is a tribute to the skill, ingenuity, and tenacity of the Czechoslovak working class —and of the young men who a decade later were to become leaders of reform—that in spite of the obsolete model the economy did not collapse altogether. It could have. The model was geared exclusively to proletarization, not to production. Yet, after a fashion, it kept on producing. Ways were found, at enormous costs, of sustaining production in agriculture, manufacture, and services. Peasants cultivating small private plots were vilified as kulaks, but they supplied a vast percentage of available foodstuffs. After-hours repairmen were equally vilified, but they provided the missing maintenance. An entire system of semilegal markets and services sprang into being. The country made do.

To this day, a visitor to Czechoslovakia cannot help being tremendously impressed by the ingenuity and capability of Czech workers. At the same time, he cannot help being depressed by the utter inability and unwillingness of the system to capitalize on those qualities. Makeshift expedients can keep a country functioning, but they cannot bring about progress. Czechoslovakia was far ahead of Austria in 1948. Today the contrast is startling. Thirty years after the war, the country has become a land of worn, hard-working people and a worn, shabby economy. Its symbol is the "narrow profile," official euphemism for shortage. They are invariably corrected quite rapidly, and immediately appear in another sector. In Czech, the word for "to buy," *kupovati,* has virtually disappeared. It has been replaced by *sháneti*—"to hunt for, to forage." Ingenuity and hard work cannot make up for the inherent limitations of the "proletarian" economic model.

The basic point of Czechoslovak experience is finally that a proletarian revolution is possible, but that it does not constitute progress. Rather, it creates a society ideally suited for mass manufacture, with all its advantages and limitations. Like the factory on which it is modeled, it produces a certain rough-and-ready equality. Like the factory, it drastically reduces the complexity of society. Again like the factory, it reduces the role of imagination and with it capacity for change. Finally, like the factory, it creates prerequisites for effective social control, and with them an infinite possibility for resisting change. The proletarian revolution creates a proletarian society. But the life-style and social function of the proletariat, as Marx recognized long ago, is the nadir of dehumanization in the course of industrial development. A proletarian revolution does not abolish it—rather, it entrenches it as a norm.

The Counterrevolution According to the official Soviet version, the developments in Czechoslovakia after 1960 constitute a counterrevolution. If counterrevolution means the displacement of the "proletarian" apparatus from power, the reading is accurate. But the Soviet script misses the crucial difference. The Czechoslovak counterrevolution was not the work of the long obsolete bourgeois-bureaucratic remnants. Nor was it the work of some small group of agents, reminiscent of the proletarian vanguard. It was the work of virtually the entire Czechoslovak people, and its foundations were Marxist rather than Sombartian, social and economical rather than political.

The obsoleteness of the "proletarian"

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power apparatus had simply become too obvious. The liberalizing process since 1960 meant essentially a gradual restriction of the arbitrary, absolute power of "proletarian" cadres and gradual replacement of ideological considerations with practical ones. It was primarily an intra-party process, supported by the people at large but led by the party. The remnants of prewar parties played no role in it. Not that they were insignificant; but their significance was historical rather than programmatic. They served as a national conscience, a mute reminder of the perennial ideals of justice, freedom, and democracy. Their programs, however, had long become obsolete, even if the ideals they embodied were not. Unable to generate new programs under the restrictions of the proletarian era when doubt was treason, they were totally unequipped to provide new direction.

The only force capable of generating programs was in fact the Communist party. It alone had the power, the freedom, and the infrastructure necessary for national leadership. Outside the party there were also talented, dedicated individuals, but they had no outlet for their ideas or efforts. For better or for worse, only the party had both the prerequisites and opportunities for offering a live alternative to the obsolete proletarian ideology.

The party had one other asset—people. In spite of the Soviet purges in the fifties, in spite of executions and mass arrests, the CP never became a purely "proletarian" party. In part, this was because Czechoslovakia was too technologically advanced. The hammer-and-sickle proletariat was not that significant a segment of its working class. In part, probably in greater part than we realize, it was also because the CP had absorbed the Czechoslovak Social Democracy. The Social Democrats had always a broadly working-class rather than narrowly proletarian social foundation, and their orientation was always democratic socialist rather than autocratically communist. As a result, though the Czechoslovak Communist party accepted the "proletarian" model, it was never quite reduced to it.

For all these reasons, the party produced a new generation of leaders far more up-to-date in their grasp of the realities of a technologically mature society. It included economists, technicians, and intellectuals who were acutely aware that the proletarian-repressive model was hopelessly obsolete, and who were capable of producing a new, socialist-democratic model.

By the mid-sixties, even the much (and justly) maligned President Novotný was aware of this. Gradually, the men at the peak of the party hierarchy attempted to reduce the high cost and waste of the proletarian-repressive model. The crowded jails began to discharge their inmates, providing a flow of highly trained manpower. First cautious steps were taken to revise the worst judicial monstrosities of the fifties and to rehabilitate those Communists who had been persecuted for dissent. Similarly, first cautious steps were taken to provide the prerequisites for a modern, technological economy. The deafening propaganda barrage was muted, the stifling isolation of Czech intellectual life from the world and from the pre-Communist past began to ease. Czechs began to travel, read, and, still within limits, even speak. The reasons were economic, but the results were necessarily also political and ideological.

Internally, the development was held in check by two factors. One was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is industrially far less advanced than Czechoslovakia. There the proletarian model is obsolescent rather than obsolete, and Soviet leadership remains committed to it. From its perspective, any departure from proletarian ideology and lifestyle in the direction of the twentieth century is suspect, and the Czechs had to tread warily, constantly reassuring Moscow that progress is not treason.

The second factor was internal. The peak of the party apparatus as well as broad popu-

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lar masses were quite aware of the untenability of the old proletarian-repressive model and prepared to accept the political consequences of its replacement. But that model was not just an idea. It was also an apparatus, a body of "proletarian" administrators, accustomed to the privileges of their positions and hopelessly ill-suited for a modern, technological society. According to party figures, less than one-quarter of executive personnel met the minimum technical qualifications for their positions—even though those qualifications were set by the apparatus itself. For these men, more than a model was at stake. Their entire position, their stature and income, all the benefits of power hinged on the role that class origin and political orthodoxy would play in personnel policies. The party had given them power to impose proletarian ideology on the society—now they were determined to use that power against any attempt to modernize that ideology.

But while the reform trend found little support in the party hierarchy, it found overwhelming support among the people at large, and, before the occupation, this still mattered. The workers, especially, were vehemently ready for reform. One of the most carefully nurtured myths of the occupation regime is that the workers had supported the proletarian-repressive model and then were suddenly and only momentarily swayed by mass communications media in 1968. This is purely and entirely a myth. The workers were wholly apathetic to any economic reform that would leave the ideology and life-style unchanged, but they were eager for a change that would affect them. To them, the untenability of the proletarian-repressive model had become particularly clear, especially on the level of ideology and life-style. They, after all, saw it at closest range. They saw the hopeless inefficiency of "proletarian" production, they provided the wasted, ill-used muscle power, and bore the consequences of ideological regimentation of economic management. They knew the high costs and low return of incompetent management, and they were thoroughly disenchanted.

Their disenchantment was less than visible, in part because the repressive apparatus barred the workers, traditionally less verbal than, for instance, journalists, from public expression. The *apparat,* well entrenched in factories, spoke in their name, even though it spoke only for itself. But ideological agitation also played a role. It could not convince the workers that the proletarian-repressive model was viable, but it did convince them that the only alternative was the equally obsolete bourgeois-bureaucratic model. The workers were finally quiescent in part because they could not speak, but in part also because they saw no alternative and assumed that any economic reform would inevitably leave the oppressive proletarian life-style unaltered.

The coming of the Dubcek regime changed precisely these two conditions. It freed the press, and it presented a socialist-democratic alternative. The men who led it were interested in economic rather than social reform. They were Communists, determined to maintain the party's grip on society. But they were also intensely aware of the need for technological process and were willing to accept its social prerequisites and consequences.

One of the basic prerequisites for reform was a greater freedom of expression, but with it came also the recognition of other choices beside the two obsolete ideologies of the manufacturing era, the bourgeois-bureaucratic and the proletarian. Dubcek spoke only of a "socialism with a human face"; the party intelligentsia went far beyond him. In effect it presented the necessary alternative, a socialist-democratic social ideology and life-style. For the first time in 20 years, the Czechoslovak working class had not only an aimless discontent, but also an alternative thoroughly suited to its needs.

They had more than that: for the first

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time in 20 years, they also had a chance to speak out in their own name. And they did. The press and the radio became a forum for public opinion, and that opinion overwhelmingly supported the reform.

The new freedom had one other effect. The full truth about the proletarian era became broadly known. Even under the ideological screen, a great deal had been known already. Virtually every Czech and Slovak had a chance to compare the slogans with the realities of his personal situation. The press revealed little that was essentially new. But it revealed for the first time the full scope of what had happened in the fifties. While the limited personal experiences produced discontent and desire for particular reforms, the panoramic view of the proletarian era brought about a determination to replace the entire model.

Here the people at large and the party leadership underwent analogous change. The leadership, too, had entered the new era with ideas of piecemeal reform. It, too, became aware of the inevitable need for a basic restructuring of society. The new freedom to admit the obvious broke the ideological spell. Differences which developed within the leadership hinged primarily on individual estimates of how much reality the situation—and especially the Russians—would bear.

A rather small minority simply found the cost too great. Men like Kolder, Indra or Bilák, though originally interested in *ad hoc* reforms, were staggered by the extent of the discrepancy between the ideology and reality. Their conclusion was basically that if the gap could not be bridged by superficial changes, a return to repression was the better alternative.

The majority of the leadership, including the present first secretary Gustav Husák, his current hard-line opponent Lubomír Strougal, Prime Minister Cerník, and possibly a number of others, like Cestmír Císar, were prepared to go ahead with the reform. They even came to accept the idea of living with an uncensored press. Their only reservation was that ultimate political control must remain in the hands of the party. To be sure, they envisaged a thoroughly reformed party, geared to the realities of modern technological production, utilizing far more flexible and humane means of control. Nonetheless, it was to be a party in control.

Only a minority of the leadership was willing to accept the full truth—*that the very idea of control was itself obsolete*. It is hard to place exactly the multiplicity of the reform spectrum, but Smrkovský, Kriegel, and possibly even Dubcek, the hesitant hero, leaned toward this view. Confident that the socialist-democratic model fitted both economic realities and popular preference, they were prepared to trust the leading position of the party to popular support rather than a control apparatus.

By and large, the people justified their confidence. The spring of 1968 will live in Czech history as a heroic era. The exuberance, vitality, and enthusiasm it released defy all description. It was one of those rare historical moments when ideological model, economic realities, and popular life-style were completely in harmony. The people were even willing to forgive the horror of the past. They were willing to dissociate the party from the discredited proletarian-repressive apparatus, and trust the new leadership and the new party.

Czechoslovakia had all the prerequisites for creating a genuinely socialist-democratic state. It was not a counterrevolution. It was too profound for that. It was a new revolution, far more advanced than the proletarian and pseudo-proletarian revolutions with which underdeveloped peoples try to forge their way into the twentieth century and become hopelessly fixated on 1920. It was a synthesis of the bourgeois and the proletarian theses in a socialist democracy.

This is the basic point about the Czechoslovak "counterrevolution." The proletarian model becomes obsolete with technological progress. Like all obsolete ideological

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models, it becomes a brake on further development. But it has low internal capacity for change, objectively because its central feature is domination and control, subjectively because of its quasi-religious status in the world of the 19th-century factory. It must be replaced, but it cannot be replaced by a return to the bourgeois-bureaucratic model. That, too, is obsolete. Its sole advantage over the proletarian-repressive model is its greater internal capacity for change. But technological production requires more. It requires free movement of men, ideas, and materials as well as rational planning. It requires a socialist-democratic model. The most important consideration in either of the alternatives is to maintain the freedom and flexibility that makes change possible. Anything which restricts that freedom and flexibility, whether in the name of free enterprise or of "socialism"—or, for that matter, any other "radical" or "reactionary" slogan —is in principle regressive.

The Occupation Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia came as a tragic anticlimax of the Czechoslovak story. It made the point that the proletarian model has not only a low internal capacity for change, but also a high capacity for resisting change. It is this combination which makes it undesirable even as a transitional model for the manufacturing stage of industrial development.

The Czechs and Slovaks stared at the Soviet tanks—and Soviet proclamations—in utter disbelief. The ideology they came to defend is utterly unreal. The instinctive Czech reaction to each new repressive measure justified in the same old ideological terms is simply "You've got to be kidding!" Unfortunately, the Soviets are in dead earnest.

Official Soviet justification of the occupation is that it was necessary to defend proletarian rule. Czechoslovak government, Communist party, and everyone with access to a blank wall and a piece of chalk vehemently denied that they had either requested or needed help. Yet the Soviet occupation did restore the "proletariat" to power. But that "proletariat" had little to do with the Czechoslovak working class, the Communist party, or the Czechoslovak people. The "proletariat" is the narrow bureaucracy which seized power in 1948 and which today defends nothing but its own privileges.

Numerical estimates are hard to make. Informed sources place the number at somewhere around 8 percent. One speaker, who had welcomed the invasion, told me that "as long as we control jobs, we can count on having 10 percent of the people with us." But that may be overly optimistic. The public opinion survey published in the last issue of *Reportér* before it was suppressed would make a figure of about 7–8 percent seem more probable.

For the other 92 percent, the occupation crystallized opinion. The intensity and unanimity of feeling, stifled and undiminished a year later, would be hard to describe. It has become too clear that the proletarian-repressive ideology has simply no support whatsoever, either among the people or in Czechoslovak economic reality. Whatever its justification 50 years ago, today it is strictly the mystified ideology of an outdated ruling class supporting itself in power by reliance on the army and the police.

The intensity and unanimity of public opinion made even the Soviets hesitate. They waited for eight months before implementing their program, and even then they turned to a realistic politician like Husák rather than eager cadres like Kolder, Indra —or their recent convert Strougal. The difference is significant. Husák is willing to implement the program because Soviet tanks leave no alternative. The hard-liners actually believe in it.

The main lines of this program are clear. It is essentially an attempt to return to the ideological dream world in which the "proletarian" cadres are still heroes rather than anachronisms. The press and radio are

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again strictly controlled and project an image of the world in which ideology alone matters and any admission that both modes of production and social relations have progressed beyond the twenties is treason. Economically, all reform has been halted. Since ideology depends ultimately on technology, technology is to remain at the stage of development that justified the ideology. Finally, the repressive apparatus has been restored to its unlimited, arbitrary power.

The situation has become normal, as the Soviets understand normality. Monopoly of power has reverted to a small, tightly controlled apparatus, justified by a monopolistic ideology and supported by army, bureaucracy, and police.

Something else has returned to "normal." The old apathy has returned. There is no opposition, since there is no alternative. But the entire system is so hopelessly irrelevant and unreal that it cannot win any support, either. The people are utterly, profoundly disgusted. Not only work morale, but the entire national morale has sunk to an ultimate low. Even people who lived through the last 20 years, risking and enduring jail, endless harassment, endless deprivation, and still hoping, have now had enough. If they can, they emigrate; if they cannot, they withdraw into themselves. In face of an utterly unacceptable and utterly unavoidable alternative, the nation is defending itself in the only way it can—*it has simply gone away*.

For the Soviets, this may well appear desirable—it makes the colony easier to govern. For the Czech regime, the situation is more difficult. The only viable alternative, politically and economically, is the Dubcek model, whether with or without Dubcek. Today, Czechs and Slovaks simply cannot be persuaded to support the old regime. Nor can the Czechoslovak economy—technology has progressed too far.

Yet the Soviets have categorically shut off this alternative. The second alternative is outright regression, making the old model stick, at all human and economic cost. The few men who favor it are the most cordially despised and isolated individuals in the country today. It seems likely that even the Soviets realize that the repercussions of such a course would make it hopelessly counterproductive.

The present regime of Gustav Husák walks a precarious tightrope between these alternatives. Ideologically, Husák has yielded almost without reservation to Soviet demands. He has imposed rigorous censorship, carried out purges, reverted to "proletarian" economic policy, restored the powers of the police, and generally recreated the paraphernalia of "proletarian" dictatorship. He has even inched close to the Soviet demand that the government justify the occupation. Not surprisingly, he too is cordially disliked within the country.

But while the Czechs detest Husák, he remains preferable to the hard-line alternative. He is a highly competent politician. He does bear down hard on the present—given the reality of Soviet tanks, this may be inevitable. But he appears to be keeping some possibilities open for the future. He has banned one journal after another, but so far has not hanged any journalists. He has carried out purges, but their victims have generally gone to other employment rather than jail. He has given the police far-reaching arbitrary powers, but so far has used them sparingly, repressively rather than vindictively. Altogether he gives the impression of a man determined to control the present without qualification and at any cost, but not of a man determined to make the future impossible. Himself a former political prisoner, he seems to wish to avoid opening new accounts which the future would have to settle.

In principle, Husák's program calls for acceptance of the consequences of the occupation, but if possible, without aggravating them. Positively, it calls for calm, steady, purposeful work in spite of frustrations and provocations. Ironically, this might well be

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the best alternative—though not an attractive one—left to the Czechoslovak people. The Soviets have chosen to fight technology with ideology, but in the long run technology must prevail. Technological progress contributes to making ideological tyranny obsolete. Again ironically, against the Soviets work is the most effective form of sabotage.

Psychologically, however, this may not be a workable alternative. It demands that the Czechs deny everything they know to be true, good, and worthwhile, that they contort themselves to fit Moscow's model, and smile while doing it. After 30 years of precisely that, it may be too much to ask. For 30 years the Czechs and Slovaks survived, sustained by the hope that became reality under Dubcek. Another 30-year postponement may be just too much. People can survive, but the nation may disintegrate.

A month after the occupation, a popular weekly printed a poem addressed to Alexander Dubcek, whom the nation loved with an intensity impossible to grasp in a saner world. It is worth quoting, at least in part: "If you grow tired, rest your head on our laps,/ If you grow weary, lean on the arm of your people,/ . . . If your load grows too heavy, share it with us, we will help you bear it,/ If your road is thorny and hard, *walk it and we shall walk it with you.*/ But never leave the road marked by the milestones/ *freedom, honor and truth./ On any other road, you will walk alone.*"

Husák is walking alone, totally isolated from his people. It remains to his credit that he has walked his road without demanding vengeance. But he is alone, and any government which the Soviets choose to impose will be equally alone.

The long-range hope is that a less obsolete regime in the Soviet Union will realize that the policy of maintaining an ideology by force is inevitably a dead-end, counterproductive while possible and disastrous when reaching the limits of possibility. Such a regime might realize that a more viable alternative, though different from Soviet lifestyle, is far more to the Soviet's own advantage. The short-range hope is that even the present regime, under the pressure from the east as well as from its own economy, might realize that the cost of repression along its western borders far exceeds any benefits. It might realize that a neutralized central Europe would insure Soviet security far less expensively and far more effectively than a restive empire.

But the present dilemma is an international version of the Czechoslovak internal predicament. It is an instance of an economically obsolete ruling class and ideology defending a privileged position by reliance on the state apparatus. The Soviets depend on force, and on the claim that the only alternative is the equally obsolete bourgeois-bureaucratic one. They cannot afford a neighbor who would be both socialist and democratic.

The hard lesson of the occupation is that the Communist ideology is not only incapable of fostering social progress beyond proletarization of a society, but is infinitely capable of preventing such progress. It must defend itself against it, at whatever the cost.

Proletarian Revolution and Social Progress

The Hard Facts For the Czechs and the Slovaks, the aftermath of proletarian revolution is tragic in its absurdity. The life and hope of a nation are being sacrificed to maintain an ideology which is too obsolete to contribute to human progress. But for the world, the Czechoslovak tragedy might serve to make some facts clear:

(1) An economically less advanced nation cannot serve as model or mentor for a more advanced one. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet ideology is regressive, as Chinese or Cuban ideology would be in the United States. A society can look for models in technologically more advanced societies, but ultimately must allow a suitable model to grow within its own conditions.

(2) Social revolution is inevitable. The

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humane and ethical ideals of the bourgeois model may be perennial, but the model itself is not. Both American and Soviet foreign policy have been hampered by inability to see this. Both foreign policies have interpreted all deviations from their respective models not as progress, but as a swing in the direction of the other model. Yet both models are obsolete, a new model is needed.

(3) The Czechoslovak experience made just that point: the proletarian model is in fact every bit as obsolete as the bourgeois-bureaucratic one. It simply is not synonymous with social progress. Once a country has advanced beyond the mass-manufacture stage, a "proletarian" revolution represents regression, not progress.

(4) Even in less advanced countries the value of a "proletarian" revolution is dubious. Its value as a partner in a social dialectic is clear, but as a dominant ideology it accomplishes change at a very high current cost, and makes future progress far more difficult. Anything that destroys the social dialectic and replaces it with a monopolistic program is in principle regressive.

(5) Ideological panaceas are counterproductive as blueprints for social existence. In principle, their realization requires suppression of alternatives, and violence is both self-defeating and self-perpetuating. By far the surest instrument of social progress is technological progress coupled with a clear recognition that its justification is human well-being—and with the freedom in which social structures can develop. *Freedom is finally the only valid program, all else is instrumental.*

The Relevance of Socialism The position of socialism in Czechoslovakia is complicated by the fact that for 20 years the word was used as a name for the proletarian-repressive ideology and life style. On a worldwide scale, this is paralleled by the close association between socialism and the Soviet ideology. Yet in spite of this, a large majority of Czechs and Slovaks have retained a perspective on socialism as a relevant social ideal, as a synonym for freedom, bread, and justice in an industrial society. In Czechoslovak usage, it is usual to qualify the term as "socialism with a human face" or more frequently as "democratic socialism." But with or without qualifications, the socialist ideal remains valid.

Socialism is also relevant in a second sense, as the foundation of socioeconomic theory in an industrially mature society. Here the basic data are quite simple. As production and consumption become increasingly social, so must the forms of direction. Under large-scale production, which by its very size becomes independent of consumer control and at the same time must become monopolistic to sustain the long-range investments required by a communications satellite or a supersonic transport, the idea of an individual owner is an anachronism. Here social supervision, planning, and coordination are essential.

But it is a far cry from such socialism to socialism as a true faith, as an ideology which dictates a life-style and justifies a privileged ruling class. Not simply because it is democratic rather than autocratic, but because it is a sober, pragmatic theory rather than an ideology. It can recognize, for instance, that socialization of production has not progressed equally in all branches of production, and that socialization of control is not equally appropriate in all instances. Especially in service industries it can be grossly inappropriate and inefficient. It can recognize that in a technologically mature society consumption is a more significant indicator than production—crudely, that shelves must be stocked with the goods consumers want to buy rather than goods that factories see fit to produce.

Socialism as a socioeconomic theory must be democratic because modern technology requires freedom of movement of ideas, men, and goods. It has to be democratic because, as Mill recognized more clearly than Marx,

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all restrictions on freedom, whether in the name of a class or an ideology, are counterproductive and infinitely wasteful. But most of all, such socialism would be scientific, pragmatic, and nonideological.

The Czechoslovak reform of 1968 was, fundamentally, profoundly socialist in these two senses. The theoreticians who spearheaded it, men like Goldstücker, Sik, or Selucký, were without exception socialists and idealists. The men on the assembly line supported them. The verdict of one of them with whom I drank a beer in a fourth-class tavern a month ago summed it up succinctly: *"Ten socialismus by byl desne fajn, kdyby se pri nem nemuselo vecne blbnout."* It defies translation, but a rough paraphrase would be, "That socialism, it would be great, if you could only knock off all the idiocy."

The Idiocy of Ideology The idiocy to which my beer-mate referred has a very concrete meaning for the men and women for whom socialism is a daily reality rather than a theoretical topic for cocktail parties or midnight bull sessions. It refers to ideology elevated to the level of a dogma with its accompanying rites. Ideology is a reflection of social ideals and modes of production at a given time. To translate the perennial to the present effectively, it must be capable of changing with modes of production. The moment it loses this ability, the moment it begins to dictate what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable ideals, men, or economic practices, it becomes regressive, antisocial, and ultimately antisocialistic.

Ideological idiocy is precisely building a "socialist" state rather than a just, happy, and prosperous one. It is adopting economic politics not because they fill human needs, but because they are abstractly "socialist." It means judging ideas not by whether they are true and helpful, but by whether they are "socialist." It means destroying concrete human lives and ideals for the sake of ideological abstractions.

Ideologies bind together the twin guidelines of progress, the perennial ideals of freedom and security and the pragmatic, scientific theories of production and consumption. They must remain entirely flexible, working hypotheses. The moment they claim ultimate validity, the moment they become true faiths, the moment they no longer serve men but demand that men serve them, they become what my companion termed *"blbnutí"*—idiocy.

Socialism in its best sense is precisely a pragmatic program—linked to the perennial ideal of freedom, bread, and justice in an industrial society. Whatever serves these ideals is socialist. Whatever hinders them is reactionary, even if it does so in the name of "socialist" ideology of another industrial era or in the name of a "socialist" elite—whether proletarian or intellectual. Socialist idiocy is no less idiotic and no less criminal for claiming to be "socialist."

Marx is reported to have said that he had never become a Marxist. If we want to continue to learn from him, we cannot afford to become Marxists, either.

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Jean-William Lapierre

Shalom, Israel

With the following article we continue our discussion, from various points of view, of the problem of war and peace in the Middle East. We welcome comment from readers who disagree with M. Lapierre; some may be interested in turning back to an article by Abraham Friend, in our July–August issue, which presents a more positive view of the Israeli position. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that despite his criticisms of the Israeli government, M. Lapierre has come under attack from New Left students in Paris, who recently engaged in a disgraceful exhibition of hooliganism to disrupt his thesis defense at the Sorbonne. Many of us are likely to disagree at one point or another with M. Lapierre's views, but the kind of methods employed against him make rational discussion impossible and lead to one or another kind of totalitarianism. On p. 521 will be found an account of the violence directed against M. Lapierre; that account first appeared in Le Figaro *and was then reprinted in* Encounter.—ED.

THERE ARE IN ISRAEL brave and clear-thinking men who are neither militarists nor imperialists. They recognize the Palestinian Arabs' right to a national existence. They realize that a prolonged stationing of troops in territories occupied by the Israeli Army in 1967 would be dangerous and unjust. They wish their country to adhere to a policy of peace that excludes both domination and expansion, a policy contrary to that advocated by General Moshe Dayan or the partisans of a "Greater Israel."

To this I can testify after attending a three-day international conference organized by the Movement for Peace and Security and held last March in Tel Aviv, at the Kibbutz Gan Shmuel, and in Jerusalem. Labor leaders, intellectuals, university professors, and political militants (the latter mainly from the left-socialist party Mapam) followed each other to the podium to affirm their wish for peace and their determination to search in good faith for the just and reasonable conditions that would make peace possible. One speaker publicly denounced the patriotic lies and conspiracy of silence with regard to the "incidents" that inevitably occur in the occupied territories. Another delegate, the spokesman for a student group, questioned the contrast between the values he had been taught to respect and the conduct of his country's public officials: "Was my education, then, only a sham?" Naturally, the speakers revealed differences about the ways peace could be achieved. There was complete freedom of expression. Some members of the audience reacted with heat to remarks that seemed to them unduly favorable to the policy of annexation.

In what Arab country would such a public confrontation, with governmental policy and certain prestigious officials openly criticized and foreign delegates taking an active part, be possible today? On the last day of the conference, poster-carrying Israeli students from the extreme Left organization Matzpen demonstrated before the great amphitheater of the Hebrew University, protesting, quite like students elsewhere, against imperialism and calling for immediate

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evacuation of the occupied territories. There were no police on hand to bludgeon them. Foreign delegates who wanted to talk with them were able to do so with complete freedom.

NONETHELESS, I did not return home without anxieties about the future of Israel and the chances for peace. How really potent is this current of pro-peace opinion in the country as a whole? What social forces can this active minority count on in order to prevail over the partisans of a policy of *faits accomplis* and territorial expansion, who argue their case from the vantage point of security needs? Meir Yaari, secretary general of the Mapam, answered such questions, in a conversation at Kibbutz Merhavia: "We have an ideal, an ideal of a socialist Zionism, and that is what we count on. Everything that has been achieved in this country is the fruit of that ideal. We will fight—with our bare fists, if need be—against a policy that is dangerous for Israel." A stirring reply but not entirely persuasive, coming as it does from this old socialist theoretician who is well-grounded in Marxism. When you want to make a given policy prevail, can you dispense with an analysis of the real balance of power and of the trends in public opinion? Can you be satisfied merely to invoke an ideal? To ward off the temptation of a swaggering nationalism, is it enough to affirm that the majority of your civil administrators and military leaders were brought up in kibbutzim, and that 60 percent of all workers are employed in the public sector?

In 1956, the Mapam opposed the Sinai War, but did not prevent it. Today Mapam is associated with the Workers' Front, which is dominated by the big social democratic party, the Mapai, of which General Dayan is a member. The Mapam participates in the government, although its two ministers occupy posts of secondary importance. It has only eight deputies in Parliament, and will retain them after the next election only by presenting its candidates on the shared lists of the Front. Does this degree of participation in the government enable the Mapam to balance the influence of the Rafi group of Dayan and Ben-Gurion, and really bend Israeli policy in a direction that favors peace? Did it succeed, for instance, in blocking the establishment of new Jewish kibbutzim in the occupied territories?

The 16th kibbutz was opened at Nathal-Argaman, in West Jordan, on May 6; three had already been organized in that area, plus two others in the Sinai, and ten on the Golan Heights. These are mainly military settlements—the land is cultivated by soldiers of both sexes. I visited one near the road that follows the cease-fire line on the Golan Heights, between Kuneitra and El Hamma. Now, a military kibbutz is less permanent, if one may put it so, than a civilian kibbutz, although in Israel—a nation that for the last 20 years has been under arms and at all times capable of total mobilization—the distinction between civilian and military has less meaning than elsewhere. But to establish people on the land with the intention of cultivating it—is this a good way of showing that one is prepared to return it in exchange for a peace settlement? One significant detail: the map of Israel that is supplied to tourists embraces without distinction, within the limits of the new cease-fire line, both occupied and other areas.

The presence of Mapam in the government has not caused the administration to budge from its intransigent position on the necessity of direct negotiations. It has not caused the government to take initiatives that many of the delegates to our conference judged essential: for example, an unambiguous official statement that the government intends to apply the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, and does not intend to annex the occupied territories. Mapam is a minority party; in 1965, it won 7 percent of the votes cast to elect the Knesset and 15 percent of the

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votes electing the directors of the Histradut (the sole Israeli trade-union organization). If the Mapam wishes effectively to oppose the policy of prolonged occupation, *faits accomplis*, and annexation the party must win over a proportion of Israeli public opinion that far exceeds its usual political following.

Everything indicates that public opinion in Israel is not moving in this direction. Security continues to be the primary preoccupation of this small nation of 2.8 million people surrounded by hostile neighbors. Their pride in the three victories of 1948, 1956, and 1967 does not blind the Israelis to their vulnerability, particularly to air attack. Not many planes or bombs are needed to destroy Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba. The Six Day War could have turned out very differently had the Egyptian Air Force not been destroyed on the ground in the first few hours of hostilities. A feeling of insecurity, combined with pride in military superiority, makes public opinion very receptive to the arguments of the "realists," who promise peace through a policy of "positions of strength" and "*faits accomplis*." General Dayan's popularity is rooted

"What Things Have Come to...."

Paris

THERE WERE *disturbances at the Sorbonne on Saturday, during the "soutenance de thèse" which M. Lapierre, of the Nice Faculty of Letters, should have given on "The Treatment of News from Israel by the Great French Dailies in 1958" (thèse complémentaire) and "Essay on the Basis of Political Power" (thèse principale).*

The "rapporteur" for the first thesis was Raymond Aron, director of Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Although no longer on the staff of the Faculty of Letters, from which he voluntarily resigned in January 1968, Raymond Aron acted as "rapporteur" for this thesis according to tradition, since this responsibility had originally been his.

Elsewhere, a lecture hall had been assigned to the general assembly of the sociology students, arranged for the same time as the "soutenance" (which was to take place in the Salle Louis-Liard). On the Thursday an evening paper announced the meeting of the sociologists, which led the members of the jury (under the presidency of M. Stoetzel, with MM. Raymond Aron, Balandier, Daval and Polin) to expect possible trouble and to consider their position.

Two attitudes were possible in view of the likelihood of disturbances: either to hold the "soutenance" in a room to which the public was not admitted, or else to let it be known to the "contestaires" that it would be held openly and in the hall originally designed for it and that any demonstration which made this impossible would be most unfair to the candidate (he holds a provincial teaching post and would be forced to make a second journey to Paris).

The jury decided on the second alternative. Raymond Aron had, in fact, been the previous evening to see M. Las Vergnas, the dean of the faculty, and had told him that he refused to officiate either in conditions of secrecy or of tumult. The dean and the general-secretary, M. Bourjac, replied that they had come to the same decision.

As a result of the disturbances (interruptions, heckling, shouting) the jury twice adjourned the "soutenance" in order to give the candidate a fair chance. He had resumed discussion of the principal thesis when a large number of students began beating on the outsides of the windows of the hall and made it impossible for him to continue speaking.

The dean and M. Polin several times appealed in vain for order. When the windows of the hall were broken, the jury decided unanimously to suspend the session, which will be resumed at a later date. They were all agreed that the doctorate, though fully deserved by a candidate of proved intellectual and moral standing, could not be conferred without the customary "soutenance."

After these incidents the same group of "contestaire" students shouted slogans against Raymond Aron in the courtyard and in the street: "Aron Fasciste!" This is what things have come to.

—LE FIGARO

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in this need to be reassured. "Dayan alone is capable of defending and protecting us," my neighbor on the return flight home told me; she was a young sabra who works in a big Tel Aviv hotel.

It is not without cause that the word "security" figures also in the names chosen by the groups that oppose a "Greater Israel": the March conference was organized by the Movement for Peace and *Security;* the student group that challenged the chauvinism of certain speakers was called the Movement for *Security* Through Peace. "Our international situation is just as good, and our domestic situation is much better, since the Six Day War. Our kibbutzim are less vulnerable to enemy fire" is what high-ranking officials responsible for Israeli foreign affairs say when someone voices in their presence any concern about the future of their country, assuming that the direct negotiations they demand will continue to be rejected by the Arab states.

IN PRACTICAL TERMS, where does the security of Israel lie if the situation created by the Six Day War, which has already lasted two years, is prolonged indefinitely? In a sustained state of war with the Arab states? In an Israeli Army occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, West Jordan, and the Gaza Strip? In the growth throughout the occupied territories of what can be called variously, depending on whether one is for or against them, the "terrorism" or "resistance" of the Palestinian fellahin, but which is in actuality a struggle, based on a claim to national sovereignty, against an occupying power? Even if he belongs to the Left and is entirely prepared to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs, no Israeli is capable of speaking dispassionately of Al Fatah and the Palestinian commandos.

One owes one's friends the truth. So I must say to those who welcomed me in Israel that they risk committing a grave mistake in their interpretation of the movement of national liberation that has arisen among the Arabs of Palestine *because of the occupation.* The arguments one hears or reads on this crucial point can be summarized thus: the terrorism carried out by the Palestinian Arabs is not guerrilla warfare, for they attack the civilian population and not our armed forces; this Palestinian movement is not new, for ever since 1936 there have always been Arab organizations in Palestine that have opposed by violence the formation of a Jewish state here; the ideological tradition of this movement, which between 1936 and 1945 had as its leader Haj Amin al Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and a friend of Hitler, is not revolutionary but reactionary and is akin to that of the Muslim Brotherhood; the "terrorist" organizations represent only a small minority of extremists among the Arabs who live in the occupied territories, among whom they are "fish out of water," their social basis being the subproletariat of the refugee camps; if Israeli authorities pursue a policy of economic and social development in the occupied territories, they will easily put an end to "terrorism."

Exactly like the arguments of highly placed officials in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this line of reasoning postulates something that to me seems most debatable; i.e., there is nothing new under the sun, and things will remain always as they are or have been. But the present does not simply repeat the past. And the future will not repeat the present. In France, at the beginning of the Algerian War, we used to hear it said—and not only by politicians of the Right—that the Algerian "terrorists" were a mere handful of retrograde fanatics who dreamed of returning to the times of Abd-el-Kader. Obviously Palestine is not Algeria, and Israeli irritation over certain comparisons is understandable.

But in the relationship between occupier and occupied there is a certain dynamic—and it was, precicely, one of the intellectuals who had come to the conference from

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Czechoslovakia who strongly underscored this point. To cite a French example: in 1940, French resistance to the Nazi Occupation was confined to a few groups, each acting on its own in the midst of a citizenry that was maintaining a wait-and-see attitude or was beguiled by the prestige of Marshal Pétain. By 1944, the situation was quite different. And so today, even if the Palestinian "terrorists" are not currently supported by the united Arab population of the occupied territories, were the occupation to be prolonged it is very likely that the repressive measures occasioned by the terrorists' actions will gradually assure them such support. The resistance-repression cycle in such situations has well-known effects: it mobilizes the population that is subject to an occupation and increasingly strengthens its solidarity with the combatants, even if the latter continue to be a minority. The Palestinian resistance organizations have a large reserve army at their disposal: a multitude of desperados from the refugee camps, who have nothing else or better to do than to enlist in the guerrilla forces, and who also have nothing to lose—which is clearly not the case with the rich middle-class Jordanian owners of the villas one admires on leaving Jerusalem by the road that leads to Ram Allah and Nablus. There are always some men prepared to "collaborate" with the occupier to protect their interests, even though they contribute through other channels to the resistance. Israelis would be mistaken to trust too much in these "moderates" or "realists."

The situation is entirely different, of course, for the political leaders of the 300,000 Israeli Arabs, such as the Mapam militant who made us welcome to his village of Baka, or the deputy mayor of Nazareth, Abdul Azziz Zuabi, a deputy to the Knesset, whom we visited in his home. No one wishes for a peace settlement more than they, because their position is now very delicate. They cannot approve a policy of prolonged occupation. During our stay in Nazareth, Abdul Azziz Zuabi went to Nablus both to intervene in behalf of some young women who had been arrested during a demonstration against the occupation forces and also to forestall a fresh demonstration. Ultimately, any escalation of resistance and of reprisals would probably shake the loyalty of these Arab citizens of Israel, who would thus risk again being subjected to the military government's special security regulations, which were lifted in 1966.

In every national resistance to a foreign occupation, quite diverse ideological currents are provisionally united. It may be that certain tendencies of the Palestinian Arab movement are reactionary; religious fanaticism and the wish to perpetuate privileges may be present. The "feudal" princes of Arabia—themselves the dependents of the great oil companies—contribute generously to the commandos. But experience shows that if such a movement survives and grows, in the long run it is the revolutionary groups that take over and exercise a preponderant influence, if only because such groups are better officered and more capable of organized action.

It is possible that I am wrong. I make no claim to infallibility. But I did return from Israel convinced that, on balance, the prolongation of the occupation and the growth of Palestinian Arab resistance constitute for this small nation a far greater danger than the united armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. For quite some time to come, Israel can preserve her military superiority and win fresh victories in wars of the classical type. She will some day have her nuclear capability. But the experience of nations stronger than Israel shows that the most modern and best equipped army is unable to put down a national resistance that begins as the "terrorism" of small, isolated groups and ends as a guerrilla war fought by large military contingents on their own soil, with at least the tacit support of the population and the "logistical" support of neighboring states.

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The people in Israel whose views run counter to the prevailing opinion, the people who say that *there is no security except through peace,* and who urge their government to act accordingly appear to me to be seeing things as they are.

ISRAELIS attach particular importance to a clause in the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, which affirms the right of every nation in the Middle East to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Even groups which oppose the annexation policy and declare that Israel must restore to the Arabs the larger part of the areas occupied since the Six Day War cite this clause in demanding "secure boundaries"—which, if one may call a spade a spade, means some territorial annexations.

Thus, the Mapam peace program calls for "the inclusion of the Gaza Strip, for reasons of security, within the frontiers of the State of Israel" and the establishment of Israeli defense posts on the Golan Heights, and affirms that a "unified Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel." It is true that Gaza has never belonged to Egypt, but it is no less true that Gaza can with reason be claimed by Palestinian Arabs. One need only visit the rugged Golan Heights to realize that whatever the frontier may be, there will always be elevations from which the Syrians can fire on the Israelis. The one reasonable solution would be—the Heights having been restored to the Syrians—demilitarization, rigorously controlled by United Nations, of a broad swathe embracing all the heights and slopes that directly dominate the Jordan Valley. It is true that Israel has lost confidence in the U.N. ever since U Thant's inexplicable decision to withdraw the U.N. task force at Nasser's insistence, precisely when its presence would have been most useful. Yet is there another and better means of international control?

As for the claim to the whole city of Jerusalem, it is in no way justified by considerations of security but is dictated by patriotic and "cultural" (or religious) motives. History, however, has made Jerusalem a holy city and a spiritual capital not only for the Jews but also for Muslims and Christians. A twenty-minute walk through the picturesque streets of the Old City takes one from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to the West Wall of the Temple and to the admirable Mosque of Omar.

Assuming that the West Jordan area is relinquished, Jerusalem is a frontier city; it is also a city with a mixed population, and a historical city in the collective memories of three civilizations. So, to my way of thinking, it is only reasonable that Jerusalem have an international status of a special kind if one truly wants a just peace that wrongs neither Jews, Arabs, nor Christians. Naturally, it would still be possible for the State of Israel to maintain its political capital in the western and modern part of this sprawling city. Free circulation between this Israeli city and the internationalized city would be assured. A frontier capital city remote from the territorial center of the nation is certainly not a "capital of security"; but it is the Israelis who wish it so, for all that one cannot then justify annexing Ram Allah, Jericho, and Bethlehem on the ground that this capital must be surrounded by a protective zone.

The truth is that whatever Israel's frontiers are, she will never have *safe* frontiers so long as her frontiers are not recognized by her Arab neighbors. Therefore, it would be more to Israel's advantage to keep no part of what she conquered by arms in 1967, and even to agree to "modifications on the frontier" in favor of the Palestinian Arabs, if in exchange she obtained from the Arab states not only *de-facto* but *de-jure* recognition. This is the essential point, the sole basis for peace in this part of the world. Certainly, no one can expect an Israeli, even were he a left-socialist, to accept peace terms that do not imply recognition of the

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right of the Jews to a national existence in Palestine—and by extension, recognition of the State of Israel.

It is in order to impose at least *de-facto* recognition on the losers in the 1967 war that the Israeli government insists on *direct negotiations* aiming at an eventual peace treaty. This amounts to demanding that the Arab states, which since 1948 have consistently challenged the very existence of Israel, make their major concession in advance of any talks; the result, as has been evident for two years, has been to block all possibility of negotiations. Within Israel, this prolongs a perilous status quo (occupation, terrorism, repression, constant tension along the cease-fire lines) and plays into the hands of the partisans of a Greater Israel, of the Gahal (the front for rightist parties), and of General Dayan. Within the Arab states, it serves the purposes of those who wish the destruction of Israel and who to that end are counting on the internal and external difficulties for Israel that an indefinite prolongation of the status quo cannot fail to provoke. If, in order to escape from this dilemma, Israel falls into the trap of a policy of annexation and a new "preventive" and offensive war (the only kind of war she can win), this will constitute proof that she is indeed an imperialist power, and Palestinian Arab resistance will be greatly strengthened.

THE PRINCIPALS of a rational and lasting peace between Israel and the Arabs are very clear:

(1) *The State of Israel exists and its existence must be recognized.* Its people have the right to live in peace and security. Obviously, one can discuss the past until one is blue in the face, polemicize endlessly for or against Zionism, object to the way the Jews have "colonized" Palestine since 1880, criticize the partition devised by the United Nations in 1947, wax indignant over the fate of the Arab refugees, etc. . . . But one cannot turn backward. One cannot destroy the State of Israel without physically liquidating a people ready to defend it to the end and firmly resolved to remain there because they consider Palestine the home of their ancestors and because nowhere else have they a homeland. It is most remarkable that men "of the Left" in France and elsewhere—who, out of ideological passion, would willingly sacrifice Israel to Pan-Arabism in the name of "anti-imperialism" and who are very vocal about the sacred rights of the Palestinian Arabs—are much less so about the fate of the Kurds, oppressed by the Arabs, or about the black peoples of the Southern Sudan, enslaved and repressed by the "Arab" government of that country. What nation in the world has come into being that has not, at some moment or another in its history, had recourse to force of arms? Was the expansion of Islam achieved without wars or conquest?

If in Europe, following the Second World War, the Oder-Neisse Line must be considered the frontier of peace between Germany and Poland, although it was imposed by force and at the price of a large-scale exodus of refugees—and the same could be said of the present frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R.—then a peaceful frontier can and must be established and recognized between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, although it may result from Israel's having been victorious in three wars and be imposed at the price of a large-scale exodus of refugees.

(2) *The Palestinian Arabs constitute a people that has a right to a national existence, and this existence must be recognized.* Within the borders of what state? Jordan? A Palestinian Arab state independent of Transjordan? This is the affair of the people directly concerned; the decision must be reached through self-determination. In any case, there is no such thing as a nation without territory, and the national existence of the Palestinian Arabs can become a reality only in Palestine. Greater Israel—

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that is to say, the annexation by Israel of the whole of Palestine, which at present she occupies—would be the negation of this right. If the Palestinian Jewish nation must not be destroyed by the Arabs, the Palestinian Arab nation must not be annihilated by the Jews. The chief stumbling block is the fate of the refugees whom Israel has for 20 years refused to repatriate, and whom the Arab states have for 20 years refused to integrate into their populations as immigrants. It is just that Israel recognize their right to repatriation or to indemnification.

For 20 years, the refugees have been maintained at the expense of the United Nations in misery and idleness, but also in the hope that, the State of Israel and all its achievements having been swept from the map of the Middle East, they will soon return to their homes and fields. The erstwhile small farmer, the owner of a few hectares now occupied by an airport or a factory, has been allowed to believe that he will recover his plot of land. But were the moment of truth to come, were a clear choice to be offered between their return to Israel to become Israeli citizens, like the 300,000 Arabs who did remain in Israel, and their establishment, with respectable indemnification, as citizens of a Palestinian Arab state, how many would choose the first alternative?

(3) Since two peoples can legitimately claim the right to a national existence within the same borders, two modes of political organization are possible. Either they are integrated into one and the same binational state (eventually a federal state if the two populations are not intermixed throughout the whole area) or they constitute two independent neighboring states (eventually confederated if they realize that in international political life they have common interests to defend). Although obviously in quite different forms, the first solution is envisaged both in the political program of the Palestinian Arab movement Al Fatah and in some of the plans put forward by Israeli public figures and political groups. Al Fatah speaks of a multicommunal state (the two communities, Jewish and Arab, having equal rights), a secular and democratic state that would be integrated within a Union of States of the Middle East—that is, within a Pan-Arab union. But what does secularity mean in a Muslim political aggregation? What would democracy mean for an ethnic and cultural minority isolated in this aggregation? In which currently existing Arab nation can one find an example or model of democracy? The Israelis have several good reasons for responding to this alternative by declaring it a mealy-mouthed scheme that says nothing worthwhile to them. In actuality, would it not amount to the Jews being dominated by the Arabs?

Some people in Israel propose organizing in the occupied territories a kind of autonomous Arab region attached to the State of Israel. The demographic imbalance and the difference in standards of living and development would be such that, in effect, this would amount to Jewish domination of an Arab minority. The binational state was a possibility up until 1948, and it had fairly numerous supporters among socialist Jews, although fewer supporters among progressive Arabs. Cultural differences between the Jews and Arabs, and, above all, the last 20 years of conflict and hatred make such a solution currently unattainable if one truly wants a peace without one people's dominating or exploiting the other.

Nothing remains, therefore, but a *division of territory between two independent states* that little by little, perhaps, might develop the bonds of an economic community and even of political confederation. The territorial division must be equitable. Without reverting to the 1948 U.N. recommendation, with its complicated frontiers, narrow corridors, and territorial interpenetrations, Israel, in return for recognition by her neighbors and sure frontiers—sure because they will be recognized—must unquestion-

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ably agree to relinquish certain areas conquered on the occasion of one or another of her three victories, and must not insist that every frontier rectification be exclusively to her advantage. For a period of time, in order to avoid "incidents," a zone established in equal depth along both sides of the newly established frontiers should be demilitarized and placed under international control, without any possibility of either of the interested parties' being able unilaterally to terminate this control. It goes without saying that any peace arrangement necessarily obliges the Arab states in no way to restrict the free navigation of Israeli vessels in the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal.

These peace principles seem to me just and rational. I should like to think they are practicable. Men can certainly be found in both camps who are ready to accept them, despite the sacrifice of national pride that they demand. Nevertheless, I question the chances of peace. I fear for Israel and for the Palestinian Arabs during the months and the years ahead. Their fate depends not only on themselves but also on the international balance of power and the struggle between the imperialisms of the great powers. Very important elements are pressuring for an indefinite prolongation of conflict and for war, by gambling on feelings of exacerbated nationalism. All propaganda that exalts the chauvinism of one side or the revolutionism of the other, that condemns one for "imperialism" or denounces the other as "reactionary," is war propaganda; as such, it serves the oil interests or the strategy of domination of this or that great power, but it does not serve the interests of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples or the cause of peace.

—*Translated by* ADRIENNE FOULKE

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Howard J. Wiarda

The Crisis of the Latin-America Democratic Left

THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT in Latin America, once considered the great hope of the Western hemisphere, seems everywhere in decline. Challenged by both the Right and the extreme Left, the democratic radical reformers and their parties seem to have lost their mystique. The "League of Popular Parties," an informal union of Latin-American social democratic parties, has broken up; the old generation of Democratic Left spokesmen is fading away. To these groups John F. Kennedy seemed the embodiment of their ideals—a return to the Good Neighbor policy, an updated version of the New Deal, and a renewed liberal outlook toward Latin-American affairs. But two post-Kennedy administrations have since come to office, and neither under Johnson nor Nixon has the Democratic Left had the sympathetic ear it once enjoyed.

Not that the Latin-American Democratic Left is in full rout. The *Auténticos* in Cuba, Arévalo in Guatemala, Frondizi in Argentina, Bosch in the Dominican Republic, and Villeda Morales in Honduras have long since been deposed; the *Colorados* in Uruguay, *AD* in Venezuela, and the *Populistas* in Puerto Rico have recently been voted out of office, while in Paraguay and Nicaragua long-term dictatorships have suppressed the Democratic Left. In Guatemala, Chile, and Colombia, Democratic Left presidents remain in power, though they are limited by internal pressures and unable to carry out adequately the goals of a peaceful and democratic social revolution; in Mexico the *PRI* is being challenged; in Costa Rica Figueres is given no better than an even chance of winning the forthcoming elections; and in Peru the grandfather of them all, Haya de la Torre, head of the *Aprista* movement, has never been permitted to exercise power (even though the influence of Aprismo on the thinking of the present military leadership has been considerable).

The Democratic Left remains a major force in these countries, but throughout Latin America and in Washington as well, the bloom is off. The moderate middle way of the social democrats has yielded—or been forced to yield—to a rash of conservative-oligarchic governments or outright military dictatorships on the one hand and to a growing chorus calling for violent revolution and popular dictatorship on the other. And nowhere is the crisis of the Democratic Left more poignant than in the Dominican Republic.

Juan Bosch has long been the leader—almost personification—of the Democratic Left in the Dominican Republic; he may well have been the most articulate spokesman for that position in the Hemisphere. Bosch spent over a quarter century, the bulk of his middle years, as an exile from the bloody dictatorship of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo. A largely self-educated writer-intellectual-politician, Bosch founded the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) in exile in 1939, and during the 1940s and 1950s came to know intimately the leading Democratic Left politicians of those times—Betancourt, Figueres, Muñoz, Prío.

Special acknowledgment is due Dr. Iêda Siqueira Wiarda, whose comments on this manuscript have been most helpful.

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Following Trujillo's assassination in 1961 Bosch returned to the Dominican Republic and launched the campaign that little over a year later would carry him and the PRD to overwhelming electoral victory. In Washington these were the heady early days of the Kennedy administration and in Santo Domingo of a great outpouring—so long bottled up by the Trujillo dictatorship—of democratic sentiment. Bosch, carefully fashioning his campaign in accord with the temper of these times, proved to be an effective candidate, filling his speeches with promises of social reform and calling for a peaceful and democratic social revolution. Through these speeches, among the clearest and simplest expressions of the democratic credo ever devised, Bosch brought the masses into national life for the first time. He liked to say that he was "spiritually attuned" to the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to the New Frontier of President John F. Kennedy. In the December 20, 1962, elections, largely on the basis of lower-class support, Bosch and the PRD won by a 2 to 1 margin.

IN OFFICE, Bosch began to organize the machinery for implementing the reforms he had promised. In the new climate that prevailed, he provided freedom to all groups —including the Communists and *Fidelista* sympathizers. But in the end he failed, and with the overthrow of his government the hopes for a peaceful democratic revolution in Santo Domingo collapsed as well.

Bosch's own shortcomings as an administrator have been described in great detail (and rather scurrilously) in a book by the former Stevenson and Kennedy speechwriter and ex-ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John Barthlow Martin.[1] But Martin's book does not adequately come to fundamental grips with sociopolitical power in the Dominican Republic. Bosch had his personal limitations (perhaps more than his share), but in themselves these were of secondary importance in explaining his fall. He was overthrown, basically, because the policies he pursued were a threat to the country's established interests—the armed forces, the Church, the wealthy. When the spiritual arm of the Church, the economic might of the oligarchy, and the armed power of the military were mobilized in unison against him, the government quickly fell. The weak peasant, labor, and student groups, which had initially supported Bosch (but had also become disillusioned by his failure quickly and dramatically to implement his reform promises), stood little chance of counterbalancing the forces defending the status quo. After only seven months in office, the Dominican Republic's first democratic and constitutional government in over three decades was ousted. The great vision collapsed; the showcase for the Alliance became a broken shop window.

This experience severely shook Bosch's faith in the efficacy of democratic politics, but—at least at this point—his faith was not destroyed altogether. At the time he wrote:

> In Latin America the will of the majority does not represent true political support because the majority is really powerless. Power is concentrated in the hands of minorities which possess arms, money, and the means of communications, and those minorities do not represent the will of the majority. True, the majority has influence every four years. But in the intervals between elections—even in those Latin-American countries which hold elections—political power is held by oligarchic groups and the military forces which they manipulate to protect their own special interests.[2]

Shortly thereafter, in an interview at his exile in Puerto Rico, Bosch echoed the same themes. "Democracy is possible in the Dominican Republic once every four years—on election day," he said, "but the rest of

[1] *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Republic from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966).

[2] "Why I was Overthrown," *The New Leader*, October 14, 1963, pp. 3–4.

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the time it is impossible." When asked whether he thought elections would take place in the Dominican Republic in 1965, as then scheduled, Bosch shrugged and stated that even if they did they would be meaningless. "The power of the oligarchy prevents any real democracy in the country."

Bosch therefore began laying the groundwork for his own return to power by other than electoral means. He and the PRD launched a clever campaign to lure Dominican professionals, intellectuals, students, labor leaders, and other opinion-makers to his cause. Recognizing that only a military movement could restore him to office, Bosch took pains to recruit younger and more liberal armed-forces officers, and soon a full-fledged conspiracy was under way. To give this movement a greater air of legitimacy, it was launched not in the name of revolution or rebellion but in the name of a return to constitutional government. Surely no one—including the United States Embassy—could object to such lofty aims.

Both the April 1965 Dominican revolution and the U.S. intervention are all-too familiar. What had begun as a revolt to oust the corruption-ridden and illegitimate triumvirate headed by Donald J. Reid Cabral and to restore Bosch to power became a civil war overnight. As the pro-Bosch "constitutionalist" forces seemed on the verge of winning and possibly destroying the system of privilege and special interest on which the old regime was based, the United States intervened militarily. Hung up by such psychoses as the "second Cuba complex" and fearful that Bosch was not astute enough to deal with the Communists, the U.S. decided —Texas style—to shoot first and ask questions later.

It is impossible to convey the despair and bitterness that set in as the U.S. forcibly snuffed out a popular democratic revolution in this small Caribbean nation. Bosch wrote a long series of bitter articles at the time, demonstrating that the Alliance for Progress was a total failure, the Organization of American States merely an agency for maintaining U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere, and U.S. rhetoric in favor of democratic development in Latin America nothing but empty lies.

Bosch's bitterness has not been assuaged with the passage of time, but his impassioned cries soon gave way to a more reasoned assessment of what the intervention meant both for the U.S. and for developing nations like the Dominican Republic.

Bosch's explanation of U.S. intervention not only in the Dominican Republic but also in Vietnam is his theory of "Pentagonism as a Substitute for Imperialism." [3] He argues that classic imperialism in the Leninist sense—that is, a system in which the imperialist power exploits its colonies as a source of raw materials and an outlet for finished products—has been superseded by Pentagonism. Under this new domination, the mother country exploits *its own* people in order to insure the aims of an economy permanently geared to war. Its own people become the Pentagonist country's best "colony" and are systematically exploited in a manner which assures that human beings and economic wealth will be *deliberately* wasted abroad, as part of an endless cycle profiting only the military establishment and the institutions tied up with it.

Pentagonism, in Bosch's view, is the product of an alliance of science, technology, industry, and the armed forces. It flourishes in a society where the profit motive and the desire for international dominance top the scale of values, and where a military-corporate establishment operates outside the traditional network of checks and balances, responsible to no one. In deadly seriousness but with a touch of irony, Bosch states that the U.S. is a politically underdeveloped nation: its political structure has failed to adapt to the immense postwar social and

[3] *Pentagonism as a Substitute for Imperialism*, New York: Grove Press, 1968; originally published in Spanish, Santo Domingo: Publicaciones AHORA, C. por. A.

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economic changes. Pentagonism, as Bosch sees it, has taken over to such an extent that the U.S. now has, in effect, a civilian government for domestic affairs and a military government with almost free reign in foreign affairs. Bosch's analysis parallels recent arguments concerning the growth of the "military-industrial complex"—and in his preface Bosch quotes from Senator Fulbright on these themes. But Bosch goes far beyond the arguments of those like Fulbright who still see possibilities for reform within the system: Bosch sees Pentagonism as inherent within the American set of values and as the *inevitable* result of the kind of industrial-technocratic, dehumanized, "Pentagonized" society that America has become. This is not just a critique of U.S. interventionism but a pseudo-Marxist albeit sophisticated theoretical explanation of how this country's recent foreign policy can be explained in terms of the kind of society the U.S. now is. Bosch's intellectual affinities are here closer to C. Wright Mills, the SDS, and perhaps even Marcuse than to Senators Fulbright or McCarthy.

THE BOSCH BOOK is marred by a host of factual errors and dubious or specious reasoning. Despite the recent revelations concerning Defense Department machinations, for example, it is preposterous to conclude that this represents a sinister *conspiracy* to take over the national government. To assert—as Bosch does—that the U.S. is a "nation of warriors," that German immigration during the 19th century has determined our aggressive, militaristic outlook, that only a few liberals have survived in the U.S. "for biological reasons" is simply ludicrous. Presumably with the invasions of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and now Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union could also be characterized as a "Pentagonized nation" (though a different label would clearly have to be used), but such an analysis is outside Bosch's purposes and he does not go into it. Indeed, many of the same charges that were once leveled against Mills and are now used in disputing Marcuse or the SDS could also be leveled against Bosch's theory of Pentagonism: they all ignore pertinent facts that fly in the face of their theoretical constructs, they all gloss over the possibilities for change, and they all (to my mind) fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the American system. This said, it is nevertheless true that Bosch's basic charges are so serious and have so many elements of truth that they deserve serious study. Surely as the Vietnam war drags on, seemingly by its own momentum, and as decisions are made as those on ABM, it is difficult to believe that there are adequate checks on the military-industrial complex.

Bosch has sought to document his case. He traces the birth of Pentagonism, its expansion during the Cold War decades, and its consolidation under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He discusses its doctrines (such as "anti-Communism"), political strategies, and methods of justifying its actions. He analyzes the "take-over" of major industries, the AFL–CIO, certain foundations and publishing houses, the universities and think tanks, indeed the entire society by the CIA-Pentagonist complex. The book closes with an apocalyptic vision of Pentagonism's march toward total power. Clearly the abuses and ill-conceived policies Bosch attacks need to be corrected, but the cause of reform will hardly be served by the verbal overkill Bosch employs. As one reviewer has stated, Bosch provides little more than "new myths for the new left."

Bosch is not only a theoretician; he is also a practicing politician. From his self-imposed exile, first in Spain and now Paris, he is still the great *caudillo* of the Dominican Revolutionary party, the only real grass-roots political organization in the Dominican Republic, and his study of Pentagonism, like others he has written, is as much a political manifesto as a scholarly tome. Though from afar, Bosch still domi-

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nates PRD councils and his word is almost holy writ to the rank and file. Given the theory of Pentagonism, what, then, in Bosch's view, is the solution to the problems of nations like the Dominican Republic? His answer is "dictatorship with popular support." His personal experience, it will be recalled, had already led him to conclude that elections in oligarchy-dominated societies are a sham, that representative democracy and gradualist reform are not capable of coping with the immense problems of the developing nations, and that the U.S. would not permit a democratic social revolution in the Dominican Republic. The solution Bosch is now calling for—and insisting on making PRD official policy—is that of "dictatorship with popular support."

This phrase first appeared in a long argument by Bosch concerning the irrelevance of elections in the Dominican Republic. Originally, his foes picked it out of context as "proof" that he was a Marxist-Leninist. From a political point of view—given the immense U.S. presence in that part of the world and the manifest feeling of most Dominicans for at least the formal structure and symbols of democratic government—this was an unfortunate choice of words. It was especially unfortunate because the Dominican Republic had so long suffered under the Trujillo dictatorship—in fact, Bosch had first risen to prominence as a foe of *all* kinds of dictatorship. The choice of words, I think, is a sign of a conflict that has always raged within Bosch, rendering him ineffective as a president and perhaps destroying him politically. It is a conflict between Bosch the intellectual, who has the obligation of speaking the truth no matter what the costs, and Bosch the politician, who has not learned that there are times to compromise and exercise restraint. In any case, Bosch has done nothing to soften the unfortunate connotations that this phrase carries, has never sought to "clarify" it or claim that he was misunderstood. Instead, he has returned to this theme again and again, and one may reasonably conclude that Bosch is satisfied to have "dictatorship with popular support" stand as the one shorthand phrase summarizing his position.

What exactly Bosch has in mind by "dictatorship with popular support" as *the* answer to the problems of developing nations has never been quite made clear. There is some speculation that he sees a "Nasserist solution"—that is, a military group (perhaps led by the "missing" Colonel Caamaño, who directed the "constitutionalist" forces in the 1965 revolution) whose objectives would be the reconquest of national identity and social progress.[4] Bosch may also see a solution à la Castro, which implies roughly the same goals as Nasserism but achieved through guerrilla warfare and under civilian rather than military leadership. He has also written favorably of both Tito's softer and more open form of popular dictatorship and of the present Peruvian junta.

Bosch's most complete attempt to explain the phrase "dictatorship with popular support" was recently published in the Dominican magazine *Ahora*. Here he eloquently describes the frustrated development most of the Latin-American nations have experienced in the last decade: despite all our aid, the lot of the poor grows worse. Bosch blames this on the Latin-American oligarchies and the Pentagonist forces that serve them. It is, however, a long step—and one he does not adequately explain—from this analysis of Latin America's ills to the conclusion that the only solution is a "dictatorship with popular support." Nor does he spell out the mechanics of the regime he has in mind or say who shall control it and how it will acquire power. Clearly, he keeps his program purposely vague, so as to keep open as many options as possible; but the very vagueness of such a loaded slogan as

[4] But see José Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), esp. pp. 113–118.

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"dictatorship with popular support" is disturbing to many of his former supporters.

While Bosch's statements remain ambiguous, his opponents have no doubt about his meaning. A recently published annual report of the Dominican armed forces states that Bosch has been visiting the Communist nations and has reached an agreement with them "to implant in our country a dictatorship with popular support like that which Fidel Castro maintains in Cuba" whose goal is the destruction of the armed forces. To representatives of the Church and the wealthy as well as some U.S. Embassy personnel, Bosch's latest pronouncements seem to confirm what they had long suspected: that Bosch has all along been a Communist and that the result of his return to power would almost certainly mean a "second Cuba." If the U.S. intervened militarily in 1965 to prevent a Bosch-PRD comeback and more subtly manipulated Dominican affairs during the following year to make sure he would not win the presidential elections, one can readily imagine what its response would be to a Bosch-led "dictatorship with popular support." Given these reactions, it is ironic that the traditional, Moscow-oriented Communists in the Dominican Republic have also denounced the Bosch thesis. The Maoists have been more sympathetic.

LET US REMEMBER some caveats. It may be that only a violent revolution led by a "dictatorship with popular support" is capable of making more than a dent in the immense problems of the Dominican Republic. But it also happens that the Dominican Republic lies within what the U.S. considers its sphere of influence and, like it or not, the U.S. is overwhelmingly powerful in this hemisphere. Is it conceivable that the U.S. would permit a "dictatorship with popular support" to come to power? Obsessed by the fear—based on the Cuban experience — that "unknown" quantities such as Bosch or Castro may be impossible to dislodge once they have come to power, the U.S. seems to feel it is preferable to move against revolutionary movements before they have a chance to consolidate their position. Bosch's call for a "dictatorship with popular support" seems wholly unrealistic, not only in the context of the existing power structure of the Dominican Republic but also in view of overwhelming U.S. influence in the Caribbean region.

It might also be remembered that the Dominican people seem profoundly to believe that representative democracy is the best form of government and that, after the Trujillo experience, they are unwilling to entertain the idea of any kind of dictatorship, "popular" or not. The fear that Donald Reid might have been trying to extend his mandate illegally, was, after all, one reason the 1965 revolution won so much popular support. Bosch is only stating a truism when he points out that representative democracy in Latin America originally reflected a grafting of inappropriate constitutional arrangements derived from North America onto societies where they would not "take." His analysis fails to take into account, however, that by now—150 years later—constitutional, representative democracy is deeply imbedded in the Latin-American psyche as a system of government which in this context may not always function as intended but is nevertheless an ideal to strive for. This is particularly true in the Dominican Republic where, since Trujillo, a blind faith in constitutionalism—almost a cult of democracy—has emerged. Bosch's "dictatorship with popular support" flies in the face of this tradition.

The more astute politicians within the PRD recognize this and privately express the fear that Bosch's public stand may have destroyed their chances of achieving power —as, perhaps, those of the *Apristas* in Peru. Leading politicians within the PRD who disagree with Bosch's position have been expelled; the party's voices of reason and moderation have been largely silenced.

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Equally damaging is the fact that many of the PRD's former supporters and allies—within the press, the labor leadership, the bureaucracy, other reformist parties, etc.—have become disillusioned. In an effort to keep the party and its coalition of supporters from total disintegration, PRD Secretary General José Francisco Peña Gómez has frantically tried to hold all the loose ends together, to explain "what Bosch really meant," to allay the fears of the military and other conservative interests and of the U.S. Embassy. These efforts have been repeatedly undermined by Bosch's insistence that he meant exactly what he said and by the demand of the left wing of the party that the PRD head up a "National Liberation Front [of all names!] of all parties opposed to the oligarchy and to U.S. imperialism."

Bosch's thesis has received widespread support among Dominican students and left-wing intellectuals. In the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo the pro-Bosch student group, campaigning on a platform of "dictatorship with popular support," won the university elections for the first time; and a number of faculty panel discussions of the Marxist-dominated school of economics and newly-created social science department have supported Bosch's position. Clearly the Dominican Republic sorely needs a new development ethic that can mobilize the country, and only its intellectuals can provide that; but what is required of the intellectual community is a measure of precision and realism in their thinking, and this Bosch's thesis does not provide.

There are some ironic twists—and none of them augur well for the future of the PRD in the Dominican Republic. Bosch's diatribes, for instance, were directed primarily against the Johnson administration—and in many ways rightly so. But Johnson and his "one voice in Latin-American affairs," Thomas Mann, are no longer making policy in Washington; W. Tapley Bennett has long since ceased to be ambassador in Santo Domingo; and it is just possible—had not Bosch said what he did—that now a PRD administration would not meet with the same U.S. objections as three or four years ago.

At precisely the time Bosch wrote on the failure of representative democracy and the need for "dictatorship with popular support," the PRD, as the "loyal opposition," seemed to be disintegrating, and middle-of-the-road President Joaquín Balaguer securely in power and assured of winning another term of office. The possibilities for electing a reformist government seemed bleak. Now, however, it begins to appear that Balaguer is vulnerable to the charge of *continuismo* (a fear whose origins can also be traced to the Trujillo dictatorship) and just may be beaten in the scheduled 1970 elections—or that he may decide not to run at all. Should the elections take place as scheduled, the PRD may well hold the balance of power. This is doubly ironic, for Balaguer—an extremely clever politician—has been regaining strength by capitalizing on Bosch's slogans to paint the PRD into a corner of its own making.

Some PRD leaders are arguing that Bosch's statements do not rule out elections as *one* possible means to power, but Bosch is not the sort to recant, and it may already be too late for the PRD. The Democratic Left in the Dominican Republic is not only being destroyed from without—that is, through U.S. intervention and systematic oppression by the armed forces—but is also disintegrating from within, largely as a result of bitter factionalism stemming from Bosch's divisive leadership.

THE EVOLUTION of Bosch's thought over the years is in some ways parallel to that of Arévalo in Guatemala and Castro in Cuba—more like the former than the latter. Arévalo too was an intellectual "spiritual socialist" whose political perspicacity was open to question; he reacted bitterly against the 1954 U.S.-sponsored interven-

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tion in Guatemala and then gravitated to the Left. One need only read his *The Shark and the Sardines* and *Anti-Kommunism in Latin America* to find the despair and frustration Bosch now expresses. Castro too, though more a man of action than a *pensador,* was previously a radical-nationalist in the tradition of the *Ortodoxo* party. Castro, seeing his promising political career frustrated by Batista's coup of 1952, became convinced that the revolution he was leading could not succeed by gradualist reformism. Eventually he gravitated to a "Marxist-Leninist" position.

Despite these surface parallels, however, it is difficult to conceive of Bosch as really an authoritarian at heart. He has been driven to the wall, and he is now saying some things that seem irresponsible and at times downright foolish. But Bosch also is the visible evidence of our own failures; "dictatorship with popular support," tragically, is where our own blindness may lead. Surely we know now that military dictatorships, oligarchic regimes, and U.S. intervention cannot altogether contain the sweep of sociopolitical change but can only slow it down temporarily. Certainly we must now recognize that the ultimate result of frustrated democratic revolution (Guatemala, 1944–54; Cuba, 1933, 1944–52; Santo Domingo, 1963, 1965) is likely to lead to more violent popular explosions later.

By pursuing his current reasoning, Bosch has, in effect, dropped out of the system. Like many others in recent years he has become disillusioned with the liberal democratic credo and opted for a more radical solution. It can be argued, however, that in contrast to the American system, with its capacity to change and adapt, the system Bosch dropped out of may not be worth saving. This is a legitimate position to take, it seems to me, though I am of two minds about it. I have studied the Dominican Republic in detail and I am very skeptical of the system's capacity to reform itself gradually, to respond at all adequately to pressing social and economic problems, to adapt to the modern twentieth-century world, and to achieve development and modernization through evolutionary, incremental means.[5] On the other hand, military-oligarchic regimes are disinclined to and clearly incapable of creating the institutional infrastructure that Latin America so sorely needs, and I am equally skeptical that Nasserism, Castroism, or Titoism necessarily represent the wave of the future.[6]

It is extremely presumptuous for affluent North Americans to tell a people living in misery, starvation, oppression, and frustration that they should be patient, that they must wait and sacrifice now for a distant and uncertain future. Bosch has been criticized by his former friends in this country as being politically inastute and irresponsible—which may be true; but let us also remember the forces pushing him to desperation: the failure of democracy in his own country, repeated United States intervention, a sense of frustrated nationalism, thousands of dead Dominicans, and many more hundreds of thousands whose hopes for a decent life have been repeatedly thwarted. To urge upon these people gradualism is now particularly difficult—and may no longer be possible. The Dominican people have been caught up in the "revolution of rising expectations," and it is doubtful whether now the clock can be turned back.

Still, can one visualize any other solution?

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[5] See Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968); and Wiarda, *The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1969).

[6] Other scholars have explored these systems in greater depth than I, but for one man's attempt to wrestle with possible alternatives to development see the articles by the present author, "Revolution or Counter-revolution in Brazil?" *Massachusetts Review,* 8 (Winter 1967): 149–165; "Crisis Coming in Brazil" *The New Republic,* September 14, 1968, pp. 15–17; "Cuba", in Ben B. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (eds.), *Political Forces in Latin America* (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, revised edition forthcoming).

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The development-modernization process is long and difficult, full of setbacks, frustrations, and tragedies. The Latin-American Democratic Left is surely not deserving of the euphoria that surrounded it in the early 1960s, but then neither have the Castro revolution and the technocratically-inclined military regimes done so marvelously either. Throughout Bosch's analysis, for instance, the assumption is that a turn to dictatorship will ipso facto mean quicker modernization. But this is an assumption far from proved, and in the Latin-American context almost certainly wrong. At the very least it should not simply be taken for granted. The development of Latin America will not come overnight, regardless of the means used; the fundamental transformations that modernization entails will require two or more generations; and this development—if it can be accomplished at all—will largely have to be accomplished by the Latin-American nations themselves, on their own terms. Once all the arguments are scrutinized, the most efficacious way toward these changes remains the program of the Democratic Left.

If not the panacea for all Latin America's ills we may once have thought, only the Democratic Left seems capable of putting forth a dynamic development ideology that is in accord with the unique experience of Latin America and the wishes of its people. Only the Democratic Left seems to be capable of reconciling the diverse sectors that make up the almost inherently corporativist but increasingly complex Latin-American societies, of creating the political institutions—parties, labor organizations, peasant associations, and so forth—that offer the most hopeful prospects for stable growth, and of reaching an accommodation with the U.S.

The old arguments in favor of the Democratic Left, if once oversold, are thus still valid. In the face of strong challenges from both the extreme Left and the Right (frequently working in alliance), the reformist course of the social democrats still represents the most viable way to meet the challenge of contemporary Latin America. What is required is long-term commitment, the ability to absorb setbacks and disappointments, and yet the perseverance to keep the goal of more just and humane societies in Latin America firmly in perspective.

The accomplishments of Betancourt, Leoni, Lleras, the PRI, Muñoz, Figueres, and Frei are impressive; they have clearly demonstrated that it is possible to carry out fundamental social reform in Latin America within a democratic framework. Frei's nationalization of the copper mines in Chile, which after all was quite a radical step, indicates that profound changes can be initiated without necessarily destroying democracy. Given the fact that even the most skilled Democratic Left leaders cannot accomplish miracles overnight, they have nevertheless succeeded in the extremely difficult task of "develop-mongering" within the framework of relatively open societies. Too often the argument that only through dictatorship can certain reforms be undertaken is a *post hoc* way to rationalize the destruction of democracy after it has occurred.

The position of the Democratic Left has now been made even more difficult than it was before, however, because it now faces not only the powerful opposition of entrenched status quo-oriented interests, the hostility of the extreme Left who demands a violent revolution, and frequently the innate suspicion of the United States government, but also the disillusionment of some Democratic Left leaders themselves, such as Bosch. But if the crisis of the Latin-American Democratic Left is a profound and difficult one, then so is the crisis of transition which Latin America as a whole is experiencing. And if the prospects for the Democratic Left in Latin America are at the moment not very bright, that simply means that the immediate prospects for the Hemisphere as a whole are not very encouraging either.

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Karl Bottigheimer

Oxford Faces Student Rebellion

LAST SPRING the University of Oxford published, mainly for internal circulation, the *Report of the Committee on Relations with Junior Members.** The investigatory prose of university committees is not in short supply or great demand, but the Oxford committee's report is distinguished both by the lucid thought of its eminent chairman, H. L. A. Hart, professor of jurisprudence, and by its unimpassioned examination of the issues which underly university problems everywhere.

The committee of six "senior" (i.e., faculty) members was appointed with a mandate "to consider . . . what arrangements and channels are desirable for consultation between the University and Junior [i.e., student] Members on faculty and other university matters affecting them. . . ." Hart immediately set about widening these "terms of reference," so that almost all relationships within the university might come under his committee's scrutiny.

Fifty-five meetings were held, and all members of the university were invited to submit written evidence. Thirty-one senior members chose to do so, including such Oxford worthies as Max Beloff, Isaiah Berlin, and the Warden of All Souls. Two hundred and three students responded individually, as well as several dozen student groups. Outsiders submitted evidence from points as distant as Auckland and Berkeley.

A smaller number of persons was invited to present oral evidence, including representatives of the Thames Valley Constabulary and the National Union of Students.

The resulting report, in 228 numbered paragraphs and four sizable appendices, treats the rules and institutions of Oxford and is as parochial in its specific recommendations as all such university business tends to be. But where most university committees shrink visibly from confronting the underlying philosophical questions, which if allowed any prominence will ordinarily divide an academic committee, the Hart Committee placed them in the forefront.

Take the central question of "democratic principles" and their applicability to a university. The Hart report acknowledges "various formulations of the case for student participation in the government of universities" but is quick to observe that "some of these invoke democratic principles and in so doing, seem to us to beg some very large questions concerning academic authority and the relevance of such principles to it." Then comes the sentence one is not likely to have heard recently on an American campus: ". . . there is a need for a clear statement of the character of academic authority which distinguishes between its defensible forms and unnecessary or obscurantist accretions."

Believing that academic authority *has* "defensible forms," the committee sets forth its case:

> We conceive that it is quite wrong to approach questions of academic authority with the assumption that a university either is or should be a microcosm of society at

* *Report of the Committee on Relations with Junior Members,* Supplement No. 7 to *The University Gazette,* Vol. 99 (Oxford University Press), 203 pp., 12 shillings.

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large, and then to draw the conclusion that, in a democratic country where students are acknowledged as entitled to the legal and political rights of adults, they have a right to share in the government of a university in all its aspects, and so to be represented on all its decision-making bodies on at least an equal footing with teachers. We think that this general argument from the democratic character of society rests on an undefended and indeed indefensible assumption that a university has no special purposes or functions and no special problems to confront, which should differentiate its academic decision-making processes from those of society at large.

The Hart report accepts that "there are aspects of university life where students should participate in strength on decision-making bodies."

> Nonetheless a university has as its distinctive purposes the advancement of knowledge and teaching, conceived not as the mere transmission of knowledge, but as the development of powers of criticism and judgment and the adjustment of the vital interplay between research and teaching. In our view, no theory of legal and political rights for the conduct of a society as a whole, not even democratic theory, is transferable to the government of these distinctively academic activities. Since there are these distinctive purposes to be pursued, it is, we believe, plain that teachers equipped by skill, knowledge, and experience, training, and continuing professional association with a university should have final authority as to the manner in which they are pursued. We think that the contrary view can only be held by those who ignore the complexity of the truth and the extent to which its attainment is dependent on experience, accumulated knowledge, and organization.

The Hart committee does not employ this statement for the benefit of the status quo. It has already admitted, and implicitly deplored, the existence of "obscurantist accretions" to academic authority, and having squared off against the student Left, it now takes on the formidable Oxford Right.

> A very modest effort at self scrutiny is sufficient to reveal to most of us, besides ordinary human failings, symptoms more or less advanced, of the specific failings which the conditions of academic life may foster or at any rate not sufficiently discourage: fear of doing anything for the first time; unnecessary secrecy; reluctance to learn what students think of the teaching offered to them; and the tendencies, sometimes hardening with the years, to believe that what is interesting or merely convenient for the teacher to teach is interesting and necessary for the student to learn. . . .
>
> Those who have the authority to decide academic matters which are of vital concern to any generation of students, such as the syllabus and methods of teaching and examination or assessment, should be under an obligation to explain their exercise of their authority to students and to modify their practice in the face of cogent criticism while remaining free to tell students (as they would their colleagues) when they are talking nonsense . . . . Authority divorced from such readiness to give reasons to those over whom it is exercised and to attend to their arguments is a foreign element in a university whose whole educational policy is designed to foster critical and rational discussion.

IN ESSENCE the Hart report recommends "democratization" (my word) of all aspects of the university not critical to the preservation of academic values. It regards this as an attainable, and indeed necessary, goal if the historic concept of academic community is to survive. The division of students and faculty into "they" and "we" is deplored as foreign to the Oxford tradition of small, close, collegiate societies, and denounced as "a howling wilderness where no academic purposes can prosper." But troglodyte Oxonians are warned that the harmony of the past, based on "factors no longer present or now much attenuated," cannot be recaptured by the mere reassertion of authority.

Thus the Hart committee sets the stage for the 66 recommendations which follow and which clearly call for major changes in

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the university. The question is: will the nostrum work? Has the doctor diagnosed the disease properly, and if so has he reached the patient in time and prescribed an effective remedy? English universities, and Oxford and Cambridge in particular, thus far seem the least afflicted of Western universities. The high degree of order, the low repute of violence, and the still formidable distinctions of a hierarchical society all conduce to lingering stability. From a liberal point of view (the point of view that "justice" rather than "repression" is the progenitor of peace), there should still be time at Oxford to make the concessions necessary to avoid the chaos that has engulfed universities in the United States, France, and Germany.

First responses to the report go some distance toward dashing such hopes. Students complained that the recommendations did not go "far enough." From the Senior Common Rooms came rumbles of discontent that the recommendations went anywhere at all. It is the special affliction of *via media* solutions, when they fail, to fail on all fronts.

Much depends upon the support available for the report's conception of the university as an unequivocally academic institution nevertheless compatible with a degree of democratic procedure. The report is filled with implications that "most students" respect academic values and that "most faculty" deplore autocratic authority. If they do not, the future of the report and what it stands for is dim.

The threat from the Right is difficult to assess. Oxford remains a sanctuary of privilege. The *priviligés* are not likely to give up without a fight, despite the excellent English record for throwing in the towel at the strategic moment.

But the most visible threat to the Hart report comes from the growing tide of student radicalism. With the exception of a few "asides," the body of the Hart report seems to have been written without student radicalism much in mind. The subject is treated at length, however, in an appendix where it is explained that the number of radical students at Oxford is relatively small, not having exceeded 300 (out of approximately 10,000 students) even in the most exacerbated situations. But the appendix takes student radicalism seriously:

> . . . The root of unrest is a horror of contemporary forms of society, excited by realization of the conditions of the world's poor, both within the West and even more outside it, by racial intolerance, by the extremes of inequality, by the spread of materialism, and by the impoverishment of human life in advanced industrial societies, stunted by monotonous labour and the artificial divisions between social classes. . . . Four beliefs, however, differentiate the attitude of student revolutionaries to these evils from the indictments of the traditional Left. The first is the belief that the radical, economic, and social changes required for the solution of these agonizing problems are excluded by the refusal, and indeed inability, of all the conventional political parties to contemplate genuine alternatives to the system. . . . Hence Conservatism and Socialism, Western Democracy and Soviet Communism, behind their different forms of idealistic cover, are held to be alike repressive oligarchies committed to the maintenance of the established order. . . .
>
> Secondly, there is the belief that the traditional sources of challenge to the established order have been invaded or neutralized by it; that working-class politics, once the active source of moral challenge, have been deadened not by direct repression but by the opiate of relative prosperity. . . .
>
> Thirdly, both the parliamentary democracies of the West and the bureaucracies of communist society and indeed all conventional forms of organization and authority are thought to be forms of repression, neither sensitive to people's grievances nor concerned to fulfil their aspirations. Hence one of the few positive principles discernible in this form of radicalism is that conventional forms of democracy and the authority of elected representatives must be replaced by "direct" democracy, so that, to the maximum

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extent possible, decisions in the factory and in the university, as well as in society at large, shall be made by general assemblies of those principally affected by them. . . .

Fourthly, militant students believe they have a special position and function. Not yet caught up in the system, but possessing intelligence and insight into it, they are, in their own eyes, the vanguard whose first task is to awaken others to the realities of their condition, to "politicize" them and thus begin the redemption of society. . . .

THE HART COMMITTEE recognized clearly the ideological threat of the student New Left to the academic university:

> In the perspective of this movement the universities appear both to sustain the structure of a corrupt society and to reflect it. . . . For this form of radicalism the conception of academic authority which we have presented . . . must be as objectionable as the crudest assertion of the absolute right of teachers to dictate what students should learn, how they should learn it, and how they should live. . . . Thus the teacher's experience and accumulated knowledge are not qualifications for determining academic policy but disqualifications: the teacher enclosed in the prevailing orthodoxies of his time is blind to the radical alternatives, to existing policies and methods of which the young, the ignorant, and the inexperienced have an undimmed vision. So, too, the transience of the student as compared with the continuing connection of the teacher with the university, far from disqualifying the former, is a fact which gives him a special right to share in the control of academic policy, because the short years of a student's stay are far more important to him than the same years for the permanent staff. . . .

THE GREAT DEFICIENCY of the Hart report is, I think, that an issue of such magnitude is tidily swept out of the main arena to be displayed, inconclusively, in a side-show. The justification that radicalism had attracted too few followers at Oxford to be regarded as a serious force seems out of place in a report that gives so much emphasis to the intrinsic worth of ideas. The committee seems to have found student radicalism so repugnant that it despaired of any efforts at dialogue. It is not impossible to sympathize with such an abhorrence—it merely mirrors the hostility of radicals to academics—but in a world in which student radicalism is not likely to remain negligible, *nolo contendere* is a disappointing plea. Worse than that, it is a blow to those who share the Hart committee's respect for academic values and who hesitate to commit them, unarmed, to battle. Such a demurrer would be more bearable if one did not feel that H. L. A. Hart (the undoubted author) was so pre-eminently a man to plead the cause. The great problem with the resistance to student activism is that it is becoming increasingly unintellectual, covert, conspiratorial, and inarticulate. Men of power in the universities are determining to deal with it "in their fashion" which, in the clinches, can result in unwarranted concessions and/or the triumph of reaction. Idealistic faculty (which is all faculty, by self-definition) are left to choose between students whom they know to be silly and administrators they know to be wicked.

A compelling and articulate defense of academic values is needed, one that addresses not the critics of the past (the church, congressional investigators, and so forth), but the critics of the present and their particular moral consciousness. Such a feat is admittedly difficult in the face of the abuse, rudeness, and even force with which the New Left forces have learned to silence those who disagree with them, but it is what Hart promises and does not perform. By showing in Appendix A that student radicalism is reducible to a coherent system of thought, Hart brings us to the very border of a critique. Then, like Achilles, he retires to his tent; and one can only hope that as the clash of arms comes closer to Oxford he will in time be stirred to reemerge.

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Roger Dionne

An Evening with the Waterbury Left

A MEXICAN WIFE languishing in the brick-and-neon waste of an industrial town naturally leaps at any tropic glimmer—even a lecture amid the folding chairs of the Community Room of Trinity Church. I was unenthusiastic. What I remembered about Maryknoll missionaries were collections taken up in parochial school to save Chinese children from heathenism and Communism, and a monthly bulletin my mother used to receive with pictures of pith-helmeted servants of God reading the Bible to fat-bellied African primitives.

But then there was my friend Wally Inglis. In parochial school, he had played taps at every military funeral in town. He went through Taft and Yale with scholarships and honors and never smoked or drank or dated. Naturally, he became a Maryknoll. Then after years of estrangement, when he was presumably saving little Laotians or Filipinos from the Chinese juggernaut, there was his name, clear as day, in an ad condemning the Vietnam war. A few months ago, he turned up in Waterbury, on his way to Baltimore to demonstrate in support of the Catonsville nine, who were being tried for napalming draft records. Whatever happened to the little missionary? Now another Maryknoll was coming to Trinity Church—Father Blase Bonpane, ex-Marine, ex-amateur boxing champ, expelled from Guatemala for revolutionary activities. There was nothing you could depend on anymore. Not even the Maryknolls.

The Waterbury Peace Committee, which I had helped organize, was sponsoring the talk. I had lost faith in the group long ago. I didn't think vigiling and chest-pounding were of much use in a land of nerve gas and missiles. Nevertheless, I agreed to hear the Maryknoll. For while in Waterbury we were romantic and mouthy, in Guatemala they fought with real bullets and napalm.

We parked in front of the Immaculate Conception Church, which rose in marble baroque mockery of the otherwise quaint New England Green. Trinity, the High Episcopal church where we were going, crouched behind the Immaculate, up Prospect Street, unseen from the Green, as though indeed crowding back from what that old WASP Faulkner called "the coastal spew of Europe." For of course the Irish and Italians and Poles and French-Canadians and Lithuanians had arrived decades earlier, before the southern blacks came up to challenge them, to work the Yankees' mills and ungratefully take over their town, scattering the WASPS up Cracker Hill and Bunker Hill and out to neighboring Middlebury and Woodbury and Watertown. As their shavelings intoned sticky Christian adages from County Cork and Calabria, these sweaty interlopers refused to treat the black man like a human being and took four and five dollars an hour to produce fuses and antipersonnel bombs for Vietnam. You certainly couldn't count on the immigrants; however, though he secluded himself under the elms of Cracker Hill, you could count on the Reverend Mr. John Parker of Trinity to give you a parish hall as you could count on Reverend Perry of St. John's, Reverend

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Clinton of the First Congregational, Reverend Lanham of the First Methodist, and other Yankee clerics. On the other hand, few Catholic priests in this overwhelmingly Catholic town had even read, let alone agreed with, Pope John's *Pacem in Terris* or Paul's *Populorum Progressio.*

Yet the Yankee clerics' love affair with the blacks and the Viet Cong was often a modish way of looking down their aquiline noses at the confused rabble of Waterbury, who came home from ten hours at the shop to noisy, mortgaged houses, whose taxes kept growing to pay, it seemed to them, for welfare for blacks, for special education for blacks, for black history in the high schools ("We never demanded Irish history!"), for Vista and Job Corps and Outward Bound and Food Stamps and Head Start and Legal Aid and Youth Enrichment, all for blacks, Negroes, niggers, and lazy white trash who didn't work their asses off like they had done to get ahead. The Parkers and the Perrys—and the New Left as well, which is more important, for the Parkers and the Perrys would do best to mind their business—have never tried to understand the desolate anxiety of these immigrants and sons and daughters of immigrants, who with Thornton Wilder made it through the thirties, went off to war with John Wayne under the banners of my country 'tis of thee in the forties, and who in the sixties can never loosen the knot in their stomachs no matter how many backyard cook-outs and beers they serve up nor how many probowls they watch in color as though they were right there—"It's better than being right there." A Chicago cop's night stick cracking a dirty bastard's head is the best sort of therapy. Long hair and sit-ins and priests getting married and lesbians making out right there on the screen for any kid to see spell nothing but trouble for them because no one's speaking to them, no one's even speaking their language.

Then there are the more cynical liberals, the Rockefeller-Lindsay-Ribicoff axis, like Harland Griswold, president of the Waterbury National Bank, and Malcolm Baldridge, president of the Scovill Manufacturing Company. They squeeze the desire-laden papists dry, while they play bridge—whist, they call it—in their low-mill-rate Woodbury hideaways, collect municipal bond interest, and invent high-faluting schemes on the Citizens' Action Committee to spend still more of the Waterbury taxpayers' money. What do they care about the Negroes or the Jews? Yet there they are sitting at the head table at the NAACP banquet, giving money to the Black Youth Movement when a lot of those punks haven't even finished high school like our kids, hobnobbing with the Jews at the Temple Israel art show and the United Jewish Appeal fund-raiser. Ever see any of them at the Franco-American Club? Or at the Hibernians? Or at the Knights of Columbus? Damn right you haven't. They don't even treat us like human beings unless they want our money or our vote.

Of course, it is from these, often boorish, poker-playing papists that the ranks of the Waterbury Right are filled. Listen to some of their names: Goggin, Foley, Teubner, Fabiano, Kearney, O'Donnell, Seliokas, Russo, Scott, Calo, Desaulniers, Ariola, Brazenas, Pont, Scully, Cutillo, Moynihan, Crafa, Barbieri, Tremaglio. They toast Wallace and LeMay at the VFW. They run the Americanism Forum, which is a front for the paramilitary Defense Survival Force, which is a front for the Minutemen. In his nomination acceptance speech last year, Paul Ariola, the president of the Police Union, saw the need for ". . . police dogs, gas grenades, shotguns in every car, high-powered spotlights, more patrol cars." Was it the Mafia he was after? This is what brought the cheers: "We serve notice on all civil rights gangsters here and now that if discussions and negotiations fail, we will put their long hot summer in a deep freeze, and we intend to have enough ice boxes to do it at a minimum risk to ourselves."

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No, one didn't like allying oneself with the Parkers and Griswolds, but the working stiffs, even when they applauded a well-turned extended metaphor, were still less felicitous. They could forgive Joe Namath a lot, for he threw a hellova pass. But Dionne, they laughed, he probably couldn't make it to the line of scrimmage, and here he is telling me all about Vietnam when I served three years in the South Pacific.

As my wife and I entered Trinity Church, under the looming cupola of the Immaculate Conception, I realized we hadn't seen any of our radical friends for more than six months. We noticed Frank Kennedy, a young priest who said underground masses for a handful of people every Sunday in the Berkeley Heights ghetto after counseling despondent spouses on Saturday night. He was talking with four or five nuns. They greeted us warmly and directed us upstairs, where we found Jim and Kathy Noonan at the entrance to the meeting room. Looking like a tough Boston Irish sailor who has difficulty approaching women, Jim was the backbone of the Waterbury Left. Untheoretical, nervous about language, unable to be hurt no matter how much gaff he took from more temperamental people like myself, he was always the man of last resort—to make the contact no one else dared, to get those leaflets run off somehow, to lead a picket in front of the Armed Forces recruiting centers, to drive black protesters down to City Hall, to tell off the mayor or anyone else who needed telling off.

"I almost didn't recognize you with the beard," he said.

I had forgotten about my beard. It would exonerate me, I thought, for I couldn't have copped out completely if I was wearing a beard. I said hello to Janet Vigezzi and Reed and Martie Smith. No one said, "Well, glad to see you back in the fold," for though they did it part-time, the same way that others joined bowling leagues and bridge clubs, these people played the reform and revolution game for keeps and would not stoop to banalities. Wally Inglis was there too, down from Boston for the weekend. He'd be taking the three-hour drive back after the talk.

Father Paul Provost, who had organized the evening for the Peace Committee, stood in front of the small room talking with the speaker. Paul was one of those shy self-effacing people who spend their lives serving soup in Bowery kitchens, registering black voters in Mississippi, searching slum tenements for health code violations, and reading the *Catholic Worker*. Yet he looked like a baseball pitcher or a clothes model and was not averse to admiring a bared thigh. Recently ordained, he worked with the city's Puerto Ricans and with Frank Kennedy in Berkeley Heights. He introduced us to Father Bonpane. The Maryknoll's dark features had the yellowish after-glow of long night hours, the markings of a hard year carrying his message across the country. He had a hoarse voice and eyes that seemed tough and a little sad. In the few seconds we looked at each other, he searched my face as though for some sign that would pigeon-hole me: friend or enemy.

My wife and I took seats next to Paul in the first semicircular row and looked around. I wondered where all the people had come from, for I had not expected more than a handful—our side and a tight rabble of right-wingers. There were many young people I didn't know. There were a few Vista volunteers. We waved to Father Frank Dumont, the theologian at the Montford Seminary in Litchfield. He looked like a pallid, fierce-eyed fox searching for revanchist heresy. With Kennedy, Inglis, and Provost, he was the fourth priest at the meeting—definitely a gathering of the Catholic Left, in exile at Trinity Church. Across the aisle from us were perhaps 25 Puerto Ricans—men in work clothes, women in black wool overcoats straight out of Garcia Lorca, and children of all ages. Undoubtedly, Paul had scoured the Puerto Rican barrio to find

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people willing to hear about their brothers in Guatemala. He had done a good job. Soon he quieted the room and introduced Father Bonpane.

It was another one of those talks—statistics on the infant mortality rate, malnutrition, disease, per-capita income—"now 2 percent of the people own 80 percent of the land"—a record of military repression, napalm from the U.S., antipersonnel bombs. At the start, there was some hesitation in the priest's voice, the slight tremor of a man about to speak truths which, though obvious to so many, are yet, even after all these years, terrifying to utter to an uncased audience. He wrote on the blackboard behind him: "THE ENEMY—THE ARMY —BRANCH OF U.S. ARMY." We supply the weapons, he said, the bullets, the bombs, the planes, the napalm, the expertise. Father Bonpane's voice sped up as the details accumulated. All the phrases so convenient for speeches repeated night after night—like The Speech of candidate George Wallace—all these phrases now tumbled out: "institutional violence," "military-industrial complex," "gringos," "United Fruit Company," "the United States thinks of them as things; they think of themselves as people," "a humanist revolution," "existential perspective," "armed resistance," "the guerrilla movement," "ten, twenty Vietnams," "CIA," "Special Forces troops," "Fascism." Father Bonpane's penchant for the neat phrase was so strong that he took to inventing his own, which smacked rather loudly of rejected advertising copy: "Selective Slavery," "Alliance for Profit"; but not everyone can come up with a line like "Put a tiger in your tank."

I noticed a bearded young man near me, scribbling in a notebook. He wore heavy-duty boots, dungarees, and a khaki fatigue jacket. He couldn't have been a reporter, yet his outfit looked too perfect for him to be one of us. He was as well-scrubbed as a Westport commuter on his way to work. Insidiously the word "spy" bored its way into my brain. For more than a year I had been carefully examining faces before opening my front door; every sound in the night became a gun-toting vigilante. I couldn't help it, even while I hated the low-octane paranoia on which my suspicions were based, the feeling that the world was made up of only two kinds of people—friends and enemies. Vietnam had taught much to the youth of America. We became petrified in a world view that might have been fabricated in the chambers of the FBI.

Perhaps it was my suspicion of the young man that made me eye the Puerto Ricans more closely. There were strange movements among them, whisperings, snickers. The women sat in their black coats with a universal sneer directed at Father Bonpane. When the priest said that students in Guatemala had begun to learn that only armed resistance could return the land to the people, an old man in a long, gray overcoat, who looked like he might at any moment dutifully pass a collection plate, laughed out loud, producing ripples of talk around him. Perhaps coincidentally with Father Bonpane's next reference to American imperialism, a pretty, olive-skinned girl of thirteen or fourteen stood up in silence. Everyone in the room looked at her nervously. Father Bonpane tried to ignore her, but her silent witnessing might have overcome him had she not been waved down by the old man in the gray overcoat. It was apparently not yet time—but time for what? we all wondered. The old man kept intermittent counsel with a Humphrey Bogart movie heavy sitting next to him, who was constantly shuffling a large sheaf of well-worn papers.

"Son gusanos," my wife whispered—"worms" in English, the Spanish pejorative for the anti-Castro Cubans who burrow through Mexico City en route to freedom in the U.S.A., where a man can be a man and fire-bomb consulates, theaters, and book publishers in New York in order to oust from office a man they don't like in Havana.

Father Bonpane's talk now became *re-*

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citative, like the Ordinary of the Mass, for everyone was watching for what the people my wife said were Cuban would do next. The young girl was not to be denied. She stood up again.

"I would like to know if you are aware of the fact . . ."

"I haven't finished," Father Bonpane snapped. "You can ask questions when I'm finished."

Again the man in the gray overcoat urged the girl to her chair, moving his hand up and down like a mother consoling a crying baby. As the priest continued, a little Oriental boy walked in.

"Hello, my little man," Father Bonpane said much too gaily.

I recognized the boy to be Reed and Martie Smith's adopted Korean son, but Father Bonpane looked as though he suspected more trouble, perhaps mistaking the boy for a Latin or wildly supposing him to be a Vietnamese orphan in American employ, somehow smuggled 13,000 miles into Trinity Church especially to sabotage the evening. When the boy sat next to his father, whom the priest was sure of (no spy would wear a madras shirt and Bermuda shorts) he seemed relieved.

AT LENGTH, looking somewhat like a man opening a cage full of lions, Father Bonpane asked if there were any questions. Every Latin over ten shot up his hand. The priest pointed to a woman seated on our side of the room who looked safe.

"I had my hand up first!" the Bogart movie heavy shouted.

"You'll get your turn," said Father Bonpane.

"We will be heard," said the man in the gray overcoat.

"I said you'll get your turn—Now, what was your question?" he asked the woman who looked safe.

"What can we do," she asked, "to get more information to the public about conditions in Latin America? The problem is that so many of us simply don't know what's going on."

As Father Bonpane was answering her, the Bogart movie heavy went up to the blackboard. He erased the priest's material and began to write:

1842 .....12 oz. meat
1968 ..... 4 oz. "
1842 ..... 6 oz. rice
. . . .

"What are you doing up there?" the priest asked.

"As you can see, Father, I am writing on the blackboard."

A roar of laughter from the Latins.

"No one invited you up there. Now please get down. You'll have your chance to talk."

"Don't listen to him, José. Go ahead and keep writing."

The Latins cheered, and, my God, the person who had shouted was Florence Foley, sitting in the last row. She must have just come in. Florence, as we affectionately called her, was the most dedicated right-winger in the Waterbury area. She had flaming red hair shooting in all directions, a face like unbaked dough, legs like bowling pins, and weighed in easily at 200 pounds. She could certainly stomp a pacifist to death as easily as a 250-pound black woman in Plainfield, New Jersey, could stomp a policeman. She toted her hate signs to every Peace Committee event, heckled every speaker, counterpicketed every Wednesday noon vigil. During the past two years she has passed out enough anti-Communist Christian Crusade and Minuteman literature to supply every household in Waterbury. She smiled at us, first-named us, cajoled us, and mocked us with implacable, winning confidence. Her cause was God's cause; with such faith she was as immovable as a mountain.

Father Bonpane returned to his answer, but the man Florence called José kept writing.

"I told you to get down."

"Dictator!" a Latin shouted.

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While Father Bonpane again returned to his answer—he was saying something about the *New York Times*—Paul Provost went and tried to reason with José, but to no avail. A jumble of statistics now filled half the blackboard. Then Jim Noonan stomped up the center aisle from his station at the back entrance.

"You've been told three times to sit down," he shouted. He grabbed José by the shoulder and half escorted, half pushed him to his seat.

Father Bonpane's timing was off, however, for he finished his answer just as José poised himself for action.

"I would like to ask you a question," he said, jumping up, "which I know you will have some little difficulty answering." He honed each syllable to a sharp point, stretching out the vowels to double or triple their normal length.

"Identify yourself," a student shouted.

"I am José Salazar from Hartford, Connecticut. I am the leader of the Cuban exiles of Connecticut, so I know what revolution does to a country."

The man in the gray overcoat leaped up. "We are all Latins here—Cubans and Puerto Ricans. We know Latin America, and this man is telling you lies."

The Latins burst into applause and shouts. A few men shook their fist. Florence's tuberous hands beat ecstatically in the back of the room. Father Bonpane tried, not too successfully, to resist the blood's urging simply to outshout Salazar and his friends.

"In Hartford we heard you praise Fidel Castro," said Salazar. "Are you aware of the 6,000 brave Cubans whom Castro has murdered?"

"What about the 30,000 American boys killed in Vietnam?" Bonpane fired back with as much logic as his opponent. Those 30,000 dead Americans—20,000 a year ago, 10,000 two years ago, 40,000 or 50,000 next year—who went silently over the hill for something named God or Country or anti-Communism or simply to satisfy the metallic taste in their mouths of desire to kill the gooks, those innocent boys and bloody henchmen of American imperialism, were forever nobly unfurled skyward in the speeches of every crass partisan of this fractured country from Tom Dodd to Blase Bonpane.

Suddenly, an attractive Cuban woman, perhaps thirty, took matters into her own hands. She lurched from her seat and began screaming as though in a fit of apoplexy. One heard through the flood of dry sobs and moans, "My father killed by Castro! My brother! I know! I know what revolution is! My family killed by that murderer!" Fury and grief overcame her. Three Cuban men rushed solicitously to her aid; they escorted her slowly to the rear.

After the room had settled down once more, José Salazar began The Speech. Father Bonpane apparently decided it would be impolitic, under the circumstances, to intervene. Using the statistics on the blackboard and others Noonan had prevented him from getting up there, he compared the life of black slaves in Cuba in 1842 to that of citizens of Cuba today. The interminable figures he read from his sheaf of finger-stained papers were as real, as solidly fleshy, to him and his friends, from Miami to New York, as were the signed confessions of Commander Bucher and his crew to their North Korean captors. Father Bonpane, the people listening to him, the millions of Castroist faithful in Cuba simply did not exist for these Cuban exiles, any more than those 83 living men from Dubuque and Tallahassee, who would blow it all once back in American hands, existed for the North Koreans. What counted were the statistics, *their* statistics. Reason is as fine and erratic as sand in a clear mountain stream; faith is the Rock of Gibraltar.

When Salazar ground to a stop under the tumultuous applause of his supporters and the "You tell 'em, José" 's tolling from Florence Foley, Father Bonpane asked, "What is your question?"

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"Do you support Fidel Castro in Cuba?" was all Salazar could think to ask, for that was what it all came down to.

The women in their black coats sat as grim and funereal as Salem judges: in the silence of their eyes Father Bonpane was already a condemned man. It was impossible to hear his defense over the shouts of the exiles, but he struggled on in good faith, and his supporters matched the Cubans an eye for an eye with shouts of "Let him talk!" and "Stop trying to take over the meeting." I wanted to shut the Cubans up too, but all I could think of were news shots of students disrupting Humphrey's campaign speeches. Though of course I believe—especially since my views have not always been the most popular at the forums of Waterbury—in the right of free speech, after Chicago I couldn't help feeling, against my better judgment, that Humphrey had forfeited that right.

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Each of those exiles had decided at some painful point during the last ten years that any supporter of Castro forfeited that right. So there we were—enemies.

As Lenin said somewhere, everything depends upon who controls the police.

Salazar talked about concentration camps in Cuba; Bonpane invoked the young draft resisters in prison here. Salazar berated the absence of democracy in Cuba; Bonpane made light of the choice between Humphrey and Nixon. ("What about Wallace?" someone yelled.)

Salazar was shocked by the confiscation without compensation of private property in Cuba; Bonpane was outraged by the bombs that destroyed villages and cities in Vietnam and Laos without compensation. Salazar blasted Viet Cong terrorism; Bonpane thundered that assassinating hated village chiefs was more humane than indiscriminately napalming women and children. And so they went on, like a very old record.

Salazar now stood in the center of the room machine-gunning statistics at anyone who would listen. Father Bonpane wandered from person to person, answering questions which I couldn't hear. Noonan and other's tried now and then to shut up Salazar, but they were shouted down by the Cubans and Florence Foley. Finally, the exiles apparently decided they had carried the day and it would be a long drive back to Hartford. In the middle of a Bonpane answer, the man in the gray overcoat stood up.

"*Vamonos,*" he said to his cohorts.

They gathered up the children with great to-do and scraping of chairs. As she stood up, a woman in the front row pulled the lapels of her coat violently against her shoulders as though some act was necessary to uncap the non-English-speaking anger in her heart. Walking past the priest, who was saying goodbye to the Cubans and telling them he would pray for them, she suddenly turned back, leaned forward, and spat. The saliva seemed to freeze in the air. It caught the light and like a great, newly cut diamond

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refracted it in all directions, then fell in a long, silver arc, tumbling heads behind it in my view, and spattered somewhere around Father Bonpane's waist. He, the entire room, fell silent. But José Salazar was not one to pass up an opportunity for a parting cannonade.

"Mister," he shouted from the door, "you are a preacher of hatred and violence. You are a traitor and no Christian."

He turned to go.

"Congratulations, José," said Florence, rippling from head to foot as she pumped his hand.

"Mr. Salazar," a student called from behind me.

Damn it, I thought, just let them get out of here. Didn't he see they were as intractable as cinder blocks?

"If Castro is so bad," the student went on, "why didn't you stay in Cuba and fight against him?"

Salazar paused. "I have a family," he said, "and no matter what, my family comes first." For the first time that evening he looked genuine; he looked genuinely sad.

"What he is saying," the man in the gray overcoat added, "what he is saying is that revolution has brought blood to Cuba, death, starvation, poverty. That is what revolution brings, and that man there preaches murder when he talks to you of revolution—murder and starvation."

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"I lost my family!" the woman who had choreographed the fit began again.

"Muchas gracias," my wife said as pleasantly as she could, *"y adios."*

The rest of us took up the cry: *"Adios, José, Adios. Adios."*

BUT THERE WAS one woman, Mrs. Fielding, who still did not understand the situation. She just did not see the flesh around the ideas of the evening. She lived on Bunker Hill in an eighteenth-century colonial cottage. Inside her home the breath of Yankee farmland, of lilacs and hay, still lingered, though the suburbs had long ago closed in upon her. She was a regular at the Wednesday noon vigils and attended all the Peace Committee lectures. She was on committees to start neighborhood houses in the ghetto and to transport black children to the country for summer vacations. She believed in her eighteenth-century cottage, in its power, its glory, its immortality.

"Mr. Salazar," she said, "don't you understand that there are so many things upon which we can agree? We here oppose political murder. We oppose concentration camps. We oppose starvation and poverty and dictatorship. So let's see how we can work together instead of shouting at each other and spitting. That isn't necessary. We all want peace. We all want justice. So for God's sake, let's work together while there is still time."

She was a true daughter of the eighteenth century. Salazar looked at her with a face bespeaking not a little knowledge of the history of the past few years. Working together meant as little to him as President Johnson's politics of consensus meant to the Black Panthers. He was more in tune with Che Guevara: "In revolution one wins or dies"; and he undoubtedly took heart from what *Time* magazine was so fond of pointing out: Che died.

"Come on, let's go," said the man in the gray overcoat.

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"God bless you, José," Florence Foley crooned.

"Go back to Guatemala! We don't want you," a woman finally dared to shout from the door.

The woman of the fit moved to the center of the room for a final flourish. Then she spotted my wife and rushed directly at us, perhaps because we had cut her off earlier.

"Castro killed my whole family! You understand?" she moaned.

My wife thought the woman was a Waterbury Puerto Rican we had both met. I didn't know, I couldn't remember. Fundamentally, it didn't matter one bit, for the dead family of her mind was the thing that was real to her—as real as the harmony of Mrs. Fielding's vision.

Once the Cubans were gone, the room exploded into talk. Once again the flannel American colossus burned in verbal effigy. I felt as though I were returning to a discussion after a trip to the men's room instead of after an absence of six months. A long time ago we had debated the hawks, laid out the facts, discussed militarism and racism with housewives and toolsetters, "not asking for much," as Gene McCarthy had put it, "just a modest use of intelligence." We picketed, we demonstrated, we politicked. We knocked on unfriendly doors during Vietnam Summer. We marched for peace in New York and marched for peace on the Pentagon. But the jingoism that oiled Communion breakfasts and Elks Club picnics mounted like a wave of lead so that here at Trinity Church I returned to what I considered the noblest minds of Waterbury to find them swept like refugees upon a desolate shore, talking a lost dialect. What else could they do? They had done everything but take up arms, for they were not yet ready to believe that Waterbury was Guatemala. What else could I do? I still wonder as I sit here writing. Perhaps some not unimportant men will read this story of my hometown, the hometown of millions. Perhaps they'll see a parable or two for America. But I'm not sure how this effort of mine serves the battle against the pietisms of the Immaculate Conception, the hypocrisies of the Citizens' Action Committee, the machismo of the Police Union. But it is at least an avenue that remains open. It is worth trying. It is an approach to the language of people.

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Burton Feldman

Robert Lowell: Poetry and Politics

NOTEBOOK, 1967–68, by Robert Lowell. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 161 pp. $6.00.

ROBERT LOWELL'S NEW VOLUME of poetry continues his passionate meditation on history selectively knotted up out of his personal torments, family and friends, his New England and religious ancestries, and the heroic or ruined underside of the past. What is strikingly new in this present volume is an obsession not so much with history as with immediate politics. This will be no surprise to anyone who has already read some of these poems published on political occasions in *The New York Review of Books,* or who has followed Lowell's recent, sometimes sensational career as a public man of the radical Left. Nor will it be surprising, in our current political clamor, if these poems are widely admired or piously approved simply for their partisan side. But it would be too bad, since in more than a few poems Lowell's radical views are as simplistic as those hatched by Protest placard-poets a tenth his weight. It would be too bad because in another way—less hotly relevant and thus likely to be scanted—Lowell's poetry cuts into politics at a deep, dark and savage angle we are not really used to in American poetry, or in American politics either.

If many disagree that Lowell is simply the greatest living poet we have, it is hard to see how anyone could deny he is our only poet whose language and temper have greatness in the older, terrible sense of the word: a royal, wrathful poetic power, rhetorically splendid and violent, rage barely bridled, a force which in earlier times was made for tragedy or for making tragedies. Lowell, the public and private man, is also of course a man of the Left. But what Lowell the partisan of the Left raises as politically important here, Lowell the poet ultimately seems to subvert. One result of this is an inner strain and unevenness, a roar of poetic force alternating uneasily with ardent but inconclusive and even sentimental gestures (which is perhaps why so many of these poems begin so well and end weakly, or vice-versa). No matter how the politico says Yes, the poet's No drowns it out, viscerally and savagely. What the poet says No to is power; and power—murderous, inwardly malignant, outwardly suffocating—is the only form politics really takes in these poems. Because power here has nothing to do with programs, parties, or laws, this finally makes Lowell's "politics" vague, but that may be the real point. Power or politics is the evil, universal condition of our lives. The *Notebook* is astonishingly and unrelievedly choked with corruption, pain and death. Lowell writes poetry *against* politics—against the enticing illusion of any political hope, even his own.

This needs to be said at once because a poetry so involved with politics may look at first like only another example of politicized poetry. We have enough of that. Still, that is partly a fair charge against this volume. Lowell himself invites it in many ways. All these more than 250 poems, Lowell explains in his afterword, are in fact a single poem, sprung mainly from the short short period between summer 1967 and summer 1968. His "plot rolls with the seasons." But as is clear from the page of "Dates" Lowell has appended at the end of the book, his poetic seasons here roll compulsively under the immediate political heavens.

These "Dates" open with "The Vietnam War, 1967" and close with "The Vietnam War,

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1968." In between are the headlines of that close span:

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SIX DAYS' WAR, first week in June 1967.
THE BLACK RIOTS IN NEWARK AND ELSEWHERE, July and August 1967.
CHE GUEVARA'S DEATH, October 8, 1967.
THE PENTAGON MARCH, October 21, 1967.
EUGENE MCCARTHY'S CAMPAIGN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION, November 1967–August 1968.
ROBERT KENNEDY'S CAMPAIGN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION, February 1968–June 1968.
MARTIN LUTHER KING'S MURDER, April 4, 1968.
THE COLUMBIA STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, April 23 into May 1968.
THE FRENCH STUDENTS' AND WORKERS' UPRISINGS, May 2 into June 1968.
ROBERT KENNEDY'S MURDER, June 5, 1968.
THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION IN MIAMI, August 5–9, 1968.
THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, August 21, 1968.
THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN CHICAGO, August 25–29, 1968.

These Dates preside without mercy, and beneath them, the poems sometimes comment directly, sometimes move off to other matters, with politics out of sight not out of mind and heart.

It might seem that here a politics and poetry of rage and outrage have found each other, both insisting on the tyrannic moment of war, riot, political murder and high sell-outs as the nonnegotiable authority for what political reality is. If so, perhaps another ideologic and blood alliance between our new politics and literature has been consummated. That certainly may have begun to happen in the novel, say with Mailer's recent history-as-novel or in Black Humor, or especially in the theater, directly in *Macbird,* indirectly in *Hair.*

All this shows most flagrantly in Lowell's enraged but too easy rhetoric on police and student demonstrations. At the Pentagon March, for example, the marchers are a "green army," greenly innocent, nobly natural; they are met by "the other army, the Martian, the ape, the hero. . . ." These "cocks of the new order, the Nordic Cop" elsewhere "smile and kick . . ./the hurt blue muscles work like testicles." As against the inflated sloganizing, Lowell can foretell the death of a student leader at Columbia by rising almost to pious martyrology. What spurs this campus orator is not simply blind ambition, blinder courage (or glands), but:

> it was his miracle that closed his eyes,
> when his whole face took on a flesh of wood

—and, listening to his electric orating, the student audience naturally understands "without listening"—"they too swayed/to the predestined poignance of his murder/. . . ."

Right after this consecration comes a poem degrading Grayson Kirk of Columbia by reducing the wrecking of his office to petty malicious details. Kirk is the "old king" who enters his study with the police. If his study is doubtless a bit upset, it is probably not really more messy than Lowell's own study if he let it go a month. To be sure, there are "frames smashed" (wittily: "their honorary honors lost") and files rifled ("all the unopened letters have been answered"). Poor old Kirk sees "woman-things that can't be his," and he comically fumes, "To think that human beings did this!" Meanwhile a police sergeant picks up some of Kirk's fuddy-duddy books, a "defiled *White Goddess* or is it/*Secret Memoirs of the Courts of Europe*?" And the sarge too talks funny: "Would a human beings do this things to these book?" This kind of writing is simply petty—or worse.

Writing directly against his political enemies or for his friends in this uncomplicated way, Lowell isn't very convincing. His targets don't seem monstrous or even dangerous, only grotesque; and after a while, Lowell's verbal artillery can seem like petulant overkill. He *does* convince us, though, that the police are not at all a very good way of getting at what's really wrong with us. Something is out of proportion, too, since Lowell often seems far less savage with some who are far more politically monstrous than the cops or Establishment. He can take a large, disillusioned view of "Munich, 1938," featuring Hitler and Mussolini, Daladier and Chamberlain pulling our strings. And World War II turns out a tragic farce explainable by picayunish pride: "Is it worse to choke on the vomit of cowardice,/ or blow the world up on a point of honor? . . . ." (That "point" of honor as a historic judgment is staggering!) "Stalin" is all underplayed restraint. What shot Stalin up the tree

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of power, to kill friends and millions of others? ". . . the usual lust to break the icon,/ joke cruelly, seriously, and be himself." One should also compare Lowell's overheated polemic against the cops or Kirk with his quite compassionate poem on Ezra Pound, whose politics come finally to seem a spur to a wiser humanity. We see Pound's "blotched, bent hands," while Pound says,

> When I talked that nonsense about Jews on the Rome
> wireless, she knew it was shit, and still loved me.
> And I: "Who else has been in Purgatory?"
> And he, "To begin with a swelled head and end with swelled feet."

To know is doubtless to forgive; and Lowell, of course, knows Pound. Well, whatever else, we know how depressing and debased but also how honestly confusing, ambiguous and complex our own immediate political troubles are. Nor shall all of Lowell's partisan piety or wit cancel out one bit of that living confusion. Lowell's invective works better if we close our eyes a little, much as with Shelley's famous, persuasive line on George III: "An old, mad, blind, despised, and dying king." That line has great force if we don't know more about that pitiable and by no means ignoble king than the official textbook version. But if we do, and if we did in 1819, Shelley's line turns cruel, a poetic example of the very political heartlessness that is being protested against.

STILL, EMPHASES LIKE THESE are not the final or best way to get at Lowell's deeper political vision. For his is a poetry turned over not to its smaller angers but its larger ones, not narrowly politicized but the opposite. It is poetry at war with what Lowell considers all political necessities, his own as well as those of others. That can be seen first by looking again at his list of "Dates." There, our local history is written down as all history used to be—as a chronicle of high event, of the wars, intrigues and successions of power and power-makers. Lowell has always seen history that way, and his politics follows suit. What other poet would—or could—comment on our politics by turning in the next line or poem to Tamerlane, Alexander, Joinville, Agamemnon, or find the right tribute for Robert Kennedy by using Plutarch? He can elevate us to historical magnitude; but with skewing effect also on the politics he handles. Reading Lowell we often awake to find the usual, recognizable fact of our world vanished, indeed annihilated. Nothing ever *is* in his poetry, but everything is daemonically:

> A repeating fly, blueblack, thumbthick—so gross,
> it seems apocalyptic in our house——
> whams back and forth across the nursery bed
> manned by a madhouse of stuffed animals,
> . . . like a plane
> gunning potato bugs or Arabs on the screen——
> one of the mighty . . . one of the helpless.

That is from the second poem in the volume, a poem to his daughter; but however mild or minute the subject, the remorseless rush and terror never ceases.

Lowell here or elsewhere isn't drumming the world up to intensity. His world and politics simply is like that, helpless or mighty, with little in between. He permits no importance or substance to the center. It is all heights and depths, a demonized realm, monstrously inhuman power above and what is all-too-human beneath. No mere citizen lives or could live in this poetic pressure, only gods or brutes—which may be a fair way of putting Lowell's corrosive view of politics. Whatever politics hopes to do or claims to know about them, men are never saved but ruined by becoming political. In Lowell's world, men in politics turn either into false gods or real near-brutes: above, Truman loses "a minute's sleep for Hiroshima," or Caligula slaughters; below, the cop or the "hero hired for terror." Only a few who make the grand refusal escape such corruption, but their escape is usually through death, ruin, or failure, like Thomas More or closer to home, Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, or Dr. Spock. As for the rest, for whatever reason, politics makes them all losers. Dundee "won the battle, lost his life and Scotland"; student leaders will be murdered, Che, Martin Luther King, all of us.

For Lowell, in fact, the single poisoned spring and truth of all politics seems nothing else but men murdering and murdered. There is hardly a poem in these several hundred that does not obsessively return to murder, almost as the metaphor of existence. Clausewitz toughly saw war as a continuation of politics

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by other means, but Lowell prophetically sees politics as murder continued by other means. War is murder extended; and power is murder extended deliriously, institutionally. Power is Attila, who "never entered a house that wasn't burning," who puzzles why the ancient world collapsed, but who leaves only his own refuse behind in turn; or it is Lenin, listening to Beethoven and thinking: "what we need are people to chop the head off." Or the "earliest sportsman" in history wakes a killer, "saw the red cane was sweet in his red grip." For Lowell politics is always political murder, the primal inexpungeable lust to kill; and it rolls evilly over the world like the corruption of the whale's viscera in his early poem. He can find murder in a grain of sand. In the poem mentioned before about the fly in his daughter's room: "I kill it," the poet continues, "and another instant's added/to the horrifying mortmain of/ephemera. . . ."

Perhaps this kind of vision is why Lowell succeeds in his new book only when conveying politics at its breaking point or beyond, or when evoking our own outsized response to such gross sins and dooms. Fitting that vision to the American scene isn't easy. Sometimes Lowell succeeds brilliantly, by details of our waste and deadness; sometimes, as on election night, the particulars themselves are desperate but dead, and we also get an ending as strained as ". . . now the fallen angels/open old wounds and hunger for the blood-feud," and so on. But like the unthinkable bomb, American political evils too often seem indescribable: our nightmares sprawl untidily, maddeningly intangible and synthetic. One has to read this volume straight through to see how narrowly American Lowell's political world remains. (Whatever his "Dates" proclaim, the rest of the world is only offstage.) We Americans hardly seem to have reached (yet) those real disasters and sins any German or Russian knows. Lowell's Vietnam or "the other army" at the Pentagon or Chicago is shorthand for what we are heading to. Still, we are not quite there. Lowell is faithful to this fact of American politics, by making the hell of that politics not the Inferno but Limbo. His poems give us the enraged helplessness of the man in the useless, empty vacuum left by power politics. Life there, and in these poems, is suspended animation. "We breathe, we live,/since our death is useless to killed or killing."

There is indeed something Kafkaesque about Lowell's America. He even has a vision where "my judge" (maybe "Saint-Just" or a mercantile ancestor) appears against a mongrelized modern setting; the poet approaches the "cleansing guillotine peeping" over the judge's shoulder, thinking, ". . . my last words,/no matter how unjust, no longer matter. . . . 'Why was it ever worth my while?' " Unlike the Kafka man, impotent in the only world he can know, Lowell fights back. Perhaps politics is the only heaven we have in sight now; perhaps God above is good, but "sees us all as straw dogs" and "finds no profit in descending here. . . ." But if ours is a world abandoned or near it, Lowell will not give an inch on its being still a sternly moral realm. His world is under almost suffocating spiritual pressure, squeezed now to a moral vacuum, but that vacuum—politics itself—is to be abhorred.

WHAT LOWELL NEWLY BRINGS to a poetry of this long-familiar political emptiness is just such abhorrence, expressed now as a music of rage. If rage is becoming one of our readier moods, this has little to do with Lowell's. His rage wells from an older, deeper source than most contemporary violence can command or even imagine. Christ, he says, is "our only king without a sword." But Christ, too turns the word "forgiveness to a sword." In Lowell, Christ's mercy is less a way of redeeming than a cause for cursing this world for its lack of mercy. So Lowell would rather affirm a politics that has failed than any more successful, i.e., more violent politics. Che Guevara was "gangstered down/for gold, for justice—" and once again that was "violence cracking on violence"; but Che was killed, the others lived, so Che is lamented. We are cursed most by our own itch to kill, and Lowell curses us for it.

He is truly one of those rare poets, a magnificent curser, probably the most formidable we have had in American poetry—a Baudelaire with a political conscience. That kind of cursing should not be confused with mere anger, or with some ice-cold misanthropy like Robinson Jeffers's. It is almost a category of poetic power by itself: Dante could curse, King Lear could curse (Timon

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of Athens only spat), Swift could, Melville could, Yeats could, Lowell can.

Perhaps it is Yeats whose political poetry can best help us understand Lowell's. Both can rage in a language at once harshly modern and traditionally splendid, and make it an instrument with which to invade the political mysteries. Yeats has a little conversation (Conor Cruse O'Brien once cited it) also prophetic for Lowell. One of Yeats's characters is reduced to saying:

> "It is not necessary to judge every one by the law, for we have also Christ's commandment of love."
>
> He turned and said, looking with shining eyes: "Jonathan Swift made a soul for the gentlemen of this city by hating his neighbors as himself."

This may be an antithesis for Yeats, but not for Lowell. Lowell reaches Swiftian disgust here because he so deeply affirms the Christian beginning point. He curses us out of love, not hate; but in a loveless world, hate can at least bite through. So: "If you want to make the frozen serpent dance,/you must sing it the music of its mouth." But where Yeats's political poetic raging spends itself powerfully and directly on its enemy, Lowell's curses are by comparison diffuse. In contrast to Yeats, he has a much less clearly defined political enemy out there, and infinitely much less clear a political program or goal. Yeats after all could flirt with some kind of fascism, that summary solution to all political difficulties. To speak of Lowell as on the Left—when we can hardly define in any clear political way what that label means now—puts the problem of his poetry neatly and painfully.

But because Lowell is nonetheless on the Left, his kind of political poetry is something new for us. Most of the great modern ragers at mankind like Yeats, or depreciators of modern culture like Eliot or Pound, only yesterday located themselves on the Right. What about Lowell? Does he want a Left in power? These poems make it hard to see that, and hard also to see why he is so drawn to the Left. What political action could help or ennoble us, without infecting us again, and worse, as we took it up? All political schemes, he tells us, are like the *Republic,* "steam from the ordure" of Plato's city-state or our own:

> This much still certain: whoever takes the sword
> must die by the sword, or someone else will die;
> it doesn't matter—injustice slays disorder—
> it doesn't matter, new establishments
> will serve the people, the people people serve.

Why then should Lowell support student and antiwar demonstrations, since they lead the good to the same violence as the vicious? A few pages after the Pentagon March poems, Lowell shows us the Nazis and Fascists . . . marching.

"I love you so. . . ," begins his poem to Eugene McCarthy. McCarthy, Lowell says admiringly, is "coldly willing/to smash the ball past those who bought the park." That "coldly" and that "smash" make one stop and think. Didn't Norman Mailer once describe McCarthy as looking like a hanging judge from hell? Lowell's poem slides by that conclusion; but then Lowell is always apt to deck out his political enthusiasms in kid gloves while making his immediate political enemies wear brass knuckles. And in Lowell's moving and noble tribute, Robert Kennedy is "like a prince" who daily left his "tower" to walk through "dirt" in his "best cloth." It is doubtless only niggling to insist that a real prince, as Kennedy may have been, could rule like a real prince: and for a real prince, getting involved in a Bay of Pigs (as the older Kennedy did), may be a sign of his genuine nobility.

Compared to Yeats or Eliot or Pound, maybe Lowell is less consistent, maybe simply inconsistent. But even when he rages against outrage, Lowell hopes against hope. He wants to be more humane, more generous, more open perhaps than any politics could afford to be and remain worthy. That kind of tension between what he hopes politically as against what he says poetically may be why this volume shows so few undeniably successful poems. Of the more than 250 poems here, perhaps only half a dozen turn out as good as Lowell's gifts always promise. In America now, those like Lowell, who for good or bad reasons

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distrust and even despise what politics is and has been, may find their natural home on a Left better at demonstrating against than legislating for. But in a time when American poetry is tiresomely private, or modestly dry about large events, or only childishly or revengefully political, Lowell is a poet who can dare to say that "Still, it's a privilege to enter the bullring." The bullring is a murderous place, but in Lowell's poetry there is a real man alone out there.

Jesse D. Clarkson

Over Thin Ice

EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1917–67, by Adam B. Ulam. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. $12.95; paper $4.95.

IN 1960, IN HIS BOOK *The Unfinished Revolution,* Adam Ulam gave promise of being a rising star in the field of Soviet studies. To be sure, his interpretation of Lenin suffered seriously from being a mere paraphrase of a book published in 1941 by a disillusioned and embittered émigrée, whose quotations Ulam did not take the trouble to check against Lenin's collected writings and speeches. (Even in his present work he on occasion cites as his authority for a quotation from Lenin a page reference, not to *Sochineniia* or *Polnoe sobranie,* but to one of his own previously published books.) *The Unfinished Revolution* nevertheless could be called a brilliant study, presenting ideological views that, though not original, at the time had not been generally accepted.

Since 1960 Professor Ulam has evidently read widely, though mainly secondary works, most of them in themselves excellent. He has also written several other books and become more pontifical in the process. The author himself acknowledges that, for the period after 1928, his "sources are mainly either official statements or revelations of defectors from the Soviet diplomatic service and the Comintern. Needless to say, both these sources have to be treated with caution" (see p. 193, fn. 97). Yet most of the book (572 pp. out of the 750 pp. of actual text) is devoted to this speculative period.

Even in the first part of the book much is left to be desired in a presumably factual *History of Soviet Foreign Policy.* In his opening chapter entitled "The Sources," Ulam devotes considerable attention to citing instances of continuity between Czarist and Soviet Russia, but he is unable to explain them. As a political scientist, not a historian, he cannot think in terms of material factors, such as geography, while "ideological" interpretation is here obviously of little use. In the second portion of this chapter, which deals with Marxism, he is on surer ground; yet he fails to clarify the extent of Lenin's departures, in practice, from Marxist doctrine, or the underlying reasons for these departures. Nor is it helpful to read his brief discussion of the Revolution, in which he often accepts slogans at face value. On page 42 he writes, "The March Revolution . . . started as a demonstration" though on page 33 he had simply written, "Food riots in Petrograd in March 1917 turned into a revolution."

Ulam accepts without cavil Kerensky's assertion that he was an SR (Socialist Revolutionary), and he finds that Kerensky's "pusillanimity" was the cause of his downfall. He does not explain how the Bolsheviks "achieved a majority" in the Second Congress of Soviets, nor does he explain Lenin's insistence that the overthrow of the Provisional government "coincide" with (actually precede) the meeting of that Congress.

The reader is left free to suppose that Lenin, for some reason, was from the outset in favor of making peace with the Germans, save for a parenthetical remark about "Lenin, as usual, more realistic than most" Bolsheviks. Ulam omits discussion of the struggles in the Central Committee, totally ignores Wilson's Fourteen Points, and substitutes a series of subjective judgments both as to Russian participants and Allied (and Associated) governments. The clarity of his presentation is not aided by his propensity for interrupting his narrative with anticipations ("as we shall see") of future developments (though sometimes he has the grace

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to admit: "but these reflections anticipate our story").

Ulam rarely offers statements of narrative fact; he is far more concerned with his own lucubrations. Therefore, his unrelenting efforts to discuss Soviet foreign policy in the early years yield no useful result, for at that time the Bolshevik government was not recognized anywhere abroad (Afghanistan was the first foreign government to recognize it, in 1920), and consequently there could be no foreign relations in any normal sense. He does not even mention Russia's repudiation of her foreign debts (in February 1918) until, in reply to the Allied invitation to the various regimes then existing in Russia (in February 1919) to meet at Prinkipo, Chicherin with tongue in cheek offered to review the question. All Ulam supplies is some account of Allied attitudes toward the Bolsheviks, against a background of his own imaginings of what the Bolsheviks were thinking.

The author envisions the Comintern in those years as peripheral to Russian foreign policy. He devotes only two paragraphs to the content of the "Twenty-one Conditions" (of 1920), while offering pages of "interpretation" of their role. At no point does he even mention the world depression that began in 1920, though it had a far more profound influence on Russian foreign policy than the depression that began in 1929, to which the book's index refers four times. The 1920 world depression was a major factor, both in the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy) and in the about-face made by the Comintern at its Third Congress (in 1921) on the question of world revolution. This Third Congress is dismissed in two paragraphs, though later Ulam offers extended discussions of the Sixth (1928) and especially of the Seventh (1935) Congresses, when the Comintern had lost what practical importance it ever had had.

There seems little need to comment on the major portion of this book (dealing with the period 1928–1967), which is a mélange of occasional profoundly true judgments incisively stated, of a mass of far-roving and long-winded, undocumented speculations which often verge on the psychoanalytic, and of sheer absurdities.

Why is no explanation offered when Bukharin, several times mentioned as leader of the "Left Communists," suddenly appears as a leader of the "Right Opposition"? The terms are correctly used, but why, in a book that so constantly stresses ideologies, is their significance nowhere explained? Bessarabia "had been a part of the Russian Empire" (when, how long, and under what circumstances?) but "had been seized by force by the Rumanians in 1918."

In his Preface Ulam quotes with unction,

> what I wrote elsewhere: "The student of Soviet affairs has as his first task to be neither hopeful nor pessimistic [why then so many injections throughout the text of the words *fortunately* and *unfortunately*?] but simply to state the facts and tendencies of Russian politics. It is when he begins to see in certain political trends the inevitabilities of the future . . . that he is courting trouble."

Yet, on page 247 he sums up Russian policy in the 1930s by remarking, "a strange fatality pushed events toward the crucial turns of 1939 and 1941."

Although the Preface is dated May 15, 1969, when Czechoslovakia under Dubcek's leadership was causing the Soviet Union immense worry, this aspect of Soviet foreign policy had evidently completely escaped Ulam's notice. It is true that his account of Russian foreign policy closes with a passing reference to the fiftieth anniversary celebration, but even then the Novotny regime was clearly in serious trouble; yet Ulam makes no mention whatever of Czechoslovakia after 1948, save for an evidently last-minute interpolation of six words in the midst of his account of Soviet troubles in Poland in 1956. There are some basic contradictions in Ulam's own opinions, but in so loosely written a book it is not surprising that even the author should forget what he has written 300 pages earlier. For example, on page 603 Ulam affirms that "any failures or near failures in Soviet foreign policy threatened [Khrushchev]—something which, as we have seen, was unimaginable under Stalin." On page 311, however, Ulam had remarked more perceptively: "There are limits even to the most absolute dictator's powers, and it is unlikely that Stalin could have acceded . . . to really demeaning conditions . . . and yet remained at the helm." Four pages later, the author

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wrote: "A temporary loss of territory might not affect the final outcome of the war, but it could spell disaster to Stalin." On the next page Ulam speculated that "it is conceivable that Stalin might have been replaced by the marshals."

The book may serve some of the purposes of political scientists (though one is not sure that any "science" is so interested in moralizing as is Professor Ulam), but historians will have to look elsewhere for a valid "analytical" account of Soviet foreign policy.

Norman S. Care

Views on Technology

TECHNOCRACY, by Jean Meynaud. Translated by Paul Barnes. New York: Free Press. 315 pp. $12.95.

THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY, by Peter F. Drucker. New York: Harper & Row. 402 pp. $7.95.

ON ONE VIEW, the development of what is called "technology" is a promise, not only of improvement in the material conditions of life, but also of peace and even social justice. Among the other views perhaps the most interesting sees in technological development the coming of a new and vicious bondage for men. New books by Peter F. Drucker and Jean Meynaud, both of which assume the need for technology, hit between these poles, but on the whole Drucker's leans toward the first and Meynaud's toward the second.

A French political scientist writing about "advanced" Western nations, with France as his chief example, Meynaud is mainly concerned with the political aspect of the development of technology—i.e. the usurpation by the "technocrat" of the voice in decision-making which traditionally belongs to the politician as the representative of the people. He believes the technocratic take-over is becoming a reality, and that a reassertion is needed of the political practices that vest decisions about social priorities in the people. This theme is not new, and Meynaud's treatment of it is made tedious by an excessive number of cautions against exaggeration, as well as a lumbering translation and a text spattered with misprints.

But this is not to deny the force of what he says. Examples of technocrats, for Meynaud, are higher civil servants and military leaders as well as members of the "scientific elite" linked with government at various levels. This variety of examples makes his attempts at defining the "technocrat" unhelpful. But he isolates certain features common to them, and these suffice to make clear the threat he has in mind. Among these features are a very high premium on "efficiency" in government, faith in the "rational analysis of social problems," and lack of accountability to the electorate, as a result of such career safeguards as tenure.

The chief value of Meynaud's book lies in his illustrations of how technocrats influence

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and even control decision-making in public policy. But I do not think he carries us much beyond illustration. We may grant that independent "experts" encroach upon traditional responsibilities of elected politicians, and intuitively we may see this as a danger. But we expect the theorist to explain and assess the encroachment so as to show how—or if—it is a danger.

What makes it possible for technocrats to emerge as holders of political power anyway? And why, exactly, should we object to their doing so? To the first question Meynaud provides several parts of an answer. He mentions that technocrats often employ the language of mathematics, which is opaque to the ordinary citizen, and that the apathy of most citizens "is a permanent factor of our political systems." But to the second question he provides little or no answer. What seems lacking here is an account of technology itself—the nature of systematic application of knowledge to social problems by so-called experts—that makes clear what, if anything, is special about how experts, in contrast to other political contenders, come to control decision-making, and what, if anything, is untoward about their rise to power.

Even if technocracy is a danger to representative democracy, how useful is Meynaud's proposal for reassertion of control by the people through their elected representatives? There is a lack of clarity about his use of the notions of "the people" and "politicians" at this point. If the reassertion he desires is really *of* the people *through* their representatives, then Meynaud's claim that apathy is permanent washes out his remedy for the threat of technocracy, and we fall into political pessimism. But if the reassertion is *of* the politician *for* the people, i.e. a demand, in Meynaud's words, for "more courage and forcefulness in the face of technocrats" on the part of politicians themselves, then apathy may be less cause for pessimism; but we are instead led to a picture of technocrats and professional politicians battling for power, with "the people" on the sidelines as apathetic, perhaps helpless spectators. The fault here lies in a lack of attention to the relationship between the people and their representatives. But the nature of that relationship is at least as important for Meynaud's aim of determining the threat posed by technocracy as that of the relationship between politicians and technocrats.

PETER F. DRUCKER, by contrast, is less concerned with the political dimension of the development of technology, though his book contains some fascinating discussion of technology itself. Drucker's aim is to characterize certain basic changes he sees occurring in economics, politics, and education. These changes he calls "discontinuities," and he argues that they involve radical departures from structures of social life that would be continuous with 19th-century science and liberal social thought.

For example, we are in the midst of a developing "world economy" with its own supranational credit and exchange mechanisms, rather than an "international economy" based upon commerce between independent national entities. Accordingly, we can begin to see a change in industries, from those based upon the productivity of workers whose skills are developed through apprenticeship, to giant multinational corporations operating relatively independently of nation-states. For these corporations productivity is a function of "knowledge workers" whose main concern is to exploit technology so as to respond effectively to the market demands of the world economy.

In general, knowledge workers are those who can analyze problems, whether they are commercial, social, or educational, into their components and then design programs for their solution which can in principle be carried out mechanically. They are a very different species from those involved in the industry of the past, e.g. they are school- rather than apprentice-trained, and their expectations and self-image are more those of the "intellectual" than the "laborer." The fact that their number is growing will have repercussions throughout our social life.

Drucker adduces vast factual and statistical material in support of his claims about trends in social change, and on the whole the case he builds is instructive and even exciting. What is to emerge from present discontinuities is a social life given structure by a complex system of organizations—business, health care, education, etc.—each of which is, and ought to be,

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autonomous in its own sphere of competence. Government is of course involved in the system, but not according to what Drucker believes is the currently accepted conception of government as a jack-of-all-trades, e.g. as a controlling agent for economic activity *and* a dispenser of welfare *and* prop for research of various sorts, *ad infinitum*. His claim is that liberal social thought has led us to overextend government, to view it mistakenly as *the* agency to which we can turn for solutions to any problems vaguely qualifying as "social." This is not the ideological conservative's point that governmental activity in areas in which private enterprise could operate is somehow immoral. Rather, Drucker's point is that any organization is limited structurally and by its command of competence in such a way as to exclude the performance of all but a few tasks. What government is primarily designed to do, as one organization among others, is to provide protection for citizens, and to provide the direction we describe as "determining social priorities."

THIS LINE OF THOUGHT seems internally coherent, as far as it goes, and it may even be attractive in quarters Drucker is inclined to oppose, e.g. the New Left. But it prompts the same question that arises in connection with Meynaud's work, that concerning the relationship between the people of a society and (in Drucker's case) the governmental organization which, amidst a system of organizations, is to perform the tasks of protection and decision.

Drucker believes that each autonomous organization ought to police itself in regard to the "morality of its knowledge," which I think means its impact upon people generally in society. There is need for moral self-control on the part of the new knowledge-based organizations, since "power always causes problems of morality," and, besides, "if the knowledge people refuse to tackle the problem, if they refuse to admit that a problem exists (as they still largely do), the community will inevitably tackle it." My initial trouble with this vital part of Drucker's account is that his overall scheme makes it unclear what meaning we can attach to the notion of "community," and thus to the notion of a community acting through its government to police an over-zealous organization or, more important, to establish priorities for social effort.

Consider Drucker's discussion of how government is to respond to the various organizations in the system:

> Government would become increasingly the decision maker, the vision maker, the political organ. It would try to figure out how to structure a given political objective so as to make it attractive to one of the autonomous institutions. It would, in other words, be the "conductor" who tries to think through what each instrument is best disposed to do.

The community, then, through its government, becomes a kind of social planning agency, but, so far as I can see, an agency deliberately lacking in power to back up its policy decisions. It must make the performance of a task "attractive to one of the autonomous institutions," which is to say that the implementation of the decisions of the people depends on the opportunities for "profitability" which determine the willingness of different institutions to take on whatever tasks are at stake.

But surely there are major social problems which cannot be "made attractive" to institutions like business and education, and cannot be turned into opportunities for "profit," and there are others which cannot be fitted into the logic of "tasks" and "performance" that Drucker seems to have in mind. The problems of compensatory justice that arise from a history of separatist racial practices, and of withdrawal from absurd foreign entanglements, are probably examples. It may be possible to make productive knowledge workers of black ghetto youth, but the motives of profit or condescen-

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sion from which a business institution might undertake such a project, assuming that the project could be made attractive to it, might well exacerbate the problems of attitude and conscience which are at the core of "racial troubles." And solving the problem of *whether* to withdraw (not the logistical problems of withdrawing) from a foreign adventure that has gone morally sour, is simply not a "task" to be "performed," no matter how adept we are at analysis and design. In general, a people whose decisions are to be implemented through a government which must "make attractive" these decisions to various enterprises (each of which has its own interests determined by its special competence and its own specification of profitability) is a people handicapped in setting its own course—even, in some cases, inhibited from setting its own course.

THESE TWO BOOKS, while both useful and informative, are essentially prologues to a theory of society and technology. They both stop short of what is the most troublesome problem in the development of technology, namely, its effects on the relationship of people to the instrument of government, by which they try to control, in some measure, certain aspects of their lives. Drucker intends to mark a contrast between his view and that of the New Left when he writes that the major concern of the society he sees emerging from discernible social changes "will be with making organization fully effective as a major instrument and tool of man and as a central organ of human society." I should think that any democratic radical would agree with this. The radical emphasis, however, would be upon organization as a tool *of man,* such that when people have their say about the direction of their lives, their technology obeys, despite criteria of profitability, productivity, performance, and the like.

Technology is not itself an insurmountable obstacle in the way of a humane society. But at the heart of an adequate theory of society and technology will be an account of the means by which the people's decisions concerning social priorities and directions can be realized as the society's decisions in these matters.

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

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